Ex parte Webb

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JOHNSTONE, Justice.
• Citation: Ex parte Webb, 855 So.2d 1031 (Ala. 2003)
• Decision Date: 21 February 2003
• Parties: Ex parte David WEBB. (In re David Webb v. William E. Penney, Sr.)

855 So.2d 1031

Ex parte David WEBB.

(In re David Webb v. William E. Penney, Sr.)

1000651.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 21, 2003.

Duane F. Gordon, Huntsville, for petitioner.

George W. Royer, Jr., Jeffrey T. Kelly, and Kenneth D. Graves of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for respondent.

JOHNSTONE, Justice.

Petitioner-plaintiff David Webb petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Bruce E. Williams of the Madison County Circuit Court to vacate his order compelling Webb to arbitrate his claims against defendant William E. Penney, Sr.¹ We grant the petition and issue the writ. On December 7, 1999, Webb signed an application for employment with Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. That application contained an arbitration provision:

"I UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS A CONDITION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THIS COMPANY THAT I AGREE TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF MY EMPLOYMENT THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN THROUGH A LAWSUIT, AND THAT BY ACCEPTING EMPLOYMENT WITH THIS COMPANY I AM WAIVING MY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN THESE MATTERS." (Capitalization original.)

As a condition of employment with Bill Penney Motor Company, Webb signed a separate document entitled "ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BY BINDING ARBITRATION," which states:

"EMPLOYER: BILL PENNEY MOTOR COMPANY INC.

"EMPLOYEE: David G. Webb

"The Employer and the Employee mutually covenant, stipulate and agree, in connection with the Employer's employment of the employee and the resolution of any dispute arising out of such employment, as follows: That the Employer operates a business which involves and effects [sic] interstate commerce. That the Employee's activities while engaged by the Employer will involve and effect [sic] interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Employer and the Employee mutually agree that all disputes not barred by applicable statute of limitations or otherwise barred by law, resulting from or arising out of said employment (including but not limited to: the enforceability of this agreement, the terms of this agreement; the benefits and conditions of employment, including all fringe benefits associated therewith; the relationship between the Employer and Employee and other Employees of the Employer; the working conditions while employed; the terms manner and conditions of termination (voluntary and involuntary); the Employer's compliance with any state and/or federal employment and civil rights rules, regulations and laws; the terms herein contained, including but not limited to their breadth and scope, and any term of any agreement contemporaneously entered into by the parties concerning or arising out of said employment; that the Employer and Employee mutually stipulate and agree to submit such dispute(s) to BINDING ARBITRATION, pursuant to the provisions of 9 U.S.C. Section 1, et. seq and according to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association then existing in the county where the dealer maintains its principal place of business, except as follows: (1) The arbitrator empaneled to arbitrate this matter shall be selected by the Employer, with the consent of the Employee, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. In the event the Employee refuses to consent to any selection made by the Employer, then the Employer shall select an arbitrator, the Employee select an arbitrator and the two arbitrators so selected shall select a third arbitrator. (2) The prepaid arbitration filing fees and all other prepaid costs of the arbitration proceeding shall be paid by the party seeking affirmative relief. THIS ARBITRATION SHALL BE IN LIEU OF ANY CIVIL LITIGATION IN ANY COURT, AND IN LIEU OF ANY TRIAL BY JURY." (Capitalization original.)

Bill Penney Motor Company employed Webb in its "cleanup shop."

On April 27, 2000, Penney, the president of Bill Penney Motor Company, allegedly struck Webb in the face when Webb refused to clean Penney's personal automobile. On August 16, 2000, Webb sued Penney for assault and battery and for the tort of outrage. Relying on the separate arbitration agreement and the arbitration provision in the employment application signed by Webb, Penney moved to compel Webb to arbitrate his claims against Penney. In support of his motion to compel arbitration, Penney submitted an affidavit by Tim Rousell, the general manager of Bill Penney Motor Company, stating, in pertinent part:

"I have personal knowledge of the information contained in this affidavit.

