Ex parte WTM

• Decision Date: 17 May 2002
• Citation: 851 So.2d 55
• Parties: Ex parte W.T.M. (In re The matter of A.M.A., a minor). W.T.M. v. S.P. V.T. and E.T. v. S.P.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

851 So.2d 55

Ex parte W.T.M.
(In re The matter of A.M.A., a minor).
W.T.M.
v.
S.P.
V.T. and E.T.
v.
S.P

2001065, 2001064, and 2001069.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 17, 2002.

Rehearing Applications Denied September 13, 2002.

Certiorari Denied December 13, 2002.

851 So.2d 56

Kathryn L. "Sunny" Lippert, Birmingham, for W.T.M

Joe Morgan III, Birmingham, for V.T.

Douglas Rogers, Birmingham, for S.P.

Ginette A. Dow, Bessemer, guardian ad litem.

Alabama Supreme Court 1012370.

CRAWLEY, Judge.

The appeals in this case represent the third appeal of a judgment awarding physical custody of A.M.A., a dependent child now five and one-half years old, to her foster mother, S.P. See W.T.M. v. Department of Human Res., 736 So.2d 1120 (Ala. Civ.App.1999) ("W.T.M.I"); W.T.M. v. S.P., 802 So.2d 1091 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) ("W.T.M.II"). The father has also petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the juvenile court to award custody to the paternal aunt and uncle. The facts and procedural history were set out in W.T.M. II as follows:

"The parents of A.M.A. are not, and have never been, married to each other. In 1997, [the Department of Human Resources (`DHR')] filed a dependency petition, alleging that A.M.A., who was then an infant, was dependent because, it said, she had been born a `crack baby' and her mother, it claimed, was using cocaine and not providing adequate care for her. DHR obtained protective custody of A.M.A., and the child was placed in foster care.

"In February 1998, W.T.M., who had established a relationship with A.M.A. at birth, was judicially determined to be her father. In March 1998, W.T.M., along with his sister S.B., petitioned for joint custody of the child, alleging that W.T.M. had suffered a disabling stroke and was unable to care for the child without help. After a dispositional hearing in August 1998, the juvenile court ordered that the child remain in the custody of DHR, with foster-care placement. W.T.M. and S.B. appealed that order to this court, but the appeal was dismissed as untimely. See W.T.M. v. Department of Human Res., 736 So.2d 1120 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).

"In May 1999, V.T., another sister of W.T.M. and the child's paternal aunt, moved to intervene and, along with her husband, petitioned for custody of A.M.A. In June 1999, S.P., the child's foster mother, also moved to intervene and sought custody. The juvenile court granted both motions to intervene and, following a dispositional hearing, awarded custody to S.P. and granted specific

851 So.2d 57

rights of visitation to the father as well as to V.T. and her husband.

"The judgment states, in part:

"`After reviewing the law submitted by counsel for the parties, and hearing argument regarding the burden of proof required in this cause, this Court finds that said Petitions filed by child's Paternal Aunt and Uncle, and by child's Foster Parent should be considered as Petitions to Modify the child custody Order issued by this Court on August 7, 1998, granting custody of said child to [DHR]. In modification proceedings, the standard of proof is set out in [Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984)], whether a change in custody would materially promote the welfare of the child. The reason for this stricter standard is that uprooting children and moving them can be very traumatic.

"`This Court finds that there have been no substantial changes in circumstances as presented by the paternal Aunt and Uncle that would materially promote the welfare of the child by changing custody from the Foster Parent to the Paternal Aunt and Uncle. This Court notes that said child has been in the custody of her Foster Parent during the past 2½ years where according to DHR reports said Foster Parent has provided child with a loving, nurturing environment and excellent care. Due to the fact that said child was found dependent by this Court on September 23, [1997], pursuant to Title 12-15-71(a)(3)(c), Alabama Code 1975, a child found dependent may be awarded to a relative or other individual who, after study by [DHR], is found by the Court to be qualified to receive and care for the child. Therefore, the care, custody, and control of said minor child ... is hereby awarded to her Foster Parent [S.P.], with whom [DHR] placed said minor child approximately 2½ years ago.'"

