Ex Parte State (in Re G.E.G. v. State ).

• Decision Date: 07 May 2010
• Docket Number: 1080779.
• Citation: 54 So.3d 949
• Parties: Ex parte State of Alabama.(In re G.E.G.v.STATE of Alabama).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

54 So.3d 949

Ex parte State of Alabama.(In re G.E.G.

v.STATE of Alabama).

1080779.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 7, 2010.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Stephanie E. Reiland, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.Submitted on petitioner's brief only.BOLIN, Justice.

The State of Alabama petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's denial of G.E.G.'s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 6, 2007, G.E.G. was indicted for two counts of first-degree sexual abuse; two counts of first-degree rape; two counts of first-degree sodomy; two counts of sexual torture; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia; and one count of second-degree possession of marijuana. With regard to the two drug-related charges, the indictment provided as follows:

“G.E.G. ... did unlawfully possess with intent to use, or did use, drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a pipe, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance, in violation of section 13A–12–260(c) of the Code of Alabama.

“G.E.G. ... did unlawfully possess marijuana for personal use, in violation of section 13A–12–214 of the Code of Alabama.”

Pursuant to a plea agreement, G.E.G. pleaded guilty to the one count of sexual torture of his seven-week-old daughter, see § 13A–6–665.1, Ala.Code 1975; possession of marijuana in the second degree, see § 13A–12–214, Ala.Code 1975; and possession of drug paraphernalia, see § 13A–12–260(c), Ala.Code 1975. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced G.E.G. to life imprisonment for the sexual-torture conviction and to 12 months in jail for each of the drug-related charges. The sentences were to run concurrently.

At the plea hearing on June 18, 2007, the following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: [G.E.G.], you have multiple counts here. I understand he is going to plead guilty to which counts, please?

“MS. JAMES [prosecutor]: He will be pleading guilty to Count 6, Count 9, and Count 10, and the rest will be nol-prossed as alternate counts.

“THE COURT: Then he will be pleading guilty to sodomy in the first degree. That's a Class A felony. Well, I am looking at the Case Action Summary. It could be an error. Let me look at the indictment as well.

“MS. JAMES: I am sorry, Judge. That will actually be Counts 8, 9, and 10, and Counts 1 through 7 will be nol-prossed as alternate counts. So he will be pleading guilty to the sexual torture, possession of marijuana second, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

“THE COURT: That does appear correct on the Case Action Summary. 9 is drug paraphernalia, 10 is possession of marijuana in the second degree, both of which are misdemeanors punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 12 months. What is the classification of Count 9, Ms. James? Is that a felony or misdemeanor?

“MS. JAMES: That's a misdemeanor, possession of marijuana.

“THE COURT: I am sorry. Count 7 [sic], sexual torture, what classification?

“MS. JAMES: That's a Class A felony.

“THE COURT: Punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years, no more than life. So two of them are Class A misdemeanors and the sexual torture you are saying is a Class A felony?

“MS. JAMES: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: So you looked at that, Ms. Williams [defense counsel]. Is that correct?

“MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: Two of these are punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 12 months in the county jail. One is not less than 10 years, no more than life in the penitentiary. Do you understand that?

“(Defendant confers with counsel.)

“THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to plead not guilty and have a jury trial?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: A jury trial is where twelve people are selected to hear the evidence and determine your guilt. Do you understand that? You have to speak up.

“THE DEFENDANT: I don't want a jury trial.

“THE COURT: I have to go through these rights with you before I ask you at the end if you want to plead guilty. Okay? So these are rights if you wanted to have a jury trial. A jury trial would be where twelve people are selected to hear the evidence and determine your guilt if you had one. Do you understand that?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: You have the right to see, hear, confront, and cross-examine each witness at that trial. Do you understand that?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: And do you understand that you have the right to testify yourself if you wanted to, but you wouldn't have to, and nobody could say anything about you not testifying?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: And you could subpoena witnesses to testify for you.

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: By pleading guilty, you are waiving all these rights. Do you understand all those rights?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: And you want to waive your right to a jury trial and plead guilty; is that right?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty?

“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

“THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything to get you to plead guilty?

“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

“THE COURT: Are you doing this voluntarily?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: And how do you plead?

“THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

“THE COURT: The State's evidence is?

“MS. JAMES: That the victim in the case is seven weeks old. [G.E.G.] is the victim's father. On or about September 1st, 2004 [G.E.G.] called the victim's mother at work, her first day back at work after having the victim in the case, and in that call [G.E.G.] told the victim's mother that the victim was bleeding and he was about to take her to the hospital. He also told the victim's mother at that time that he apologized for hurting the victim, that he wanted to die. Once he got the victim to the hospital, a nurse at the hospital saw that the victim was split from the top of her vagina to the bottom of her anus.

“[G.E.G.] at that time said that he had drank five beers and smoked some marijuana, rubbed baby oil over the victim, and at that time he thinks his fingers must have slipped and entered her vagina. The defendant also wrote a statement saying he put baby oil all over my baby and sexually abused her. The doctor in the case, Dr. Saltzer, after examining the baby, said the damage could not have been done by a finger, but had to have been done by an inanimate object or a sexual organ. And also the medicals in this case would show the victim was split from the top of her vagina to the bottom of her rectum, that she will also have future problems with her bowels, with her female organs, and also with controlling her bladder. And all of this happened in Montgomery County.

“THE COURT: Accept your plea, adjudicate you guilty.”

On July 24, 2007, the trial court sentenced G.E.G. On August 22, 2007, G.E.G. filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to the three charges. G.E.G. argued, among other things, that the record failed to establish a factual basis for any plea entered as required by Rule 14.4(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. On August 27, 2007, the trial court denied G.E.G.'s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. On September 19, 2007, G.E.G. appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed G.E.G.'s conviction for the offense of sexual torture but reversed the two guilty-plea convictions on the drug-related charges because it concluded that there was no independent factual basis to support G.E.G.'s admission that he smoked marijuana before he sexually tortured his child. G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.2008). The Court of Criminal Appeals, citing Boyington v. State, 748 So.2d 897 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), stated that G.E.G. was never seen with marijuana, that the record was silent as to the existence of drug paraphernalia, and that the indictment appeared to be based strictly on G.E.G.'s remark to the nurse who examined the infant that he had been smoking marijuana. The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that G.E.G.'s guilty plea may have relieved the State of its burden to present evidence; however, it reasoned, the underlying factual basis relied upon for bringing the indictment was insufficient to support a conviction because a mere “confession,” without any corroborating evidence, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Both the State and G.E.G. sought certiorari review. We denied G.E.G.'s petition and granted the State's petition.

Discussion

With regard to the requirement that a defendant's confession be corroborated to sustain a conviction, it has long been the rule in Alabama that the State must offer independent proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense to authorize the admission of the defendant's confession or inculpatory statement. Robinson v. State, 560 So.2d 1130, 1135–36 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). “While a confession is inadmissible as prima facie proof of the corpus delicti, it can be used along with other evidence to satisfy the jury of the existence of the corpus delicti.” Bracewell v. State, 506 So.2d 354, 360 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). The purpose of requiring that a defendant's confession be corroborated is to alleviate the concern that the confession could be false and the conviction thereby lack fundamental fairness.

“The purpose of requiring proof of the corpus delicti, as a condition precedent to the admission of a confession, is to insure its trustworthiness. For this reason, there is some judicial language to the effect that corroborative evidence independent of the confession need not be sufficient to establish corpus delicti but must be sufficient independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the confession.”

Charles W. Gamble & Robert J. Goodwin, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 200.13 at 1262 ...