Ex parte State

• Decision Date: 27 October 1921
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 234
• Parties: Ex parte STATE. v. WHITE FURNITURE CO. STATE
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

90 So. 896

206 Ala. 575

Ex parte STATE.

STATE v. WHITE FURNITURE CO.

7 Div. 234

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 27, 1921

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

Petition by the State of Alabama for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review a judgment of such court on the appeal of the State of Alabama against the White Furniture Company, 90 So. 895. Writ denied.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., for the State.

P.E Culli, of Gadsden, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

This proceeding is by writ of certiorari to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this cause, holding that when personal property is sold on such terms as to constitute a conditional sale--that is, with a reservation of the legal title in the vendor until all of the purchase money is paid and an option in the vendor, upon the vendee's default in its payment, to either retake the property or enforce the payment of the debt--it is the property of the vendee within the meaning of the tax laws, and cannot be assessed as the property of the vendor, so as to require him to pay the taxes thereon.

Section 44 of the Revenue Act of 1919 (Gen.Acts 1919, p. 299) makes it "the duty of every person in every election precinct to *** render to the assessor under oath a full and complete list of all property of which he was the owner, or in which he had any interest whatever, or of which he was trustee or agent on the first day of October of that year."

Our assessment statutes take no account of qualified or conditional estates in personal property, and with respect to the duty of, and liability to, assessment for taxation they make no reference to legal and equitable, or general and special owners. It is not to be presumed that the Legislature intends that the same property is to be assessed against two persons, as the property of each, although one may have the legal and the other an equitable title thereto; or although one may have the general and the other a special property therein.

So when a statute requires that property be assessed to the owner, we think it means the general and beneficial owner--that is, the person whose interest is primarily one of possession and enjoyment in contemplation of an ultimate absolute ownership--and not the person whose interest is primarily in the enforcement of a collateral pecuniary claim and does not contemplate the use or enjoyment of the property as such.

It is well settled that when the vendee of real property is in possession under an executory contract of sale, he is liable to be taxed as the owner. Bowls v. Oklahoma City, 24 Okl. 579, 104 P. 902, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1299, and note collecting many authorities. The case of Tracy v. Reed (C.C.) 38 F. 69, 2 L.R.A. 773, cited to the contrary in 26 R.C.L. 358, § 315, is opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority.

In 27 A. & E.Ency.Law (2d Ed.) 678, it is said that:

"Assessments in the name of a person as owner who holds the equitable title to property and is in possession have been generally upheld as valid"--for which many authorities are cited.

It is, of course, to be conceded that the equitable ownership of an executory purchaser of realty is of a higher nature than is a like interest in personalty, and is more favored by the law; but for the purpose of taxation it is difficult to find any valid distinction.

This court has repeatedly said that the title of a conditional vendor of personalty is more than a mere lien for the security of...