Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County
| Decision Date | 07 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-5629,89-5629 |
| Parties | EXECUTIVE 100, INC., a Florida Corporation, Kings Ridge 239, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARTIN COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Elaine M. Catsos, North Palm Beach, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Stephen C. Page, Lee B. David, Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Stuart, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before JOHNSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and BROWN *, Senior District Judge.
This case arises on appeal from the district court's order of May 23, 1988 dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint as premature.
The plaintiffs, Executive 100, Inc. ("Executive") and Kings Ridge 239, Inc. ("Kings Ridge") (referred to together as the "plaintiffs"), purchased parcels of land in Martin County Florida. Executive's parcel is bordered on the south by County Road 714, and on the east by a new segment of Interstate 95 completed in 1987. Kings Ridge's parcel is between the Florida Turnpike and the new segment of Interstate 95.
The completion of Interstate 95 has added significantly to the development value of both parcels. In order to capitalize on this new value, both plaintiffs filed applications for amendments to the Martin County Comprehensive Land Use Plan to change the zoning of their parcels from agricultural/rural ranchette 1 to industrial. The County Local Planning Agency reviewed the applications and passed them on to the Board of County Commissioners of Martin County (the "Board"), which denied the zoning changes.
The Board, however, did grant an amendment to the Martin County Comprehensive Land Use Plan to change the zoning of two parcels along Interstate 95, owned by interests other than the plaintiffs, to industrial. One parcel was located at the interchange of Interstate 95 and County Road 76, and the other parcel was located at Interstate 95 and County Road 708.
The plaintiffs filed this suit under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, alleging ten counts: five on behalf of Executive, and an identical five on behalf of Kings Ridge. 2 Counts one and six alleged that the Board, by denying the rezoning requests, deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of law. Counts two and seven alleged that the Board's actions violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights. Counts three and eight alleged that the agricultural/rural ranchette zoning regulation is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Counts four and nine alleged that the prohibition of industrial use was so unrelated to the public welfare that it was a confiscation of property. Counts five and ten alleged that the Board wrongfully interfered with plaintiffs' prospective economic advantage.
The Board moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of legislative immunity and on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint was unripe. The district court found that the complaint failed to allege specific facts sufficient to preclude the application of legislative immunity and dismissed all of the claims against the defendants in their individual capacities. The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust state inverse condemnation proceedings that were available under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), and Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 563 So.2d 622, 628 (Fla.1990). 3 The court, therefore, dismissed all of the counts as unripe. 4 In this appeal, we first consider whether the district court erred in holding that the individual defendants were entitled to legislative immunity with respect to all claims in the complaint. We then consider whether the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs' complaint was premature.
This Court must review de novo the district court's order dismissing the complaint. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (11th Cir.1988); Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir.1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The motion to dismiss should be denied, however, unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1016. The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint must be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See id.
The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims against the Board members in their individual capacities because the plaintiffs claimed prospective injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. 5 The Board argues that the complaint did not seek injunctive relief against the Board members in their individual capacities. The Board also argues that claims for injunctive relief may be brought against government officials only in their official capacities, and not in their individual capacities, where the relief sought is an order concerning the defendants' official duties.
Local legislators are entitled to legislative immunity in this Circuit. DeSisto College v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 764-65 (11th Cir.1989). A defendant who enjoys official immunity from suits for damages may, however, be subject to suits for prospective injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1980-81, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984). Nevertheless, in the present case, none of the plaintiffs' counts ask for an injunction against an individual Board member. 6 Accordingly the plaintiffs do not ask for injunctive relief against the Board members in their individual capacities. The plaintiffs' argument, therefore, is baseless. 7
A plaintiff seeking to challenge a local government's refusal to rezone his property may bring four different causes of action. Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, at 719-23 (11th Cir.1990). First, a plaintiff may claim that the zoning applied to his land constitutes a taking of his property without just compensation in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 721 (). 8 Second, a plaintiff may claim that the zoning applied to his property goes too far and destroys the value of his property to such an extent that it amounts to a taking by eminent domain without due process of law. Id. at 721 (). Third, a plaintiff may argue that the regulation, either on its face or as applied, is arbitrary and capricious, does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and therefore is an invalid exercise of the police power. Id. at 721-22 (). 9 Finally, a plaintiff may claim that the zoning denies him equal protection of the laws, either because it treats a suspect class differently from others, because it affects a fundamental right, or because it treats a non-suspect class differently and is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. at 722 (). 10
1. Counts One and Six of Complaint
The Board asserts that the plaintiffs' claims are not ripe because the plaintiffs have not proposed alternative zoning so as to reach a final determination of the nature and extent of development that the Board will permit on the plaintiffs' land. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986), the Supreme Court stated that "[o]ur cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it." Id. at 349, 106 S.Ct. at 2567. In MacDonald, the Court refused to hear the plaintiff's just compensation claim after its first development plan was rebuffed because the state courts had "le[ft] open the possibility that some development [would] be permitted, and ... le[ft] [the Court] in doubt regarding the antecedent question whether appellant's property ha[d] been taken." Id. at 352-53, 106 S.Ct. at 2567-68. Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff's just compensation claim would not be ripe until the plaintiff reapplied for a permit to pursue a less ambitious development plan. Id. at 352-53 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. at 2568 n. 9.
Counts one and six of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the Board deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of law. These claims are due process takings claims. 11 In order for these claims to be ripe for adjudication, the plaintiffs must obtain a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinances to their property, including denial of variance applications. 12 Eide, at 721, 720; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352-53, 106 S.Ct. at 2567-68. In the present case, the plaintiffs do not allege that they have sought variances or pursued alternative, less ambitious development plans. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' due process takings claims (counts one and six) are not ripe and should be dismissed.
2. Counts Two and Seven of Complaint
Counts two and seven of plaintiffs' complaint allege that the Board's actions violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights. These claims, which are based on allegations that the Board's action had no rational basis, are not barred by MacDonald 's reapplication requirement. See Eide, at 724 n. 12. In order to establish the ripeness of their equal protection claims, the plaintiffs must show only that the Board has made a final decision denying commercial zoning. Ei...
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