F.A.P. v. J.E.S.

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–P–758.,14–P–758.
• Citation: F.A.P. v. J.E.S., 87 Mass.App.Ct. 595, 33 N.E.3d 1245 (Mass. App. 2015)
• Parties: F.A.P. v. J.E.S.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

87 Mass.App.Ct. 595

33 N.E.3d 1245

F.A.P.

v.J.E.S.

No. 14–P–758.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 5, 2015.

Decided June 30, 2015.

Dennis R. Brown, for the defendant.

Kimberly Ann Parr, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Present: VUONO, MILKEY, & BLAKE, JJ.

Opinion

MILKEY, J.

At an ex parte hearing, a Juvenile Court judge issued a temporary harassment prevention order against the defendant, an eleven year old boy. See G.L. c. 258E, § 5. The order was issued based on allegations that the defendant had digitally raped the plaintiff, the seven year old girl on whose behalf the harassment complaint was filed. Following an evidentiary hearing, the judge extended the order for one year.¹ On appeal of the order issued after hearing,² the defendant argues that the evidence of “harassment” was legally insufficient, and that the judge erred in multiple additional respects: by applying an erroneous interpretation of the statute, by improperly admitting hearsay testimony, and by unduly constraining his ability to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses. Although we are unpersuaded by most of the defendant's arguments, we agree that the judge applied an incorrect view of the law. We therefore remand this matter for further consideration.

1. Background.³ The parents of the two children were close family friends, and their families spent a considerable amount of time together. During the afternoon of January 25, 2013, a Friday, the defendant and his mother arrived at the plaintiff's home where they spent the next several hours. At one point, the defendant and girl were unsupervised together on the second floor.⁴ This caused the plaintiff's mother some concern because the children had, on one occasion in the past, engaged in some inappropriate touching.⁵

A few minutes after the plaintiff's mother called for the children to come downstairs, the plaintiff reported that she was bleeding from her vaginal area. Both mothers examined her in a bathroom and confirmed that she was in fact bleeding. The plaintiff's mother called a doctor to discuss the matter, and eventually brought the plaintiff in for an appointment the following Monday. The remainder of the evening was unremarkable.

When initially questioned by her mother, the plaintiff said she was unaware of anything that might have caused the bleeding. The plaintiff reported the same to her doctor, who found a small tear on her labia. On further questioning, the plaintiff suggested to her mother that the injury might have been caused by an incident on the school playground during recess. After the plaintiff's mother learned from the school that there had been no recess during the applicable time period due to inclement weather, she began more intensively questioning the plaintiff about what might have caused the injury. During such questioning, she implored the plaintiff to tell the truth, while threatening punishment if she did not. According to her mother, the plaintiff finally “cracked” and informed her that just before the bleeding started, the defendant had “shoved his fingers up there” and then told her not to tell anyone or they both would get in trouble. The plaintiff's mother reported her daughter's allegation to the local police, and a delinquency complaint was ultimately filed against the defendant. On March 21, 2013, the plaintiff's mother filed the current harassment action on her daughter's behalf.

The plaintiff herself did not testify. Through her attorney, she notified the defendant of her intent to have her out-of-court statements introduced through her mother's testimony. The defendant countered with a motion in limine seeking to exclude such testimony except through invocation of G.L. c. 233, § 82(a ), inserted by St. 1990, c. 339.⁶ The judge agreed with the

defendant's position that this statute applied if the plaintiff's statements were to be admitted for their truth. She nevertheless denied the defendant's motion on the grounds that she was not going to admit the statements for their truth.⁷ The judge's position remained constant throughout the trial, and in her findings and rulings, she explained her views as follows:

“The procedural requirements of [G.L. c.] 233, § 82 are required when child hearsay is offered for its truth. Here, the Court made it clear to the parties throughout the proceedings that the [girl's] statements were not admitted for their truth, but were instead admitted for the purpose of establishing her state of mind and generally that [she] made an allegation of sexual abuse against the [boy], which served as the basis for the [G.L. c.] 258E complaint.”

