Eyler v. Eyler
| Decision Date | 22 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 06S01-8605-CV-470,06S01-8605-CV-470 |
| Citation | 492 N.E.2d 1071 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Candace K. EYLER, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Gary EYLER, Appellee (Respondent Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Peter G. Tamulonis, Kightlinger, Young, Gray & De Trude, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Gregory F. Hahn, William T. Rosenbaum, Cohen Malad & Hahn, Indianapolis, for appellee.
ON CIVIL PETITION TO TRANSFER
This is a dissolution action in which the wife files a petition for transfer and requests that we vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Eyler v. Eyler (1985), Ind.App., 485 N.E.2d 657 (Ratliff, P.J., dissenting). She claims error upon the following issues:
1. whether in its division of personal property, the trial court improperly applied a minority interest discount and excluded property acquired following final separation;
2. whether the trial judge should have disqualified himself;
3. whether the trial court improperly relied upon a custody evaluation conducted by Tri-County Mental Health Center; and,
4. whether the trial court's custody determination was erroneous.
Transfer is hereby granted.
ISSUE I
The major marital asset in this marriage was the parties' jointly-titled shares of stock in the business operated by the husband. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that the property of the parties should be fixed and valued as of the date of filing of the petition for dissolution. Following an extensive review of the evidence, the trial court found that at the time of filing, the shares owned by the husband and wife constituted 90.2% of the outstanding stock in the business, and that as of said date the "most appropriate and accurate evaluation of the business" was $1,308,992.00. During the ensuing separation, the husband purchased the remaining 9.8% of the stock of the company.
The wife's allegations of error arise from the following findings by the trial court:
71. That the Court now finds that discounts of 25% for the minority interest aspect of wife's share, and 20% for the "one man business" aspect of the business, should both be applied to the value, and accordingly the Court finds the combined discounted value of the business, Superior Training Services, Inc., to be the value of $785,395.00.
72. That the Court further finds that the Eyler's marital estate interest of 90.2% of the stock, to have a value of $708,426.00.
This latter value was then included in the trial court's calculations determining the total marital assets for division.
Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-11 provided in pertinent part as follows a) For purposes of this section, "final separation" means the date of filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage under Sec. 3 of this Chapter.
b) In an action pursuant to Sec. 3(a) of this Chapter, the Court shall divide the property of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to the marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the marriage and prior to final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, * * *.
The trial court correctly determined that the shares of stock acquired by the husband in his own name following the separation were not subject to division as marital assets. The detailed findings of the trial judge included valuations of all the parties' assets as of the date of separation, thus precluding the wife's argument that the husband "obviously through use of a portion of the marital estate" acquired the additional 9.8% interest following separation and prior to dissolution decree.
With respect to the manner in which the "minority interest" discount was applied by the trial court, we find error. The trial court has discretion in selecting any date between the date of filing of the dissolution petition and the hearing for purposes of valuation of a marital asset. See, Eppley v. Eppley (1976), 168 Ind.App. 59, 67, 341 N.E.2d 212, 218. Regardless whether using the date of separation, or using any other date through the completion of the final hearing, the shares constituting the 90.2% share of the business were at all said times held in joint ownership and not burdened by the factors which may warrant consideration of the "minority interest" discount.
Therefore, in calculating the total assets of the marriage to be divided, we find that the trial court's valuation of the business at $708,426.00 to be erroneous to the extent that it includes a 25% minority interest reduction. Using the trial court's valuation of the business to be $1,308,992.00, reduced by 20% for the "one man business" consideration to which wife does not object, we calculate that the portion includable in the assets of the marriage subject to division to be 90.2% thereof, or $944,568.62.
After consideration of other assets and liabilities, the trial court summarized the division of property as resulting in a net distribution of the wife of $437,153.68 (44%), and to the husband $555,267.28 (56%). However, we decline the wife's suggestion that the trial court should be required to apply the same resulting 56/44 property division ratio to determine the final division applicable to the increase resulting from the recalculation of the business stock valuation. Many factors may properly be considered by the trial judge, not the least of which may be the extent to which the increase in business valuation is attributable to property acquired by each spouse prior to the marriage or through inheritance or gift. Because the trial court's findings include a determination of the value of the business stock owned by the husband prior to the parties' marriage, that the husband received gifts during the marriage from his father, the trial court should now determine anew the final division of property.
With respect to the remaining issues, we adopt and reiterate the opinion of the Court of Appeals as follows.
"The trial court granted to Gary and Candace joint custody of the children, with Gary having primary custody. Candace asserts that the custody award was erroneous, because it was contingent upon a change in circumstances. To support her assertion, Candace emphasizes that the original language of Finding of Fact No. 25 was conditional:
25. That pursuant to testimony given before the court, Mr. Eyler is going to marry Peggy Patterson. Mary Smith, an employee of the Husband, who works on a daily basis in the Husband's home has a close and daily relationship with the children. The Court's Order awarding the Husband physical custody of the children is contingent upon Miss Patterson becoming more knowledgeable about child rearing through attending parenting classes, literature and continued involvement in the children's activities. The Order is also contingent upon the fact that Mary Smith, or someone who is of the same demeanor and temperament as Mrs. Smith be employed by Mr. Eyler so that individual can provide the children the needed necessary [sic] discipline and structure. In addition, the Court also instructs Mr. Eyler to be more accessible to the children by working closer to home.
"Both Gary and Candace filed motions to correct error which challenged the language of Finding of Fact Number 25. The trial court ruled on the motions to correct error:
20. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent have contended that this Finding of Fact is erroneous or ambiguous and the Court finds that portions of this Finding will lead to further controversy if not amended.
21. The Court did not intend for the award of joint custody with primary custody to Husband to be contingent and the usage of that word in Finding of Fact 25 was unintentional and mistaken.
22. The Court hereby corrects, clarifies and amends Finding of Fact 25 as follows:
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