Ex parte Snyder

• Decision Date: 31 October 1876
• Citation: 64 Mo. 58
• Parties: EX PARTE BABE SNYDER.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

64 Mo. 58

EX PARTE BABE SNYDER.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1876.

Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Boggess & Sloan, with Hall & Given, for Petitioner, cited: Mason vs. Woerner, 18 Mo. 566; 1 J. J. Marsh. [Ky.] 205, 206; People vs. White, 24 Wend. 520, 539, 540, 541; People ex rel. Kearney vs. Carter, 29 Barb. 208; Perkins, Treas., vs. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103; Craig vs. State of Mo., 4 Pet. 431; Buel's Case decided by Judge Treat in Eastern District of Missouri; Garland's case, 4 Wall. 333; Cummin's case, 4 Wall. 277; Murphy and Glover Test Oath cases, 41 Mo. 339; State vs. Steptoe, 61 Mo. 411; Jones, Ex parte, 27 Ark. 349; Perry vs. State, 41 Tex. 488; Hurd Hab. Corp. 331; Ex parteStrahl, 16 Iowa, 369; The People vs. Bradley, 40 Ill. 390; State ex rel. Henderson, vs. County Court of Boone Co., 50 Mo. 317; 27 Me. 114.

J. L. Smith, Att'y Gen'l, for Respondent, cited: State vs. Douglass, 50 Mo. 593; People ex rel. vs. Burgess, 24 Ill. 184; State vs. Carroll, 6 Am. Law. Rep. 754; Harbaugh vs. Winson, 38 Mo. 327; State ex rel. Craig vs. Dougherty, 45 Mo. 294.

SHERWOOD, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1867 the legislature created the Common Pleas court of Cass county. Subsequently, by the act of March 1873, probate jurisdiction was conferred on that court, as well as concurrent, original and appellate jurisdiction with the circuit court in all civil cases. By the second section of the amendatory act, an election for judge of that court was to be held in 1874, and it was held accordingly, and the present incumbent elected for the term of four years.

In March, 1875, an act was passed repealing the former acts, and establishing, in lieu of the Common Pleas court, a Probate and Criminal court, to be possessed of exclusive, original and appellate jurisdiction in all criminal cases, and a like jurisdiction in all probate matters, with certain exceptions not necessary to be enumerated.

This act was not to take effect until January 1, 1876, when the governor was to appoint a judge who was to hold office until his successor, to be elected in the fall of that year, was elected and qualified. This appointment and election have taken place, and the prisoner, whose application we are now to consider, was indicted, convicted of grand larceny, and is now in the penitentiary in execution of the sentence of the Probate and Criminal court.

This application necessarily involves the consideration of three points: First, whether the new Constitution, which dates from November 30th, 1875, prevented the act last mentioned from becoming operative; second, if such prevention did occur, the effect thereof on the case at bar, touching the validity of the conviction; third, whether the present is a proper method of procedure whereby such conviction may be called in question.

I.

Relative to the first point; It will be observed that the new Constitution (§ 3, p. 43) divides all common pleas courts existing and organized into three classes; providing that those in cities and towns having a population exceeding 3,500, and such as are presided over by a judge of the circuit court, shall continue to exist, etc., until otherwise provided by law, and that “all other courts of common pleas shall cease to exist at the expiration of the present terms of office of the several judges thereof.”

The Common Pleas court of Cass county falls within the last named class, if the words just quoted are to be received in their ordinary import. Receiving them in this manner we but adopt the advice of Judge Story, who says (Sto. Const. § 451): “Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties; for niceties of expression; for critical propriety; for elaborate shades of meaning; or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understanding. The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss.” Receiving these words, then, of the Constitution in the way thus pointed out, there is no room left except for the conclusion that the Common Pleas court of Cass county was given, together with all others of its class, a constitutional and permissive existence until the expiration of a certain period.

And on turning to another section (Const. § 1, p. 43), this view finds additional confirmation; for all laws in force at the adoption of the constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, are to remain in full force until altered or repealed by the general assembly, while “all laws (though not in force) inconsistent with the constitution shall cease upon its adoption.”

It will not be denied that the law establishing the Common Pleas court of Cass county was in force when the constitution was adopted, nor that such law was consistent therewith, nor will it be affirmed that the act creating the Probate and Criminal court of Cass county was in force when the constitution took effect. So that it would seem clear beyond question, that the constitution, by continuing the existence of the Common Pleas court of Cass county, until the expiration of the present term of the judge thereof (which will not occur until 1878), and by continuing in full force the law which gave that court its being, necessarily, and by inevitable implication, accomplished the virtual repeal of the act establishing the court whose existence is now being considered. Because the law which professedly abolishes the Common Pleas court, professedly creates the Probate and Criminal court. Both cannot, nor were they...