Ex parte Tyler. riginal

• Decision Date: 24 April 1893
• Docket Number: No. 17,O,17
• Citation: 149 U.S. 164,13 S.Ct. 785,37 L.Ed. 689
• Parties: Ex parte TYLER. riginal
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

149 U.S. 164

13 S.Ct. 785

37 L.Ed. 689

Ex parte TYLER.

No. 17, Original.

April 24, 1893.

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER:

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by leave of court March 7, 1893, by M. V. Tyler, sheriff of the county of Aiken, S. C., representing that he is unjustly detained by G. I. Cunningham, United States marshal for the district of South Carolina, to which the marshal made return upon a rule laid upon him to do so. The facts appearing from the petition, return, and accompanying documents are as follows:

On December 5, 1889, in the case of Bound v. The South Carolina Railway Company, Daniel H. Chamberlain was appointed receiver of the railway company by an order of the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, with the usual powers of receivers in such cases, and all of the property of the company was placed under his care and management, and protected by injunction. On March 7, 1892, the receiver filed a bill in equity in that court against the treasurers and sheriffs, 18 in number, in the counties through which the railroad in his possession passed, alleging that the treasurers were about to issue tax executions, and the sheriffs about to levy and seize thereunder property of the railroad company for the taxes for the fiscal year beginning November 1, 1890. The bill alleged that the taxes for that fiscal year were unconstitutional and illegal in part, upon various grounds set forth therein in detail, and involving an alleged wrongful and illegal raising of the valuation by the state board of equalization; that the levy and sale of the road would cause irreparable injury, preventing the receiver from carrying on the business of the railroad as a common carrier; that there was no adequate remedy at law; that a multiplicity of suits would be necessary to protect his rights, if he sued at law; and that the levy would cast a cloud upon the property,—and prayed for an injunction against the issue and levy of the tax warrants in question. The bill further set forth that the receiver had tendered, without condition, the taxes admitted to be due, and that the same had been refused by the county treasurers, but pending the motion for preliminary injunction the defendants were permitted to waive this refusal, and receive the amounts tendered, which was accordingly done. On April 8, 1892, the court, after full hearing, issued the injunction prayed for, and, the defendants having answered, it was provided by order of court that the testimony should be taken in due course in time for final hearing at the November term, 1893.

For the fiscal year beginning November 1, 1891, the receiver made a return of the property for taxes as provided by law, similar to the return he had made the year previous, and, the state board of equalization having again proceeded in the matter of the assessment and valuation as before, the receiver again tendered the taxes calculated on the valuation as returned, and not upon the valuation as assessed. The amounts so tendered were received, but tax executions or warrants were issued by the county treasurers for the difference between the return and the assessment, and on February 4, 1893, levy was made by Tyler, sheriff of Aiken county, upon property in the hands of the receiver at Aiken. There were apparently two warrants,—one for $1,215.14 and the other for $466.40,—and the value of the property levied on was $9,500. That property consisted of 14 freight cars, 5 belonging to the South Carolina Railway, 1 to another South Carolina company, and 8 to various railroad companies of other states. All of the cars were marked with the initials of the corporations to which they belonged, and most of them with the names of the owners in full. Eight of the cars were loaded with merchandise belonging to shippers. The cars were chained to the track of the South Carolina Railway Company, alongside of the only freight depot of the company in Aiken, and effectively stopped traffic through that depot for a period of 12 days. On Monday, February 6, 1893, the receiver filed his petition in the circuit court of the United States, alleging the illegality of the taxes for which the warrants were issued, in substantially the same terms as in the bill of the year before, and setting forth that he had paid the taxes admitted to be due; that the court in the previous case had decided a tax in all respects similar to be illegal,—and after disclaiming any intention to delay or escape the payment of the taxes due, and alleging that he was only doing his duty as an officer of the court, prayed that the treasurer and sheriff be enjoined from interfering with the property in the receiver's charge, and be committed for contempt for levying upon property in the custody of the court. The court issued a restraining order, and a rule to show cause, returnable at Charleston on February 20, 1893, as follows:

'Ordered, that an order do forthwith issue and be served upon said MacMitchell and M. V. Tyler, requiring, them to show cause before me on the 20th day of February, 1893, at 10 o'clock A. M., at the United States courthouse, Charleston, S. C., why they should not be attached and punished as prayed for.