802 So.2d at 1092-93. In W.T.M. II, this court held:

"[T]he trial court applied the McLendon standard, which was too stringent a burden of proof. Therefore, this cause must be remanded with instructions for the trial court to apply the correct standard, the `best interest' standard. See Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46 (Ala. 1994). In its determination of the child's best interest, the juvenile court should keep in mind § 12-15-62(c), Ala. Code 1975 (mandating that `[i]f a permanent plan is not presented [by DHR] to the court [within 18 months of an order placing a child in foster care] there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the child shall be returned to the family'); the decision in R.C. v. Nachman, 969 F.Supp. 682 (M.D.Ala.1997), aff'd, 145 F.3d 363 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that DHR has the affirmative duty to facilitate family reunification whenever that goal is possible); and § 12-15-1.1, Ala. Code 1975 (stating the legislative goal of family reunification in juvenile dependency cases).

"The judgment of the juvenile court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to apply the `best interest' standard to the disposition of this dependent child."

802 So.2d at 1094.

Citing Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46 (Ala.1994), this court remanded the cause to the juvenile court to apply the "best-interest" standard. The rule of Perkins is that when the trial court uses an improper, higher standard to deny relief to a party requesting a modification of a prior custody order, the appellate court will not

851 So.2d 58

review the evidence under the correct lower standard and direct the award of custody. Instead, the appellate reverses the judgment and remands the cause for the trial court to make a custody determination, applying the correct standard. Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d at 46-47.¹

On remand in this case, the juvenile court entered the following order:

"In accordance with an Order issued by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals,... instructing this Court to apply the `best interest' standard in this dispositional hearing of a dependent child, this Court finds that it is in the best interest of said minor child that her custody remain with [S.P., the foster mother] who has had physical custody of said minor child for the past 3½ years and has provided said child with a loving and nurturing environment, and excellent care. Child's Paternal Aunt and Uncle shall have the standard rights of visitation with said minor child as previously Ordered by this Court on March 7, 2000."

From the juvenile court's order on remand, the father (case no. 2001064) and the paternal aunt and her husband (case no. 2001069) appealed to this court. The father also petitioned for a writ of mandamus, directing the juvenile court to award custody to the paternal aunt and uncle (case no. 2001065). We hold that the juvenile court erred by determining that it was in A.M.A.'s best interest to be placed in the custody of her foster mother, S.P.

The juvenile court's factual findings—that S.P. had had physical custody of the child for 3½ years, that S.P. had provided the child with a loving and nurturing environment, and that S.P. had given the child excellent care—are fully supported by the record. However, those factual findings are insufficient, as a matter of law, to overcome the statutory policies and preferences expressed in § 12-15-1.1 and § 12-15-62(c), Ala.Code 1975.

Section 12-15-1.1 states, as a legislative goal for the juvenile court, that the court should "preserve and strengthen the child's family whenever possible" and should maintain "a preference at all times for the preservation of the family." See § 12-15-1.1(1) and (8). Section 12-15-62(c) states a preference for placing a dependent child who has been in long-term foster care with a relative over an unrelated caregiver.

Judge Murdock's dissenting opinion cites our decision in W.T. v. State Department of Human Resources, 707 So.2d 647, 651 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), for the proposition that § 12-15-71 gives the juvenile court "`the broadest possible range of placement options in the dispositional phase of a dependency proceeding.'" 851 So.2d at 67. It is true that, based on the law as it existed when W.T. was decided, the juvenile court was not required to give priority to placing a dependent child with a relative over an unrelated caregiver. After our decision in W.T., however, the Alabama statutes relating to the disposition of dependent children (§§ 12-15-62 and 12-15-65)

851 So.2d 59

were amended, effective April 22, 1998, to comply with two pieces of congressional legislation, namely: (1) the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) ("the ASFA") (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 and 675) and (2) the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-193, § 505(3), 110 Stat., 2104 (August 22, 1996), now codified, in relevant part, at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)

Most of the Alabama amendments appear at § 12-15-62(c) and § 12-15-65(a), (m), and (n). The 1998 amendments added three sentences to subsection (c) of § 12-15-62, the first two of which are pertinent here:

"The purpose of the permanency hearing shall be to determine the permanency plan for the child which may include whether, and, if applicable, when, the child shall be (i) returned to the parent, (ii) placed for adoption wherein the Department of Human Resources shall file a petition for termination of parental rights, or (iii) referred for legal custody. The permanency hearing shall determine whether the plan will include placement in another planned permanent living arrangement in cases where the department

...