Executive Limousine Service, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, s. 78-1623

• Decision Date: 04 April 1980
• Docket Number: 78-1624,Nos. 78-1623,s. 78-1623
• Citation: 628 F.2d 115
• Parties: EXECUTIVE LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC., a Virginia Corporation, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, Appellant, v. The Honorable Neil E. GOLDSCHMIDT, Secretary of the Dept. of Transportation, et al. EXECUTIVE LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC., a Virginia Corporation, Appellant, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. The Honorable Neil E. GOLDSCHMIDT, Secretary of the Dept. of Transportation, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 115

628 F.2d 115

202 U.S.App.D.C. 115

EXECUTIVE LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC., a Virginia Corporation, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, Appellant, v. The Honorable Neil E. GOLDSCHMIDT, Secretary of the Dept. of

Transportation, et al.

EXECUTIVE LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC., a Virginia Corporation, Appellant, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. The Honorable Neil E. GOLDSCHMIDT, Secretary of the Dept. of

Transportation, et al.

Nos. 78-1623, 78-1624.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 18, 1979.

Decided April 4, 1980.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Civil Action No. 76-1210.

Maxwell A. Howell, Washington, D. C., for appellant Executive Limousine Service, Inc., in No. 78-1624.

Gregory Paul Barth, Gen. Counsel, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, Washington, D. C., with whom Joel C. Weingarten, Associate Gen. Counsel, Washington Area Transit Commission, was on brief, for appellant in No. 78-1623.

William J. Birney, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert ^*, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Michael J. Ryan, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellees.

Also Gregory Paul Barth, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission in No. 78-1624.

Before McGOWAN and LEVENTHAL ^**, Circuit Judges, and PENN ^***, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge McGOWAN.

McGOWAN, Circuit Judge:

This case presents a jurisdictional dispute between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC or Commission) over for-hire ground transportation of passengers from Dulles International Airport.

On June 30, 1976, Executive Limousine Service, Inc. (Executive), brought an action for declaratory judgment and for an injunction to prevent the FAA and Greyhound Corporation (Greyhound) from impeding Executive's efforts to offer certain transportation service at Dulles that had been authorized by the WMATC. ¹ The Commission intervened as a plaintiff. The District Court initially issued a temporary restraining order, but then dissolved it and denied a preliminary injunction. ² On appeal, this court affirmed the denial of the injunction. ³

Cross-motions for summary judgment were then filed in the District Court, and a hearing was held on April 21, 1978. By Memorandum Opinion and Order filed May 3, 1978, the District Court granted the FAA's motion and dismissed the complaint. ⁴ This appeal followed.

For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand to the District Court.

I

On September 11, 1974, Executive and the FAA entered into a contract authorizing Executive to provide scheduled limousine service from Dulles to three hotels in the District of Columbia. ⁵ The WMATC already had granted Executive a certificate of public convenience and necessity (certificate) for this service. On March 26, 1976, Executive obtained a WMATC certificate to provide limousine service to a fourth hotel, the Hyatt Regency. ⁶ The FAA permitted Executive to serve the Hyatt Regency on an interim basis until the expiration of its initial contract on June 30, 1976. The FAA subsequently advised Executive that the expanded service could not be included in a proposed renewal contract because the FAA was party to a contract that purported to grant Greyhound the exclusive right to provide limousine service from Dulles, excepting only the three hotels that Executive already served. Executive pointed out that it had obtained a certificate for the additional service from the WMATC. The Director of the Metropolitan Washington Airports responded, on behalf of the FAA:

(T)he WMATC has the authority and responsibility to award certificates of public convenience and necessity for ground transportation within the Washington metropolitan area. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), however, under our statutory authority for the operation of Dulles Airport and Part 159 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, has the right to control business activity at the airport, including the operation of motor vehicles for hire, by requiring that such activities be conducted under prescribed terms and conditions. Specifically, this means that ground transportation for hire from Dulles Airport may not be provided unless that right is specifically granted by contract with the FAA. The fact that WMATC has awarded you a certificate of public convenience and necessity does not exempt you from the necessity of entering into a contract with the FAA for the right to operate motor vehicles for hire on the airport, nor does it require the FAA to enter into a contract for such purpose. ⁷

The FAA accordingly tendered a renewal contract that excluded service to the Hyatt Regency. Executive signed it in order to continue operating, and instituted this action challenging the FAA's refusal to contract for the additional service.

Both the FAA and the WMATC assert jurisdiction over the transportation at issue here. The Administrator of the FAA traces his authority over Dulles airport to the Second Washington Airport Act, as amended (the Act), D.C.Code §§ 7-1401-12 (1973), which Congress passed in 1950. Section 7-1404 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

The Administrator shall have control over and responsibility for the care, operation, maintenance, improvements, and protection of the airport, together with the power to make and amend such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to the proper exercise thereof.

In addition, D.C.Code section 7-1406 in general terms grants the Administrator authority to contract for supplies and services at the airport:

The Administrator is authorized to contract with any person for the furnishing of supplies or performance of services at or upon the airport necessary or desirable for the proper operation of the airport, including but not limited to, contracts for furnishing food and lodging, sale of aviation fuels, furnishing of aircraft repairs and other aeronautical services, and such other services and supplies as may be necessary or desirable for the traveling public.

Control over ground transportation is not specifically granted in either section of the Act.

Acting, as he saw it, pursuant to the statutory authority contained in these provisions, the Administrator promulgated regulations governing motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire at Dulles. Those regulations provide, in pertinent part:

(a) No person may operate a taxicab or other motor vehicle on Dulles International Airport for the purpose of picking up a passenger for hire unless he operates in accordance with one of the following conditions:

(1) He has a contract with the United States authorizing him to pick up passengers for hire on that airport. ⁸

The WMATC, on the other hand, asserts jurisdiction under the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Regulation Compact (the compact). Congress authorized this interstate compact in 1960 ⁹ and amended it to include Dulles in 1962. ¹⁰ Article I of the compact provides:

There is hereby created the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit District, hereinafter referred to as Metropolitan District, which shall embrace the District of Columbia, the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church, the counties of Arlington and Fairfax, and political subdivisions of the State of Virginia located within those counties and that portion of Loudoun County, Virginia, occupied by the Dulles International Airport and the counties of Montgomery and Prince Georges, in the State of Maryland and political subdivisions of the State of Maryland located within said counties, and all other cities now or hereafter existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area bounded by the outer boundaries of the combined area of said counties, cities and airport. (Emphasis added.)

Article II sets forth the jurisdiction of the WMATC:

The signatories hereby create the "Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission," hereinafter called the Commission, which shall be an instrumentality of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland, and shall have the powers and duties set forth in this compact and such additional powers and duties as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the signatories. The Commission shall have jurisdiction coextensive with the Metropolitan District for the regulation and improvement of transit and the alleviation of traffic congestion within the Metropolitan District on a coordinated basis, without regard to political boundaries within the Metropolitan District, as set forth herein. (Emphasis added.)

Article XII describes the transportation services covered by the compact. It provides, in pertinent part:

This Act shall apply to the transportation for hire by any carrier of persons between any points in the Metropolitan District and to the persons engaged in rendering or performing such transportation service . . . .

II

The parties agree that, pursuant to the Property Clause, ¹¹ the Congress has plenary power over property that, like Dulles, belongs to the United States. They also agree that Congress may delegate some of its authority to an agency. The question presented by the instant case can be stated relatively simply: With respect to the regulation of ground transportation from Dulles, what authority was delegated to whom?

We think that Congress, in creating the WMATC and in specifically extending the WMATC's transportation authority to include Dulles Airport, intended that the WMATC regulate the transportation of passengers from the airport.

We have seen that Congress in 1950, in vague and general terms, gave the FAA "control over and responsibility for the care, operation, maintenance, improvements, and protection of the airport," D.C.Code § 7-1404, and also authority...