F. Ronci Co., Inc. v. Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management Dist. Com'n, s. 88-77-M

• Decision Date: 29 June 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 88-77-M,s. 88-77-M
• Citation: 561 A.2d 874
• Parties: F. RONCI COMPANY, INC. v. NARRAGANSETT BAY WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT COMMISSION et al. P., 88-102-M.P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 874

561 A.2d 874

F. RONCI COMPANY, INC. v. NARRAGANSETT BAY WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT COMMISSION et al.

Nos. 88-77-M.P., 88-102-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 1989.

Christophe H. Little, Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Nancy Gordon Solomon, Narragansett Bay Com'n, Herbret F. DeSimone, DeSimone & Leach, Providence, for plaintiff.

Richard W. Petrocelli, Visconti & Petrocelli, Ltd., David M. Campbell, Visconti & Petrocelli, Ltd., Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This matter comes before the Supreme Court on consolidated petitions for certiorari. Both parties, F. Ronci Company (Ronci or plaintiff) and Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management District Commission (the commission or defendant), seek review of a Superior Court judgment that partially affirmed and partially reversed an order issued by the commission in its capacity as a regulatory administrative agency. Before setting forth the relevant facts giving rise to this dispute, we shall briefly describe the genesis of the commission and the extent of its regulatory powers.

In 1980 the General Assembly created the commission, an administrative agency, to combat severe water-quality problems arising from the discharge of pollutants into Narragansett Bay. In furtherance of this objective, the Legislature authorized defendant to impose limitations on the specific quantities and types of pollutants that may be discharged into its collection and treatment facilities. To ensure adherence to these discharge limitations, the commission may require a discharger of waste water to develop and implement a so-called compliance schedule. An enterprise that expells toxic water into defendant's sewerage system may further be required to construct and utilize pretreatment facilities when its waste-water emissions exceed maximum limits allowed by the commission. Failure to abide by defendant's toxicity limitations and compliance orders may result in the commission's precluding the enterprise from discharging any industrial waste water into its sewerage facilities. With this background in mind, we turn to the facts upon which the consolidated petitions rest. Because the record in the instant case is lengthy, comprising over 1,600 pages of recorded hearings and written findings, we shall extract only the most relevant and salient details from the transcript.

Ronci is a manufacturer of shoe and belt buckles. The company has two facilities in North Providence--one located at 1800 Smith Street and the other at 2 Atlantic Boulevard. One step in the manufacturing of these metal buckles involves electroplating at Ronci's Smith Street plant. Electroplating is the process by which certain precious metals are bonded to a less costly metal base in order to make the product more attractive and marketable to the consumer. An unfortunate but necessary byproduct of electroplating is the creation of waste-water streams which contain metal particles expelled in the course of the plating procedure. Ronci discharges its waste water directly into defendant's collection and treatment facilities.

Upon analyzing samples of waste water procured from plaintiff's Smith Street plant, the commission found Ronci in violation of its effluent limitation regulations. Thereafter, the commission ordered Ronci to develop and implement a compliance schedule, which called for the construction of an elaborate pretreatment facility. The schedule was submitted by plaintiff and subsequently approved by the commission on January 17, 1985. The projected operational date of the facility was August 9, 1985. During the next seven months, however, Ronci encountered several delays in the construction of the building. The commission granted plaintiff's written requests for extensions of time as these delays occurred until December of 1985.

On January 31, 1986, following the denial of Ronci's latest request for a time extension, the commission commenced enforcement proceedings against plaintiff. A duly appointed hearing officer held lengthy hearings during May and June of 1986, taking testimony and considering evidence submitted by both parties. On December 26, 1986, the hearing officer issued an extensive decision. This decision concluded with a recommendation to the commission's executive director that a civil penalty in the amount of $219,950 be levied against Ronci and, further, that Ronci be ordered to comply with relevant electroplating-discharge standards no later than seven months after the date of the commission's decision. In the event of continued noncompliance the hearing officer recommended that plaintiff be prohibited from discharging waste water into the commission's facilities, thereby effectuating a shutdown of plant operations. The executive director in an order dated January 8, 1987, adopted the hearing officer's recommendations in their entirety. Ronci, acting pursuant to G.L.1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 42-35-15, then appealed the commission's order to the Superior Court for Providence County.

