Ex Parte Trottman

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Stuart
• Citation: Ex Parte Trottman, 965 So.2d 780 (Ala. 2007)
• Decision Date: 16 March 2007
• Docket Number: 1060073.
• Parties: Ex parte Regina Deloise TROTTMAN and Willie Ross. (In re T.W., individually and as next friend of J.T., a minor v. Russell County Board of Education et al.).

965 So.2d 780

Ex parte Regina Deloise TROTTMAN and Willie Ross (In re T.W., individually and as next friend of J.T., a minor v. Russell County Board of Education et al.).

1060073.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 16, 2007.

Mark S. Boardman and Philip F. Hutcheson of Boardman, Carr & Hutcheson, P.C., Chelsea, for petitioners.

Sam E. Loftin of Loftin, Loftin & Hall, Phenix City, for respondents.

STUART, Justice.

T.W., individually and as the next friend of J.T., her daughter, a minor, sued the Russell County Board of Education; Regina Deloise Trottman, individually and in her capacity as an instructional assistant at Mount Olive Elementary School; Dyanne D. Hood, individually and in her official capacity as secretary at Mount Olive Elementary School; Willie Ross, individually and in his official capacity as principal of Mount Olive Elementary School; C.W., then an 18-year-old former student of Mount Olive Elementary School; and others, alleging claims of assault and battery, negligence and wantonness, and negligent or wanton supervision or training. Defendants Russell County Board of Education, Hood, Trottman, and Ross moved for a summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to State-agent immunity. See Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000). The trial court entered a summary judgment for the Russell County Board of Education and Hood, but denied the summary-judgment motion as to Trottman and Ross. Trottman and Ross then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Russell Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for them on the basis of State-agent immunity. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts

On November 16, 1999, J.T., then an 11-year-old girl enrolled in the sixth grade at Mount Olive Elementary School, informed her teacher that she was sick and wanted to go home. The teacher instructed J.T. to telephone her mother. J.T. left the classroom and returned a few minutes later. About 45 minutes after J.T. returned the teacher was informed that J.T. needed to come to the office to check out of school.

Trottman, an instructional assistant, was assisting in the office that day and, at Ross's direction, was checking students in and out of the school. C.W., an 18-year-old former student at Mount Olive Elementary School, entered the office and spoke with Hood. Trottman did not overhear their conversation. C.W. then informed Trottman, outside Hood's presence, that he needed to check his sister, J.T., out of school. When J.T. arrived at the office, Trottman checked her out, permitting J.T. to leave with C.W.

After J.T. and C.W. left the school grounds, Trottman remarked to Hood that J.T. had a nice brother. Hood, knowing that J.T. did not have a brother, realized that J.T. had left the school grounds with C.W. under a false pretense. Hood and a teacher left the school grounds to search for J.T. They found J.T. in C.W.'s vehicle, which was parked in a vacant lot near his house. When Hood approached the vehicle, she could see that C.W. was sexually assaulting J.T.; Hood was able to stop the sexual assault before it was completed.

Standard of Review

"The standard governing our review of an issue presented in a petition for a writ of mandamus is well established:

"`[M]andamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Barber v. Covington County Comm'n, 466 So.2d 945 (Ala.1985). In cases involving the exercise of discretion by an inferior court, mandamus may issue to compel the exercise of that discretion. It may not, however, issue to control or review the exercise of discretion except in a case of abuse. Ex parte Smith, 533 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1988).'

"Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989)."

Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Ala.2000).

Discussion

Ross and Trottman maintain that the trial court exceeded the scope of its discretion when it refused to enter a summary judgment for them on the basis that they were not entitled to the protection of State-agent immunity as provided in Ex parte Cranman, supra. According to Ross and Trottman, they are entitled to State-agent immunity for the claim of negligent supervision of students because, they say, their conduct in allowing J.T. to leave the school grounds with C.W. fell within the discretionary function of educating and supervising students. Additionally, Ross argues that he is entitled to State-agent immunity on the claim of negligent supervision of personnel because, he says, his conduct fell within the discretionary function of exercising his judgment in supervising personnel and formulating policies.

In Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046 (Ala.2003), this Court set forth the law applicable to our analysis in a case like this one, stating:

"In [Ex parte] Cranman, [792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000)], this Court restated the doctrine of State-agent immunity as follows:

"`A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's "`(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or

"`(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as:

"`(a) making administrative adjudications;

"`(b) allocating resources;

"`(c) negotiating contracts;

"`(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or

"`(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or

"`(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or

"`(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students.

"`Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity

"`(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or

"`(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.'

"792 So.2d at 405 . . . .

"We have established a `burden-shifting' process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity. Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705 (Ala.2002). In order to claim State-agent immunity, the [State agents] bear the burden of demonstrating that [the plaintiff's] claims arise from a function that would entitle them to immunity. Wood, 852 So.2d at 709; Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So.2d 21 (Ala.2002). If the [State agents] make such a showing, the burden then shifts to [the plaintiff], who, in order to deny the [State agents] immunity from suit, must establish that the [State agents] acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond their authority. Wood, 852 So.2d at 709; Ex parte Davis, 721 So.2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998). A State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he or she `fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.' Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 178 (Ala.2000)."

874 So.2d at 1051-52.

A. Claim of Negligent Supervision of Students Asserted Against Ross and Trottman

Ex parte Cranman provides State-agent immunity for individuals who are "exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in . . . educating students." 792 So.2d at 405. Educating students includes not only classroom teaching, but also supervising and educating students in all aspects of the educational process.

In Ex parte Blankenship, supra, this Court held that a band director and a high school principal were entitled to State-agent immunity because they were exercising their discretion in educating students when they allowed a 19-year-old male, who was not a student at the school, to participate in the band. In Blankenship, the parents of C.S., a female band member, had asked Harold Blankenship, the band director, to keep C.S. and Jason Howard, the 19-year-old male, separated. When the band returned to Elmore County from marching at a football game in Troy, neither C.S.'s parents nor the parents designated by C.S.'s parents to pick up C.S. were available, even though C.S.'s parents knew that it was their responsibility to provide C.S. with a ride home after the trip. C.S. and a girlfriend left with Howard and his brother, who was at the high school to pick up Howard. At some point after that, C.S. and Howard engaged in sexual intercourse. When C.S. told her parents what had happened, C.S.'s parents reported the incident to the police. They later sued Blankenship and Louie Fryer, the principal, alleging that Blankenship and Fryer had failed to properly supervise C.S. by allowing C.S. to leave the school grounds with Howard.

Blankenship and Fryer moved for a summary judgment, arguing that their actions were protected under the doctrine of discretionary immunity. C.S.'s parents argued that Blankenship and Fryer had exceeded the scope of their discretion and were not entitled to immunity because they had allowed Howard, a nonstudent, to participate in the band when the guidelines established by the Elmore County School Board stated...