Ex parte Slavin, A--11821

Decision Date01 March 1967
Docket NumberNo. A--11821,A--11821
PartiesEx parte Eugene L. SLAVIN, Relator.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

William J. Salyer, San Antonio, for relator.

Robert Valdez, San Antonio, for respondent.

ORIGINAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

POPE, Justice.

Relator, Eugene L. Slavin, brought this original habeas corpus proceeding after the district judge held him in contempt and committed him to jail for three days and until he purged himself of contempt by paying $212.00 which the court found was the amount he had not paid under a child-support order. The question presented for decision is whether the terms of the child- support order are definite and certain enough to be enforced by contempt. Our opinion is that the order is ambiguous, and, therefore, the relator should be discharged.

Relator and his wife Gloria Slavin were divorced on February 8, 1963. The divorce decree awarded custody of the three minor children to Gloria. They were at that time aged four, nine and fourteen. The portion of the decree which ordered relator to pay support and which is in question is:

'The Defendant is further ORDERED to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($150.00) per month for the care, support and maintenance of the three minor children until said children attain the age of eighteen years, that the Defendant, EUGENE L. SLAVIN, shall pay the sum of THIRTY-SEVEN AND 50/100 DOLLARS ($37.50) each week for the care, support and maintenance of his minor children beginning with the 7th day of February, 1963, and shall pay a like sum on the Thursday of each succeeding week thereafter, * * *.'

The decree was sufficiently certain as long as all three of the children were less than eighteen years of age. Relator urges, however, that the order became reasonably subject to either one of two constructions after one of the children reached eighteen. Relator paid the monthly support of $150.00 until one year after the oldest of the three children reached eighteen. He then reduced the support payments proportionately and began paying $100.00 for the two children who were still less than eighteen. He urges that art. 4639a, § 1, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., only authorizes a court to order a parent to make payments for the benefit 'of such child or children, until same have reached the age of eighteen (18) years * * *.' Relator says that by his payment of $150.00 monthly for a year after the oldest child reached eighteen, he actually paid $318.00 more than he was required by law to pay. He says this construction of the support order is a reasonable one and is consistent with innocence.

The order is subject to another construction, one that would support the order of contempt. That construction is that the court which ordered relator to pay support intended that he would pay the fixed monthly sum of $150.00 until the youngest of the three children reached the age of eighteen. By such a construction, the father would continue to pay $150.00 to the two children beneath the age of eighteen, and when the second child reached that age, the sum would continue until the youngest child reached eighteen.

It is an accepted rule of law that for a person to be held in contempt for disobeying a court decree, the decree must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him. Walling v. Crane, 158 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.1946); Berry v. Midtown Service Corporation, 104 F.2d 107, 122 A.L.R. 1341 (2d Cir.1939); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956); Middleton v. Tozer, 259 S.W.2d 80 (Mo.Ct.App.1953); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 52 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 12 (1963). The underlying reason for this rule is that:

'The rights of the parties under a mandatory judgment whereby they may be subjected to punishment as contemnors for a violation of its provisions, should not rest upon implication or conjecture, but the language declaring such rights or imposing burdens should be clear, specific and unequivocal so that the parties may not be...

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