The judge went on to explain why she believed that her ruling was in accord with the purpose of the statute. In the judge's view, all that the plaintiff needed to show to obtain a harassment order was that she feared the defendant based on her allegation that he had committed an act (here a rape) that fit within the statutory definition of “harassment.” According to the judge, whether the defendant actually committed the alleged rape was not properly before her; instead, that was for the parallel delinquency proceeding. Citing to O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 427, 961 N.E.2d 547 (2012), the judge stated that “[t]he standard in M.G.L. ch. 258E cases is one of fear.”

2. Discussion. We begin by addressing what a plaintiff must establish to obtain a harassment prevention order. Such an order can be sought by anyone “suffering from harassment.” G.L. c. 258E, § 3, inserted by St. 2010, c. 112, § 30. The statute sets forth two definitions of “harassment.” The first, which does not apply to the facts of this case, defines “harassment” as “3 or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.” G.L. c. 258E, § 1, inserted by St. 2010, c. 23 (definition of “harassment,” subsection [i] ). See

generally O'Brien v. Borowski, supra at 419–420, 961 N.E.2d 547 ; Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 63, 3 N.E.3d 577 (2014).

The second definition of “harassment” applies to situations where, as here, a defendant allegedly committed one or more acts of sexual misconduct. G.L. c. 258E, § 1 (definition of “harassment,” subsection [ii] ).⁸ Under this definition, a plaintiff can establish the need for a harassment prevention order in either of two ways that largely overlap. First, a plaintiff can show that a defendant “by force, threat or duress cause[d the plaintiff] to involuntarily engage in sexual relations.”⁹ Second, a plaintiff can prove that a defendant committed any of twelve specifically enumerated sex crimes, including—as relevant here—rape of a child, G.L. c. 265, § 22A.

If the defendant digitally raped the plaintiff, this would constitute a violation of G.L. c. 265, § 22A, and that, by definition, would amount to “harassment.” Proof that the defendant intended to instill fear, and in fact did so, would be wholly unnecessary.¹⁰ Thus, by focusing on whether the defendant intended and caused fear, the judge added elements that the plaintiff had no burden to prove under the theory of harassment under which she was proceeding. In addition, the judge erred by avoiding the question of whether she believed the alleged rape actually occurred (that is, whether there was proof of the second definition of harassment). To be sure, whether the defendant committed the rape beyond a reasonable doubt will be resolved in the delinquency proceeding. However, where, as here, a claim of harassment is based on an allegation that the defendant committed one of the enumerated sex crimes, the judge is not free to avoid addressing whether the plaintiff had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the defendant in fact committed that crime. Before turning to what remedy is appropriate to address the judge's having applied an incorrect legal standard, and decided the case under the wrong theory, we examine the defendant's other claims of error.

3. Sufficiency. The defendant argues that there was insufficient admitted evidence to support the issuance of a harassment order under a proper reading of the statute. The most compelling evidence that the defendant raped the plaintiff was, of course, the plaintiff's out-of-court statements that he did. However, because the judge did not admit those statements for their truth, we do not consider them for sufficiency purposes.¹¹ Apart from the out-of-court statements, there was evidence that a seven year old girl suffered a labial tear directly after having been alone with a defendant who had previously engaged in an indecent touching of her. That evidence was sufficient to support a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant raped the plaintiff.

4. Limitations on cross-examination. There is no merit to the defendant's argument that the judge unduly constrained his right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses. Despite the straightforward nature of the plaintiff's allegations, the evidentiary hearing stretched on for three days. Throughout the proceedings, the defendant was afforded extensive opportunities to press the plaintiff's witnesses on the details of their testimony and to explore their credibility. Although the judge did tell the defendant's counsel to “move on” to another topic on multiple occasions, this generally was only after the defendant was given an exhaustive opportunity to explore the subject.¹² Especially in light of the nature of the proceedings at issue, the judge acted well within her discretion in

limiting cross-examination. In short, the defendant was given a “meaningful opportunity to challenge the other's evidence,” C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. 648, 657, 815 N.E.2d 582 (2004), and that is all that is ultimately required.¹³ Moreover, the judge appropriately was concerned that the defendant was in fact attempting to use cross-examination for an...