Express Recovery Servs. Inc. v. Olson

• Citation: 397 P.3d 792
• Decision Date: 27 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 20151013-CA,20151013-CA
• Parties: EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES INC., Appellee, v. Daniel Paul OLSON, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Utah

397 P.3d 792

EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES INC., Appellee,
v.
Daniel Paul OLSON, Appellant.

No. 20151013-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed April 27, 2017

Grant D. Gilmore, Attorney for Appellant

Edwin B. Parry and Joshua R. Dunyon, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. authored this Opinion, in which Judges Stephen L. Roth and Michele M. Christiansen concurred.

Opinion

VOROS, Judge:

¶ 1 The principal question posed by this appeal concerns which party prevailed at trial and thus can claim the benefit of a contractual attorney fee provision. Express Recovery Services Inc., assignee of All Pro Appliance Service Inc., sued Daniel Paul Olson on a debt arising from an employment agreement between Olson and All Pro. Olson counterclaimed seeking a setoff (but no net damage award). Neither party proved its claims at trial. The trial court awarded no attorney fees, reasoning that neither party had prevailed. Olson contends on appeal that he prevailed at trial because he achieved his optimal outcome: zero recovery. We agree. We accordingly vacate the trial court's order declining to award attorney fees and remand the case for a determination of a reasonable fee award.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 All Pro hired Olson as an appliance service technician in September 2011. The employment agreement contained a liquidated damages provision requiring Olson to reimburse All Pro for training costs if he was terminated within two years after he completed his training. Within the two-year period, All Pro and Olson parted company.

¶ 3 Hoping to recoup the training costs, All Pro assigned its rights under the employment agreement to Express Recovery, a debt collector. Express Recovery sued Olson for breach of contract, seeking $10,348.25 in damages for training costs and other amounts allegedly owed. Olson counterclaimed for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking a setoff of approximately $1,600 for amounts allegedly owed. Olson did not, however, seek a net recovery.

¶ 4 After a bench trial, the court ruled that Express Recovery had failed to prove its breach of contract claim and that Olson had failed to prove his counterclaims. Both parties requested attorney fees under a provision in the employment agreement entitling

397 P.3d 794

the prevailing party to attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied attorney fees to both parties. Olson appeals, seeking attorney fees incurred in the trial court and on appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Olson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to name him as the prevailing party. " ‘Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review for correctness.’ " Anderson & Karrenberg v. Warnick , 2012 UT App 275, ¶ 8, 289 P.3d 600 (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald , 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (plurality opinion)). We "review the trial court's determination as to who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook , 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25, 40 P.3d 1119.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Olson's main contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion "when it failed to name [him] the prevailing party and award him his reasonable costs and attorney fees in accordance with the contract." Express Recovery responds that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion in determining that neither party prevailed."

¶ 7 The trial court ruled that "[w]hile the Employment Agreement contains a provision for attorney fees, ... the court believes that each party acted in good faith herein and no attorney fees should be or are awarded to either party." The court concluded that "[n]either party prevailed and neither party breached improperly this original contract." Thus, the court ruled that "[n]either party is entitled to a money judgment," and "[e]ach party is to bear its own fees and costs."

¶ 8 "Attorney fees are generally recoverable in Utah only when authorized by statute or contract." Reighard v. Yates , 2012 UT 45, ¶ 41, 285 P.3d 1168 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "If the legal right to attorney fees is established by contract, Utah law clearly requires the court to apply the contractual attorney fee provision and to do so strictly in accordance with the contract's terms." Hahnel v. Duchesne Land, LC , 2013 UT App 150, ¶ 16, 305 P.3d 208 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). " ‘Since the right is contractual, the court does not possess the same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it has when fashioning equitable remedies, or applying a statute which allows the discretionary award of such fees.’ " Cobabe v. Crawford , 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. App.1989) (quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co. , 507 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir.1975) ).

¶ 9 Here, the trial court properly ruled that attorney fees were recoverable because "the Employment Agreement contains a provision for attorney fees." The dispute on appeal focuses on whether Olson qualified for a fee award as the prevailing party.

¶ 10 Utah courts generally apply a "common sense ‘flexible and reasoned’ approach ... to the interpretation of contractual ‘prevailing party’ language." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy , 2004 UT 47, ¶ 14, 94 P.3d 270 (quoting Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale , 783 P.2d 551, 556–57 & n.7 (Utah Ct. App.1989) ). This approach begins with the "net judgment rule," which provides that "the party in whose favor the ‘net’ judgment is entered must be considered the ‘prevailing party’ and is entitled to an award of its fees." See Mountain States , 783 P.2d at 557–58. While the "net judgment rule" is a starting point, the court should also consider "common sense factors in addition to the net judgment." A.K. & R. Whipple , 2004 UT 47, ¶¶ 26–28, 94 P.3d 270 ; see also R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook , 2002 UT 11, ¶ 25, 40 P.3d 1119 (enumerating relevant factors). " ‘This approach requires not only consideration of the significance of the net judgment in the case, but also looking at the amounts actually sought and then balancing them proportionally with what was recovered.’ " Olsen v. Lund , 2010 UT App 353, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 521 (quoting A.K. & R. Whipple , 2004 UT 47, ¶ 26, 94 P.3d 270 ). Ultimately, "[t]he focus should be on ‘which party had attained a comparative victory, considering what a total victory would have meant for each party and what a true draw would look like.’ " Id. ¶ 8 (quoting J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud , 2005 UT 39, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 353 (additional internal quotation marks omitted)).

397 P.3d 795

"Comparative victory—not necessarily a shutout—is all that is required." Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 11 Furthermore, where the parties request attorney fees pursuant to a contract, only claims based on or related to that contract figure into the prevailing-party analysis. See Anderson & Karrenberg v. Warnick , 2012 UT App 275, ¶ 16, 289 P.3d 600 (concluding...