Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge

• Citation: 876 So.2d 459
• Parties: Ex parte TRONCALLI CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH DODGE, INC. (In re David J. Case v. Alexander Dodge Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., et al.).
• Decision Date: 12 September 2003
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

876 So.2d 459

Ex parte TRONCALLI CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH DODGE, INC.

(In re David J. Case v. Alexander Dodge Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., et al.).

1021135.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

September 12, 2003.

Nicholas B. Roth and Heather L. Necklaus of Eyster, Key, Tubb, Weaver & Roth, LLP, Decatur, for petitioner.

Charles E. Robinson, Jr., of The Robinson Law Firm, P.C., Ashville, for respondent.

WOODALL, Justice.

Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc. ("Troncalli"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court (1) to vacate its order denying Troncalli's motion to dismiss the claims of David J. Case against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (2) to enter an order dismissing the complaint. We grant the petition.

On August 20, 2002, Case sued Troncalli and Alexander Dodge Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.; the complaint contained the following factual allegations:

"COMPLAINT

"STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES

"1. Plaintiff, David J. Case, is a resident citizen of St. Clair County, Alabama.

"2. Defendant, Alexander Dodge Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as `Alexander Dodge'), is a domestic corporation doing business in Marshall County, Alabama.

"3. Defendant, [Troncalli], is a foreign corporation doing business in Cumming, Georgia.

"STATEMENT OF FACTS

"On or about June 29, 2001, [Case] went to Defendant Alexander Dodge to purchase a truck. Although Defendant Alexander Dodge did not have the particular truck [Case] wanted to purchase on their lot, they did locate such vehicle at Defendant [Troncalli] in Cumming, GA. [Case] paid Defendant Alexander Dodge for a 2001 Dodge Dakota pick-up truck. They, in turn, paid [Troncalli] for said vehicle. [Case] then went to Defendant [Troncalli's] place of business to pick up the vehicle.

"The 2001 Dodge Dakota which [Case] purchased was represented to him as being brand new. The vehicle had only nineteen (19) miles on the odometer when [Case] picked it up. However, sometime after [Case] purchased the truck the power window on the driver's side ceased to function properly. [Case] took the truck to Jim Burke Dodge in Birmingham, AL, to get the power window inspected. Upon inspecting the vehicle, the service manager at Jim Burke Dodge pointed out to [Case] that the paint on the driver's door of his vehicle did not match the paint on the remainder of the vehicle. [Case was asked] whether he had wrecked the vehicle. Naturally, this was the first knowledge [Case] had that his vehicle may not have been brand new when he purchased it.

"The service manager suggested that [Case] take his truck to a body shop for further inspection. Therefore, [Case] took the vehicle to Daffron's Body Shop in Pell City, AL. A technician at Daffron's Body Shop confirmed that the vehicle's driver door had sustained injury. [Case] and/or [Case's] insurance provider were forced to pay for having the damaged door and window repaired at Daffron's Body Shop."

The claims against the defendants included (1) "conspiracy to commit fraud," (2) bad faith, (3) misrepresentation, (4) deceit, and (5) breach of contract.

Troncalli did not answer the complaint. Instead, on September 19, 2002, it filed a "Special Appearance for the Purpose of Alleging Lack of Personal Jurisdiction." Troncalli alleged that it "had no contact with the State of Alabama in this transaction," and moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground. Troncalli subsequently supported the motion with a brief and the affidavit of Ryan Troncalli, its general manager. The affidavit stated, in pertinent part:

"3. [Troncalli] is incorporated in the State of Georgia, with its principal place of business in Cumming, Georgia.

"4. In or about June of 2001, [Troncalli] was contacted by [Alexander Dodge], a dealership located in Albertville, Alabama, regarding a dealer transfer purchase of a 2001 Dodge Dakota truck.

"5. David Case, the Plaintiff in the above-styled case, had approached Alexander Dodge regarding the purchase of a particular 2001 Dodge Dakota truck, but Alexander Dodge did not have that particular vehicle on its lot at the time.

Alexander Dodge located said vehicle at [Troncalli] through the use of a computer database locator, which is maintained by Chrysler and includes a list of all Chrysler vehicles which are delivered to its various dealerships.

