Ex parte Textile Workers Union of America

• Decision Date: 24 April 1947
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 897.
• Citation: Ex parte Textile Workers Union of America, 30 So.2d 247, 249 Ala. 136 (Ala. 1947)
• Parties: Ex parte TAXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

30 So.2d 247

249 Ala. 136

Ex parte TAXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA.

7 Div. 897.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 24, 1947

Isadore Katz and David Jaffe, both of New York City, and Ling &amp Bains of Bessemer, for petitioner.

Horace C. Wilkinson, of Birmingham, and Chas. F. Douglass, of Anniston, for respondent.

STAKELY, Justice.

This is an original petition to this court by Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association, for a writ of prohibition or in the alternative for a writ of mandamus. The proceeding here grows out of certain rulings made by Hon Lamar Field, Judge of the Circuit Court of Calhoun County involving, among other things, the jurisdiction of that court. Upon issuance of the rule nisi, Judge Field filed answer. The cause is submitted here on petition and answer. We shall undertake to show that petitioner is entitled to mandamus, but not to prohibition.

On January 11, 1940, one Madge Richardson filed suit in the Circuit Court of Calhoun County against Textile Workers Union of Anniston, Alabama, and Vicinity, Local 204, Textile Workers Organizing Committee of the C. I. O., commonly known as Utica Local 204, Miss Virginia Browning, Miss C. Strickland and Mrs. Lillie Badgett. Process was served by the Sheriff on Textile Workers Organizing Committee and also on Miss C. Strickland, Miss Virginia Browning and Mrs. Lillie Badgett.

On February 26, 1941, the Honorable R. B. Carr, then Judge of the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, ordered a repleader. Pursuant thereto the plaintiff filed an amended complaint the parties defendant then being named as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association, Miss Virginia Browning, Miss C. Strickland and Mrs. Lillie Badgett. Thereafter Miss Virginia Browning married and became known in the proceeding as Virginia Browning Holloway.

In May 1941, the case was tried, resulting in a verdict of the jury and judgment against Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association, and Virginia Browning Holloway. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama rendered on October 7, 1943, is reported as Local 204 of Textile Workers Union of America et al. v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 37, 15 So.2d 578. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the Circuit Court of Calhoun County.

On September 18, 1946, the plaintiff amended her complaint by changing the caption to read as follows:

'Mrs. Madge Richardson, plaintiff, vs. Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association; Congress of Industrial Organization, an unincorporated association doing business in Calhoun County, Alabama as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America; Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association, doing business in Calhoun County, Alabama as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association, and Textile Workers Organizing Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organization, Local 204, an unincorporated association; Virginia Browning Holloway.'

At no time has there been any service of process except as hereinabove stated. On September 27, 1946, petitioner appeared specially in the Circuit Court of Calhound County for the purpose of filing pleas in abatement presenting in substance the defense that the court had no jurisdiction over the petitioner because there had been no service upon petitioner and because petitioner was neither present in or doing business in Calhoun County, Alabama, being a nonresident of Alabama with its home office in New York, N. Y. The plaintiff objected to the filing of the pleas in abatement and consideration of the pleas. On the same date the court sustained the objection. To this ruling petitioner reserved an exception.

Confronted with the adverse ruling petitioner elected to plead further to the merits, including pleas raising the statute of limitations. The case went to trial and at the conclusion of the evidence the plaintiff again amended her complaint to make the caption read as follows:

'Mrs. Madge Richardson, Plaintiff v. Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America an Unincorporated Association; Congress of Industrial Organizations, an Unincorporated Association, doing business in Calhoun County, Alabama, as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America; Congress of Industrial Organization an Unincorporated Association, alias, Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America; Textile Workers Union of America, an Unincorporated Association, doing business in Calhoun County, Alabama, as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an Unincorporated Association; Textile Workers Union of America, an Unincorporated Association, alias Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, and Virginia Browning Holloway, defendants.'

Upon the filing of the last mentioned amendment, petitioner attempted to refile its pleas in abatement which show that petitioner appeared specially for the purpose only of filing such pleas. The court sustained the plaintiff's objection to the filing and consideration of the pleas in abatement, petitioner reserving exception. The pleas to the merits, including the pleas of the statute of limitations, were then refiled to the complaint as last amended. The case then went to the jury, the only plea of the defendant being the general issue, the pleas of the statute of limitations having been charged out by the court. The result was a mistrial. The case will be set for trial again when the proceeding here has been determined.

According to the allegations of the petition Textile Workers Union of America is an unincorporated association existing under and by virtue of a constitution adopted by it in May, 1939. A copy of the constitution is attached to and made a part of the petition. The petition further alleges that petitioner is a nonresident of the State of Alabama and that petitioner is an International Labor Union with its home office in New York City, N. Y., and has affiliated with it numerous textile local labor unions throughout the United States of America, one of which is Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association located at the Utica Knitting Company in Anniston, Alabama; the petition further shows that Local 204 is a local of petitioner and exists as such local by virtue of a charter issued to it by petitioner on June 1, 1939, copy of which is attached to the petition and made a part thereof.

The answer of Judge Field concedes that the only service in the cause is as stated in the petition. In his answer he takes the view that whether the Textile Workers Union of America, petitioner, was for the first time brought into the trial of the cause by the amendment to the complaint, depends on whether petitioner was doing business in Calhoun County as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America at the time the original complaint was filed. His answer further shows that he is of the opinion and so ruled that if Local 204 was a name under which the Textile Workers Union of America was engaged in business in Calhoun County at the time the wrongs complained of were committed and that the real defendant in the case was sued and served under the name of Local 204, then there was no change in the real party defendant in the case. His answer further shows that he is of the opinion and so ruled that jurisdiction over Textile Workers Union of America turned on whether Local 204 was a separate and distinct organization wholly unrelated to the Textile Workers Union of America or whether the action of Local 204 was in truth and in fact the action of Textile Workers Union of America under the name of Local 204, the two organizations being really but one organization. The judge further shows in his answer that the foregoing questions were submitted to the jury for its determination under the general issue along with the other issues in the case.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations, an unincorporated association, which was also named in the foregoing amendments, has filed a separate petition seeking relief similar to that here sought upon allegations substantially similar to the allegations in the petition before us. The answer of Judge Field in that case is substantially the same as his answer in this case. Decision in this other case will turn on the decision in the case now under consideration.

It is an accepted principle that every court of general jurisdiction has the judicial power to determine the question of its own jurisdiction. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 46 S.Ct. 263, 70 L.Ed. 578; Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am.Rep. 13. This does not mean that the decision may not be erroneous, but it does mean that such a decision stands until set aside by the court of last resort (authorities supra), with the exception as to attack on the judgment of a sister state, a situation not here applicable. Haas-Phillips Produce Co. v. Lee & Edwards, 205 Ala. 137, 138, 87 So. 200; Kingsbury v. Yniestra, Adm'r, 59 Ala. 320.

We think it is plain that Judge Field has decided that jurisdiction over petitioner turns on whether petitioner is in truth the legal entity on which service was had. According to his ruling, if at the time of service, petitioner was doing business in Calhoun County as Local 204 of the Textile Workers Union of America, an unincorporated association, then petitioner by such service was then brought into court because instead of two separate legal entities there is but one legal entity. According to his ruling if petitioner was not in...