"2. Defendant William E. Penney, Sr. is the president and 67% owner of Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Alabama, and is engaged in the business of buying and selling new and used automobiles, of servicing automobiles for retail sale and of selling automobile parts.

"3. Specifically, Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. purchases new and used vehicles and automobile parts for resale from out-of-state suppliers and vendors. Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. also sells new and used vehicles to persons and other entitles residing outside of the State of Alabama. Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. also sells parts to persons and entities residing outside of the State of Alabama. Furthermore, Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. advertises for potential customers outside of the State of Alabama. Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. also maintains a web site on the World Wide Web. On this web site, customers throughout the United States may obtain online financing, schedule service, order replacement parts, as well as obtain information on current discounts and incentives.

"4. To both facilitate these transactions and its business generally, Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc., employs persons in its `clean up shop' to clean new and used automobiles sold by Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. in the course of its business. Plaintiff David Webb was employed by Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc. in its `clean up shop.' The matters at issue in this lawsuit between David Webb and Bill Penney, Sr. occurred at the `clean up shop' at Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc., and occurred while David Webb was engaged in his employment at the `cleanup shop.'...

"5. As a condition of David Webb's employment with Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc., Webb agreed to settle any dispute arising out of his employment through binding arbitration rather than through a civil lawsuit. An arbitration agreement executed by David Webb specifically includes and provides for arbitration of all disputes `arising from or relating to ... the relationship between the Employer and Employee and other Employees of the Employer.'...

"6. In addition to the arbitration agreement signed by David Webb ..., David Webb also signed a separate arbitration agreement in connection with his application for employment at Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc.... In this arbitration agreement, David Webb agreed that as a condition of his employment with Bill Penney Motor Company, Inc., he `agree[ed] to settle any disputes arising out of his employment through binding arbitration rather than through a lawsuit....'"

Although Webb interposed several objections to Penney's motion to compel arbitration, the trial judge granted it and stayed the case "pending the completion of the arbitration process."

"A petition for the writ of mandamus [was] the appropriate means by which to challenge a trial court's order compelling arbitration." Ex parte Hood, 712 So.2d 341, 343 (Ala.1998). Compare Rule 4(d), Ala. R.App. P. (providing that on and after October 1, 2001, review of an order compelling arbitration, like review of an order denying arbitration, is by appeal). "[T]he standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel arbitration at the instance of either party is a de novo determination of whether the trial judge erred on a factual or legal issue to the substantial prejudice of the party seeking review." Ex parte Roberson, 749 So.2d 441, 446 (Ala.1999).

Webb states these issues for our review:

"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION HAS A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

"II. WHETHER WILLIAM PENNEY, SR. CAN ENFORCE AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN BILL PENNEY MOTOR COMPANY, INC. AND DAVID WEBB WHEN WILLIAM PENNEY, SR. IS NOT A SIGNATORY TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

"III. WHETHER THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN QUESTION SHOULD ENCOMPASS THE INTENTIONAL TORTS OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY/OUTRAGE.

"IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN QUESTION IS UNCONSCIONABLE."

Our conclusion on Webb's first issue pretermits the remaining three.

Unless a contract containing arbitration provisions, or unless a transaction evidenced by such a contract, substantially affects interstate commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act does not govern the contract and does not preempt § 8-1-41(3), Ala.Code 1975, which prohibits specific enforcement of a pre-controversy "agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration." Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869, 872 (Ala.1999).

"[T]he party moving for arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of a contract containing an arbitration clause, in a transaction that substantially affects interstate commerce. See Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So.2d 759, 765 (Ala.2000). If the party moving to compel arbitration fails to make such a showing, the burden of proof does not shift to the opposing party and the motion should be denied."

Ex parte Greenstreet, Inc., 806 So.2d 1203, 1207 (Ala.2001).

"The FAA renders enforceable any `written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,... or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal....' 9 U.S.C. § 2.... Thus, on its face, the FAA applies only to `tran

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