After considering arguments of counsel and examining the enabling legislation of the commission, the trial justice affirmed that portion of defendant's order which, among other things, required Ronci to construct a pretreatment facility and ordered compliance with relevant discharge standards. The trial justice, however, reversed and vacated the monetary penalty levied against Ronci, concluding that the plain and unambiguous language of the enabling act precluded the commission from imposing civil fines. Both parties filed petitions for writs of certiorari. In the interests of judicial economy, we ordered consolidation of these petitions.

Ronci challenges the commission's authority, as endorsed by the trial justice, to make findings of fact and to determine liability at an administrative hearing for regulatory noncompliance. The commission, on the other hand, seeks reversal of the trial court's decision insofar as it found defendant without authority to impose civil fines against violators of its discharge regulations. Although Ronci and the commission both raise a plethora of arguments in support of their respective positions, we need only consider the issues of merit presented for this court's determination.

Ronci argues that the definition of the term "integrated facility" contained in the commission's rules is vague and therefore unconstitutional. The commission has adopted regulations that classify electroplating and metal-finishing facilities as "integrated" or "nonintegrated," depending in pertinent part on the amount of waste water, if any, they discharge which is attributable to nonelectroplating operations. Under the commission's regulations, the aggregate amount of pollutants that a nonintegrated facility may expel into its waste water is restricted by "categorical standards," whereas integrated facilities are subject to a more stringent "combined waste stream formula."

At the nub of plaintiff's vagueness challenge is the following definition, the language of which reads in relevant part:

"The term 'integrated facility' is defined as a facility that performs electroplating as only one of several operations necessary for manufacture of a product at a single physical location and has significant quantities of process wastewater from non-electroplating manufacturing operations." (Emphasis added.) 40 C.F.R. § 413.02(h).

Specifically, Ronci contends that the term "significant quantities" is vague, and therefore, its inclusion as an essential element in defining "integrated facility" renders the administrative regulation unconstitutional. Ronci also alleges that the commission applied this "completely subjective standard" to it in an arbitrary and capricious manner. We disagree.

Thomas More in his widely acclaimed Utopia 61 (H. Ogden 3d ed. 1949) quite aptly summarized the need for guidance from laws of sufficient clarity as follows:

"[The Utopians] think it highly unjust to bind men by laws that are too numerous to be read and too obscure to be readily understood. * * * [T]he plainest interpretation is the fairest. All laws, according to their view, are promulgated for the single purpose of teaching each man his duty. Subtle interpretations teach very few, for there are few who can understand them; the simpler and more obvious sense of the laws is clear to all. If laws are not clear, they are useless for the masses of people who need their guidance most. There might as well be no laws at all as to have laws which only men of great ability and long training can interpret. Most men lack the brains for this task and cannot spare the time from their work."

Recognizing the need for reasonably clear and unambiguous laws, the United States Supreme Court, as well as this court, has stated that a statute will normally withstand a vagueness challenge if its wording is capable of being understood by persons of ordinary intelligence. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972); State v. Picillo, 105 R.I. 364, 369, 252 A.2d 191, 194 (1969). In addition the statute must also set forth sufficient guidelines for those responsible for its application in order to guard against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. at 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d at 227-28. While generally held to the same standards of validity and construction as statutes, administrative regulations have traditionally been subject to a more relaxed standard of scrutiny for vagueness, particularly when no constitutional interest is implicated by their application. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72 (1982); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115-16 (1972); see also City of Warwick v. Aptt, 497 A.2d 721, 724 (R.I.1985).

It is apparent that the regulation...