Ex parte Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1922
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 607.
• Citation: 93 So. 425,207 Ala. 531
• Parties: EX PARTE SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. STEAGALL
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

93 So. 425

207 Ala. 531

EX PARTE SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.

STEAGALL v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.

6 Div. 607.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 20, 1922

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1922.

Appeal from Petition for Certiorari to Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J. C. B. Gwin, Judge.

Proceeding by Sallie Steagall against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company to recover under Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act for death of her husband, Alpha Steagall. From a judgment for petitioner, defendant applies for writ of certiorari to the circuit court. Writ awarded, and judgment reversed and remanded.

See also, 206 Ala. 488, 90 So. 871.

Tillman Bradley & Baldwin, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Hill Hill, Whiting & Thomas, of Montgomery, and Mathews & Mathews of Bessemer, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

Alpha Steagall was killed, March 26, 1920, by an accident arising out of and within the course of his employment by the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company, to which we shall refer as defendant. September 14, 1920, Sallie Steagall, his widow, to whom we shall refer as petitioner, filed her petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act, approved August 23, 1919 (Gen. Acts 1919, p. 206), claiming compensation for the death of her husband, alleging that she was the sole surviving dependent of the deceased. This complaint was not verified, as required by section 28 of the act. On October 23, 1920, petitioner, by leave of the court, filed her amended claim or complaint duly verified and in substantial agreement with the provisions of the act. To the complaint thus filed defendant appears to have filed pleas (1) that there was no dispute between petitioner and defendant, that defendant had been ready and willing from the death of deceased to settle with petitioner according to sections 12b and 13 of the act, that the facts were substantially as set forth in the petitioner's petition, and filing therewith in writing a proposed settlement, which it offered to make with petitioner, subject to the approval of the court, as provided by the act, and (2) notice had not been given as provided by sections 19 and 20 of the act. Thereupon, October 23, 1920, the court made an order, reciting a submission on the amended complaint, demurrer to same, defendant's answer, demurrer to the same, and plaintiff's motion for judgment, overruling the demurrers, but denying judgment and dismissing the cause-

"on the ground that there is no controversy in this case as to the death liability of respondent under Compensation Act, the amount of compensation due, or any other matter of controversy requiring an adjustment in this court as contemplated by Compensation Act."

On November 5, 1921, petitioner, by leave of the court, filed a paper writing, duly verified, in which, to use the language of the paper, she renewed her petition for compensation under the act, referring to and adopting her original petition, as amended October 23, 1920, and defendant's answer, and set out again the facts on which she based her claim. Defendant demurred and pleaded, to state the pleas in brief: (1) The statute of limitations of one year, as provided by section 20a of the act; (2) that petitioner's claim had been adjudicated by the order of October 23, 1920; (3) that no notice had been given as required by sections 19 and 20 of the act, unless a suit which had been brought (in common-law form, and which had been disposed of on demurrer) constituted notice. The court sustained a demurrer to defendant's "verified answer"-meaning the pleas above stated-and proceeded to hear the cause upon the verified petition, determined the facts in writing, and gave judgment for petitioner, and the defendant now, by certiorari, brings the cause here for review.

The contention on behalf of defendant (appellant) is, in substance, that the judgment of the court rendered October 23, 1920, dismissing the cause, was final, and the action could not be reviewed by subsequent proceedings; that the new action was barred by the statute of one year.

All necessary facts being admitted, the court, on October 23 1920,...