Ex parte Wood

Decision Date06 December 2002
Citation852 So.2d 705
PartiesEx parte J. Walter WOOD, Jr. (In re E.L., a minor child, by and through his friend, Sharon Love v. Walter Wood et al.)
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and T. Dudley Perry, Jr., asst. atty. gen., Alabama Department of Youth Services, for petitioner.

Robert D. Drummond, Jr., Montgomery, for respondent.

LYONS, Justice.

E.L., a minor child, by and through his next friend, Sharon Love, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, sued J. Walter Wood, Jr., executive director of the Department of Youth Services ("the Department"), and other fictitiously named defendants, on theories of negligence and wantonness, seeking damages as a result of Wood's alleged failure to provide adequate educational programs for children committed to the Department's facilities. Wood moved for a summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State or State-agent immunity in his capacity as the executive director of the Department. The trial court denied the summary-judgment motion, and Wood petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment on the basis that Wood is entitled to immunity from liability. We deny the petition.

The Department operates facilities for, and provides social and educational services to, delinquent youth committed to its custody in accordance with State law. As executive director of the Department, Wood implements the policies and procedures established by the Alabama Youth Services Board.1 Wood has worked in the juvenile justice system for over 28 years; he was appointed to his current position as executive director of the Department on July 19, 1999.

E.L. was adjudicated a delinquent and was placed at the Vacca campus operated by the Department on December 4, 2001. E.L. alleges that he and other class members at the Vacca campus have not received the curriculum and course of study mandated by State law. He states that he attends school for only two hours each school day, as opposed to the six hours required by § 16-1-1, Ala.Code 1975, and Rule 290-3-1-.02 of the Alabama State Department of Education. E.L. claims that during those two-hour classes he has received no educational instruction and that, instead, he and his classmates watch movies during class time at the Vacca campus.2 E.L. further asserts that Wood, as executive director, is required to periodically monitor the Department's programs to determine their effectiveness and whether they adhere to the Department's policy and procedure.

E.L. sued Wood, "in his individual capacity as Director" of the Department, seeking to represent all individuals committed to the custody of the Department and placed at the Vacca campus from February 12, 2000, to the present. E.L. is seeking compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs. E.L. contends that Wood is personally responsible for providing and implementing appropriate educational opportunities required by State law for those individuals committed to the custody of the Department. E.L. argues that Wood acted in bad faith by willfully denying E.L. and his class members "equitable and adequate" educational programs.

Initially, Wood objected to E.L.'s efforts to certify this case as a class action. Wood failed to respond to the request for production that E.L. filed along with his initial complaint. Instead, Wood sought to stay discovery in the trial court, or, alternatively, to limit discovery to those issues relating to his immunity from liability and/or class-action certification. E.L. filed a response along with a motion to compel production. The trial court did not rule on the discovery motions, but directed Wood to first file a motion to dismiss based upon immunity before it ruled on the discovery motions.

Instead, Wood filed a motion for a summary judgment; the motion was supported by his own affidavit. In its entirety, Wood's affidavit states:

"My name is J. Walter Wood, Jr., and I am the Executive Director of the Alabama Department of Youth Services. I was appointed to that position by the Alabama Youth Services Board on July 19, 1999. I have worked in juvenile justice and juvenile corrections for over 28 years.
"As Executive Director, I carry out the policy and procedure established by the Alabama Youth Services Board for the operation of the Department within the budget limitations established by the Legislature in the allocation of funds for the Department. I have reviewed the amended complaint filed by the Plaintiff in the case pending in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, styled E.L. v. Walter Wood, [C]ase No. 02-461-PR. All of my responsibilities in connection with the issues identified in the complaint require the exercise of judgment and discretion in carrying out state policy. The issues involve only the following: administration of the Department, allocation of resources, hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel, or otherwise exercising judgment in the discharge of my duties imposed by statute, rule[,] or regulation in counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind or educating students."

In his summary-judgment motion, Wood argued that he was entitled to State or State-agent immunity. The trial court denied Wood's motion for a summary judgment and questioned how it could consider the motion based on the information before it without allowing further discovery. Wood then filed his mandamus petition.

A writ of mandamus is a

"drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."

Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993); Ex parte Am-South Bank, N.A., 589 So.2d 715, 717 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Day, 584 So.2d 493, 494 (Ala.1991). While the general rule is that denial of a summary-judgment motion is not immediately reviewable by an appellate court, the exception to the general rule is that a denial of a motion for a summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is immediately reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus, Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996), or by a permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., Ex parte Franklin County Department of Human Resources, 674 So.2d 1277 (Ala.1996).

However, whether review of the denial of a summary-judgment motion is by a petition for a writ of mandamus or by permissive appeal, the appellate court's standard of review remains the same. If there is a genuine issue as to any material fact on the question whether the movant is entitled to immunity, then the moving party is not entitled to a summary judgment. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. In determining whether there is a material fact on the question whether the movant is entitled to immunity, courts, both trial and appellate, must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party, considering only the evidence before the trial court at the time it denied the motion for a summary judgment. Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala.2000). After reviewing the record before the trial court at the time it denied Wood's motion for a summary judgment, we conclude that Wood failed to meet his burden.

Wood argues in his petition that E.L.'s claims against him in his individual capacity are barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity and that E.L. should have asserted his claims against the State, not against Wood individually. Wood further argues that he cannot be held personally liable under the theory of respondeat superior when the Department is immune from liability, absent proof that he acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith.

E.L. argues that a writ of mandamus is inappropriate in this case because, he says, Wood failed to present evidence demonstrating that the claims asserted against him arise from his performance of discretionary acts. "`Discretionary acts' are defined as `those acts as to which there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and involving what is just and proper under the circumstances.'" Ex parte Davis, 721 So.2d 685, 688-89 (Ala.1998) (quoting Wright v. Wynn, 682 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.1996)). This Court restated the standard applicable in cases involving State-agent immunity in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000).3 E.L. agrees that certain aspects of providing education to children in the custody of the Department require the exercise of discretion and judgment; however, E.L. argues that compliance with the minimum number of hours of required curriculum per school day as established by State law involves no exercise of judgment on behalf of Wood.

This Court has established a "burden-shifting" process when a trial court is presented with the defense of State-agent immunity:

"`[A] State officer or employee is not protected by discretionary immunity if in performing his discretionary functions he willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad faith injures someone. [Nonetheless,] [o]nce a defendant demonstrates that a plaintiff's claims arise from the defendant's performance of a discretionary function [i.e., a function now entitling the defendant to State-agent immunity], the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted in bad faith or with malice or willfulness, in order to deny the defendant discretionary immunity from suit....'

"Ex parte Davis, 721 So.2d 685, 689 (Ala.1998) (citations omitted [in Ryan]).

"`In order to claim the benefits of [State] immunity, a State officer or employee bears the burden of
...

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