Faber v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 13 April 1933
• Docket Number: No. 21705.,21705.
• Citation: 185 N.E. 255,352 Ill. 115
• Parties: FABER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

352 Ill. 115

185 N.E. 255

FABER

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 21705.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 23, 1933.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 13, 1933.

Error to Circuit Court, Peoria County; Joseph E. Daily, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Myra L. Johnston, claimant, for the death of Paul E. Johnston, employee, opposed by Fred M. Faber, employer. To review the judgment of the Circuit Court sustaining the decision of the Industrial Commission awarding compensation, the employer brings error.

Affirmed.

McKenna, Harris & Schneider, of Chicago (George A. Schneider and Abraham W. Brussell, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Victor P. Michel and George Z. Barnes, both of Peoria, for defendant in error.

HEARD, Chief Justice.

Myra L. Johnston filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial for mission on October 15, 1931. The application asked compensation for accidental injuries sustained by Paul E. Johnston, arising out of and in the course of his employment by Fred M. Faber, etc., which injury resulted in the death of Johnston on May 4, 1931. The arbitrator found by decision dated December 7, 1931, that the relationship of Myra L. and Paul E. Johnston, deceased, had existed for over twenty years; that the petitioner was dependent upon the deceased at the time of his death and should be entitled to an award but the evidence showed that no blood relationship existed; that the petitioner never had legally adopted the deceased, but took him at the time he was three or four weeks old and raised him as her own son. Accordingly the arbitrator ordered Faber to pay to her a sum not to exceed $150 for burial expenses and a sum not to exceed $300 to the special fund of which the state treasurer is ex-officio custodian, the above payments to be made within sixty days. A petition to review the decision of the arbitrator was filed with the Industrial Commission by the petitioner on December 31, 1931. The Industrial Commission reversed the decision of the arbitrator and found that the earnings of the deceased during the year next preceding the injury and death were $780 and that the average weekly wage was $15; that a condition of loco parentis existed over a period of twenty years between the petitioner and the deceased, and that while she was not the natural mother of the deceased, her relation was the same as ‘parent’ within the meaning of the compensation act as referred to in section 7 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 48, § 144), and that the deceased left him surviving as his sole beneficiary under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the petitioner, whom he was under moral obligation to support at the time of his injury and death, and ordered that the respondent pay to her for her support and maintenance the sum of $7.50 a week for a period of 220 weeks as compensation on account of his death. A writ of certiorari issued, and the matter was duly heard by the circuit court of Peoria county, and on July 1, 1932, the court entered an order confirming the decision of the Industrial Commission of March 19, 1932.

The facts are undisputed. The evidence shows that Myra L. Johnston was married in Springfield, Ill., in 1903. Her husband died May 12, 1916. In 1910 she saw Paul E. Johnston, the deceased, at the Proctor Hospital, in Peoria, Ill. He was then a child four weeks old. She took him and mothered him as her own son. At that time she was living with her husband, and the deceased lived at her home from the time he was four weeks old up to May 4, 1931, when he died as the result of an accident. He never lived at any other home and carried the name of Johnston. She never adopted him in court. He called her mother. Up to the time he was able to work she supported him. He began to work at the age of eight, and up to the time of his death he gave all of his money to Mrs. Johnston, who clothed him and both of them lived on the money. She was dependent on him for support at the time of his death. She had only one child born to her, which died at the age of seven months. She did not know the name of the father or mother of Johnston.

Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 48, § 144, paragraph 207 of chapter 48 (Cahill's Rev. St. 1931, p. 1406), provides that the compensation which shall be paid for an injury to an employee resulting in death, where the employee leaves no widow, husband, child, or children whom he was under legal obligation to support at the time of his injury and does leave any parent totally dependent upon the earnings of the employee, shall be paid to such parent. The only question involved in this case is whether or not Myra L. Johnston is entitled to compensation by reason of this provision.

At common law or under the Personal Injuries Act the right to damages where an employee suffered death or injury was vested. Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is analogous to and is to take the place of damages at common law and under the statute. The Workmen's Compensation Act is based on the broad economic theory that death or injury to an employee arising out of and in the course of employment is an incident of industrial activity and production, and that compensation therefor is properly chargeable as a part of the cost of such activity and production. Wangler Boiler Co. v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 118, 122 N. E. 366. The compensation act should be liberally construed in order to accomplish its purpose of making a speedy disposition of the claims of injured employees (Illinois Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Com., 289 Ill. 233, 124 N. E. 665) and so as to give effect to the purpose and object of its adoption (Chicago Cleaning Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 177, 118 N. E. 989). It should be given a practical construction and should not be made to depend upon fine-spun theories, based upon scientific technicalities. Juergens Bros. