Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co.
Decision Date | 14 December 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 45.,45. |
Citation | 54 F.2d 510 |
Parties | EXNER et ux. v. SHERMAN POWER CONST. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Warren R. Austin, of Burlington, Vt., and Homer L. Skeels, of Montpelier, Vt., for appellant.
C. Menzies Miller, Frank E. Barber, and Ernest W. Gibson, Jr., all of Brattleboro, Vt., for appellees.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
This is an action in tort, brought by Delia H. Exner to recover damages to her person, property, and business which were caused by the explosion of dynamite kept by the defendant company in connection with work upon a hydroelectric development at Bellows Falls, Vt., in which it was engaged. The plaintiff Frederick Exner, the husband of Delia H. Exner, was joined as a plaintiff because he sought to recover damages for injuries to his marital rights.
The defendant kept dynamite in a small hut on the westerly bank of the Connecticut river located conveniently to its work. This hut was approximately 935 feet from the dwelling of the plaintiffs, in which they rented rooms and apartments and carried on a restaurant and lunchroom. The dynamite hut was located close to a thickly settled part of Bellows Falls, and within fifty rods of five dwelling houses, a hotel, several factories, and business buildings belonging to persons other than the plaintiffs.
Mildred Wolfel, one of defendant's witnesses, who observed the explosion from the New Hampshire side of the river, 300 or 400 feet from where it occurred, said that she saw two men coming out of the dynamite hut carrying boxes; that she saw a flash and a ball of fire and then another flash, and experienced an explosion so severe as to throw her across the road. The hut was blown to atoms by the explosions, and three men engaged in getting the cases of dynamite to take down to the place along the river where the blasting was to be done were killed.
There was evidence that Mrs. Exner, the plaintiff, who was in bed in her house at the time of the explosion, was thrown out of bed and received injuries, that her house was so badly shattered as to require extensive repairs, and that her business was damaged. The accident occurred on February 18, 1928.
The principal storehouse of the dynamite was on the eastern or New Hampshire side of the river. From that, dynamite was brought in an automobile across the bridge and placed in the hut to be warmed so as to be in condition for use when needed for blasting. Evidence was introduced that twenty cases of dynamite, weighing fifty pounds each, were sent from the storehouse across the river to the hut the day before the explosion, and that three such cases were still on hand in the hut before the additional twenty cases were brought to it. The morning of the explosion, an order had been given to send fourteen boxes across the river to the hut, but they had not been taken over prior to the explosion. There was evidence that after the explosion one of the witnesses picked up as much as two fifty-pound cases of unexploded dynamite at the scene of the explosion and found four or five more in a tool box thirty to fifty feet from the hut. The general foreman of the defendant testified that about one thousand pounds of dynamite were ordinarily required for daily use in blasting, but on some days when the company was not doing much drilling much less than one thousand pounds would be used.
The defendant's president testified that there was no place where the dynamite hut could be located that would be accessible to the work that would not be within fifty rods from an inhabited dwelling, and, if it had been placed beyond that limit, the dynamite would necessarily have been too cold for use before it reached the job and would have been carried more frequently than was the case through the streets of Bellows Falls, to the greater peril of the inhabitants. He also said that the hut was adopted as a place to store a supply of dynamite for daily use after a hearing before the deputy fire marshal of the state, and with his consent.
There is a statute of Vermont (Rev. Laws 1880, § 4323 now G. L. 7109), the consideration of which is involved in this case, which reads as follows:
Section 13 of No. 147 of the Acts of the Vermont Legislature of 1919 also provides:
The plaintiff's declaration, as amended, contained four counts, under each of which an amount of dynamite in excess of fifty pounds was alleged to have been kept at the place of the explosion and within fifty rods of a building inhabited by another than the defendant:
(1) Alleging a violation of section 4323 of the Revised Laws of the state of Vermont.
(2) Alleging a violation of regulations of the state fire marshal.
(3) Alleging the negligence of the defendant in the handling, storing, and keeping of dynamite.
(4) Alleging excessive and heavy blasting operations by the defendant.
While not one of the counts was formally dismissed, the court, in its charge, disregarded everything except violation of section 4323 of the Vermont Revised Laws and held that there was an absolute liability for the damage if the jury found that section 4323 was transgressed by keeping more than one fifty-pound package of dynamite in or about the dynamite hut and within fifty rods of an inhabited building of a person other than the defendant.
Upon the case as submitted to the jury we must determine whether, under section 4323, or under the common law, the defendant became liable, irrespective of any fault, for the damage arising from the explosion.
The defendant was not, in our opinion, liable to the plaintiffs for a violation of section 4323. It is well established that only members of a class to be benefited can invoke a civil remedy by reason of such a statute as we have here. Molin v. Wisconsin Land & Lumber Co., 177 Mich. 524, 143 N. W. 624, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 876; Kinney v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 310, 22 So. 593, 37 L. R. A. 497, 67 Am. St. Rep. 119; Ives v. Welden, 114 Iowa, 476, 87 N. W. 408, 54 L. R. A. 854, 89 Am. St. Rep. 379. The plaintiffs inhabited a dwelling more than fifty rods from the dynamite hut, and the act in terms covers only an area within a radius of fifty rods from the place of storage. If there had been no inhabited dwellings within that zone, the plaintiffs would have incurred the same risk as in the present case and would have suffered the same damage from the explosion, yet ex hypothesi the statute would not have been violated. It is impossible to see how the plaintiffs were of the class intended to be benefited by a law forbidding storage of dynamite within an area in which they were not included. It is true that the act contained a provision for fines for continued violation, after notice from an inhabitant of the town to remove the dynamite. But that clause was intended only to afford ample means for informing the storer of the dynamite of his violation of law and to enable inhabitants of the town outside the forbidden area, even busybodies, to benefit those within it by setting penalties in motion. We see no reason to suppose that a general interest in having laws observed or in helping people within the zone extended the protection of the statute to all inhabitants of the town. The plaintiffs were not of the class to be benefited. Any reasoning which would embrace them would be applicable even if they had lived in a corner of the town five miles away.
In Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322, 23 N. E. 389, 7 L. R. A. 262, 19 Am. St. Rep. 34, where a statute forbidding the storage of dynamite within twenty rods of the boundary of defendant's land was violated, the plaintiff was allowed to recover though she did not show she was within twenty rods of the place of storage. If this holding is to be taken as contrary to the views which we have expressed, we are compelled to disagree with it. For a full statement of the facts in the Laflin & Rand Powder Co. decision, see the original opinion reported in 21 N. E. 516.
The question remains whether there was an absolute liability for the damage caused by the explosion at common law. We may say at the outset that we have been referred to nothing relevant as to this in the Vermont decisions, but they would not control in any event, because the...
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