"6. On or about the 29th day of June, 2001, [Case] picked up the vehicle made the basis of this suit at [Troncalli] in Cumming, Georgia.

"7. At the time of delivery, [Case] delivered a check ... payable to [Troncalli] by Alexander Dodge in consideration for the dealer transfer. [Case] also signed the Odometer Statement... on behalf of Alexander Dodge and accepted the Bill of Sale and the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin on behalf of Alexander Dodge.... As the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin indicates, the vehicle was transferred from [Troncalli] directly to Alexander Dodge.

"8. In the dealer transfer described above, the vehicle made the basis of this suit was sold wholesale directly to Alexander Dodge, and Alexander Dodge then made a retail sale of the same vehicle to [Case].

"9. There were no negotiations, whether by telephone, correspondence, email, or other communication between Troncalli and [Case]. Further, during the dealer transfer, there were no telephone calls, correspondence, email, or other communications made by or on behalf of [Troncalli] to the State of Alabama, whether to [Case], Alexander Dodge, or any other parties in connection with the dealer transfer.

"10. The State of Alabama is outside of the market area of [Troncalli]. [Troncalli] does not conduct business, advertise, market, or solicit customers in or from the State of Alabama, nor does it ship vehicles into the State of Alabama or otherwise conduct business or operate within the State of Alabama.

"11. All paperwork and money involved in the above-described dealer transfer, as well as delivery of the vehicle itself, occurred within the State of Georgia."

Case filed a response to the motion to dismiss and an "Alternative Motion to Continue to Allow the Plaintiff to Conduct Limited Discovery." In the latter motion, Case stated:

"[Case] is satisfied that this court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Troncalli as a matter of law based on its `specific contacts' with Alabama. However, if this court should disagree and rule that `specific [jurisdiction' is] lacking, it should allow a limited discovery period to allow [Case] to probe Defendant Troncalli's [contacts for `general jurisdiction' in] Alabama....

"[Case] could not possibly produce this information without discovery. In other words, this is a situation where Defendant Troncalli holds all of the cards. Although it filed its motion to dismiss on September 16, 2002, it has only recently filed affidavit testimony by its general manager on the issue of its general [jurisdiction] contacts with Alabama. This testimony has not been subject to cross-examination and, because the information sought lies solely in the hands of Defendant Troncalli, the only way for [Case to] probe this information is from written discovery and depositions."

(Emphasis added.)

On March 3, 2003, the trial court entered the following order:

"Motion to dismiss by Defendant [Troncalli] denied. [Troncalli] participates in a network which offers vehicles for sale to persons in Alabama. [Troncalli] knew the vehicles listed on the network may be purchased by residents of Alabama who would otherwise have no reason to visit the Defendant Troncalli's location in Georgia."

Troncalli then filed this petition, asking this Court to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Troncalli's motion to dismiss the complaint and to direct the trial court to grant its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The following principles are well established:

"[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper device by which to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. See Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Paul Maclean Land Servs., Inc., 613 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Ala.1993).' "An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."' Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So.2d 620, 623 (Ala.2002) (quoting Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 729 (Ala.2002)). Moreover, `[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.2002)."

Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866 So.2d 519, 525 (Ala.2003).

Jurisdiction is obtained over out-of-state defendants pursuant to the "long-arm" rule, Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a)(2)(A)-(I). Recently, we explained:

"`A physical presence in Alabama is not a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.' Sieber v. Campbell, 810 So.2d 641, 644 (Ala.2001). What is required, however, is that the defendant have such contacts with Alabama that it '"should reasonably anticipate being haled into court [here]."' Dillon Equities v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.1986) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).

"Depending on the quality and quantity of the contacts, jurisdiction may be either general or specific. Leventhal v. Harrelson, 723 So.2d 566, 569 (Ala.1998). `General jurisdiction applies where a defendant's activities in the forum state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic," regardless of whether those activities gave rise to the lawsuit.... A court has specific jurisdiction when a defendant has had few contacts with the forum state, but those contacts gave rise to the lawsuit.' Id.

"But regardless of whether jurisdiction is alleged to be general or specific, the nexus between the defendant and the forum state must arise out of '"an action of the defendant [that was] purposefully directed

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