'(2) That the said MacMitchell and M. V. Tyler do likewise show cause before me, at the same time and place, why they should not be enjoined and restrained from interfering with any or all of the property of the said South Carolina Railway Company, or other property in the possession and control of the said D. H. Chamberlain as receiver and officer of this court, or from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the officers and agents of the said receiver, and also from levying upon, advertising, or selling or in any manner whatsoever attempting to dispose of, the said property.

'(3) That the said MacMitchell and M. V. Tyler do likewise, in due course, file an answer, if any, why such further relief as may be necessary should not be granted in the premises.

'(4) In the mean time it is ordered that the said MacMitchell and M. V. Tyler be, and they are hereby, restrained and enjoined from levying upon, seizing, advertising, or selling, or in any manner whatsoever endeavoring to interfere with or to dispose of, the said property in the possession of the said D. H. Chamberlain as receiver of this court, until the hearing of the rule, and the order of this court thereon.

'(5) That a copy of the petition and order herein be forthwith served upon the said MacMitchell and M. V. Tyler.'

On February 8th a supplemental petition was filed by the receiver, reciting the filing of the original petition, the order thereon, and the service of copies of said petition and order, and stating that the sheriff refused to comply with a written demand, on February 7th, for the release of the property from his custody.

Accompanying this supplemental petition were affidavits stating the facts in detail, whereupon the order of February 6th was so modified as to require the respondents to show cause on February 11, 1893, instead of February 20th.

The respondents answered the petitions on February 12th, denying any unlawfulness in the assessment, and admitting that the property was in the possession of the court, but denied that such possession exempted the same from process of law for the collection of taxes by the state. They admitted the levy upon the cars, but denied any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief that anty of them belonged to corporations other than the South Carolina Railway, and denied that the levy seriously interfered with the receiver or the public in doing business over said road. They further denied that the facts stated in the original and supplemental petitions, if true, were sufficient to constitute a contempt of court, and insisted upon various matters, afterwards again set forth in the application for habeas corpus.

They asserted the legality and regularity of the warrants for the collection of the taxes, and that the levy was made in obedience thereto, and submitted that they were acting under the laws of South Carolina, as the officers and agents of the state, 'and as such engaged in the performance of their duties in issuing the said execution, in making the said levies, and in retaining possession of the property so levied upon, under the valid, constitutional laws of the said state, and that, if said petitioners have any controversy with any one in regard thereto, it is a controversy with the state of South Carolina, which is no way a party to these proceedings, and that there can be no controversy with the respondents in this regard unless they were acting without the commission and warrant of the state of South Carolina, and were trespassers, which they deny;' and, finally, they disclaimed 'any intention to treat this court or its orders with disrespect, and state that they have been actuated alone with a desire to discharge their official duties as officers of the state of South Carolina.'

This return was accompanied by a large number of affidavits tending to show the legality of the tax complained of.

A hearing having been had, the circuit court delivered its opinion, stating the facts briefly, and holding that the interference by the court by injunction was justified on the ground of excessive levy, and on the ground of the taking of property other than the property of the alleged taxpayer, but, further, that while property in the hands of a receiver of any court, either state or national, was bound for the payment of taxes,—state, county, or municipal,—yet that a receiver is not bound to pay taxes in his judgment unlawful, unless by the order of the court whose officer he is, and that in the present proceeding it was not competent for the court to go into the question of whether the tax was or was not illegal. The circuit court thereupon entered severally the following orders:

'This cause came on to be heard on...