Eyl v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
| Citation | 264 Neb. 582,650 N.W.2d 744 |
| Decision Date | 06 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S-00-219.,S-00-219. |
| Parties | Harold D. EYL, an individual, and City of Wisner, a political subdivision, Appellees, v. CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION, a New York corporation, and Northeast Cooperative, a cooperative association, Appellants. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
William J. Brennan and Gerald L. Friedrichsen, of Fitzgerald, Schorr, Barmettler & Brennan, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, for appellants.
Susan E. Fieber, of Nolan, Olson, Hansen, Fieber, Lautenbaugh & Geren, Omaha, for appellee City of Wisner.
David E. Copple and Jim K. McGough, of Copple, Rockey & McGough, P.C., Norfolk, for appellee Harold D. Eyl.
A jury awarded appellee Harold D. Eyl a $2,146,000 verdict for injuries he sustained after he was exposed to the herbicide "Pramitol 5PS" while working for appellee City of Wisner. Pramitol is manufactured by appellant Ciba-Geigy Corporation, and the City of Wisner purchased the product from appellant Northeast Cooperative, a distributor. We granted the appellants' motion to bypass.
On appeal, the appellants argue that Eyl's claims are labeling based and preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1994). Eyl contends that FIFRA does not preempt his claims and asks us to overrule our decision in Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 928, 118 S.Ct. 329, 139 L.Ed.2d 255. In the alternative, Eyl argues that because he was a bystander who should have been warned that a substance had been applied, his claims are not labeling based and that FIFRA does not apply. We determine that FIFRA applies to preempt Eyl's failure-to-warn claims and decline to overrule Ackles. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand with directions to dismiss.
On April 9, 1993, Eyl was assigned to work at River Park in Wisner, Nebraska, where employees were setting posts and laying pea rock around playground equipment. On that morning, Donald H. Bode, an employee of the City of Wisner, applied Pramitol to prevent weeds in the playground area, which would then be covered by the pea rock. Pramitol requires water to activate it, and Bode testified that he usually wore rubber boots if it was wet.
Neither Ciba-Geigy nor Northeast Cooperative provided flags or signs that could be displayed to warn others that Pramitol had been applied in the area. A representative for Ciba-Geigy admitted that in addition to product labels, the company does send out additional pamphlets, brochures, leaflets, and news articles to suppliers or communities, but that the information must be consistent with the label.
Richard Brahmer, the general manager of Northeast Cooperative, testified that on some occasions, he would give customers information about a product that was not on the label. Brahmer stated that he was probably aware that people from the community would come in contact with Pramitol, but did not warn customers purchasing it to protect the application area. He testified that Northeast Cooperative sometimes prepared warning flags for customers of other products, because in 1996, a law was passed that required applicators to post warnings.
The label for Pramitol states, "DANGER":
The material safety data sheet for Pramitol in effect on April 9, 1993, states that if skin contact occurs, the person should wash with soap and water and should remove contaminated clothing and wash before reuse. The data sheet advises users to wear rubber gloves, waterproof boots, a long-sleeved shirt, long pants, and a hat. The data sheet also states that Pramitol can cause chemical burns to the skin and lists it as being "extremely irritating" to the skin. A later data sheet, issued in 1994, lists the same precautions, but omits the reference to chemical burns and states that Pramitol is "non-irritating" to the skin.
Eyl was present when the Pramitol was applied. Eyl did not read the label or the data sheet for the product because he did not use the product. The data sheet was available at a city warehouse where the employees worked, and boots were available for them to wear if needed. Eyl spent the day hauling pea rock to the playground area in a wheelbarrow, which required that he walk through grass and over the playground area. He testified that there was heavy fog and that the grass was wet. Puddles of water were also in the playground area.
Eyl was wearing steel-toe leather boots with oil-resistant soles. He testified that the boots became wet and stayed wet all morning. When he got home that evening, his boots, socks, and pant legs were wet. He wore the boots again for about 5 hours the next day. After April 10, 1993, the boots turned whitish in color and became stiff and brittle.
On April 11, 1993, Eyl's feet were red and sore. Eyl first saw his physician on April 13, and at that time, Eyl's feet and ankles were swollen, red, and hot. Eyl's feet later developed ulcers and remained painful. His condition did not improve, and Eyl was later seen by a dermatologist and was referred to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. Because of the condition of his feet, Eyl is permanently disabled.
After Eyl presented his case, the appellants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that labeling-based state common-law failure-to-warn claims were preempted by FIFRA. The court stated that it did not view the case as a labeling-based claim that was preempted by FIFRA and denied the motion. The appellants then adduced evidence and renewed their motion for a directed verdict. The motion was overruled.
During the jury instruction conference, the court refused an instruction on design defects and stated that the case was a failure-to-warn case. The court submitted Eyl's claims to the jury on negligent failure to warn against both appellants. The court submitted to the jury Eyl's strict liability claim for a warning defect against only Ciba-Geigy. The only claims submitted to the jury were claims based on a theory of failure to warn. The jury found for Eyl on all claims and awarded damages. The appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Among the issues raised, the appellants argued that Eyl's claims were preempted by FIFRA. The motions were overruled, and judgment was entered against the appellants.
The appellants assign, rephrased, that the district court erred in (1) failing to find that Eyl's failure-to-warn claims are preempted by FIFRA, (2) failing to grant their motion for a directed verdict because Eyl failed to present a prima facie case, (3) failing to find that Eyl was negligent as a matter of law in a manner that entitled them to a directed verdict, (4) allowing medical experts to testify regarding causation when the experts did not know the level and extent of Eyl's exposure to Pramitol, (5) failing to grant their motions for a mistrial, (6) allowing prejudicial evidence, (7) failing to instruct the jury on the allocation of damages, (8) instructing the jury on future medical expenses, (9) instructing the jury regarding the label approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), (10) instructing the jury about Eyl's factual claims, and (11) overruling their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the verdict was excessive.
A directed verdict is proper at the close of all the evidence only when reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion from the evidence, that is to say, where an issue should be decided as a matter of law. Bowley v. W.S.A., Inc., ante p. 6, 645 N.W.2d 512 (2002).
In order to sustain a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court resolves the controversy as a matter of law and may do so only when the facts are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion. Nebraska Nutrients v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d 472 (2001).
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Manker v. Manker, 263 Neb. 944, 644 N.W.2d 522 (2002). When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently of the conclusion reached by the trial court. In re Grand Jury of Douglas Cty., 263 Neb. 981, 644 N.W.2d 858 (2002).
The appellants contend that FIFRA preempts Eyl's failure-to-warn claims because this court, and a large majority of other courts, have held that FIFRA preempts labeling-based common-law causes of action. See Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 928, 118 S.Ct. 329, 139 L.Ed.2d 255 ().
Eyl, however, asserts that the claims are not preempted because after our decision in Ackles, the EPA, in an amicus brief filed in Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag, 22 Cal.4th 316, 993 P.2d 366, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 36 (2000), expressed the opinion that FIFRA does not preempt common-law claims. The Montana Supreme Court then adopted the EPA's position that FIFRA does not preempt common-law claims. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Services, 304 Mont. 1, 16 P.3d 1042 (2000),cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 40, 151 L.Ed.2d 13 (2001). Eyl further argues that even if FIFRA preempts failure-to-warn claims, it does so only for labelingbased claims in which there is a failure to warn the user of the product. Eyl argues that because he was a bystander, not a user, his claims are not labeling based.
Federal preemption arises from the...
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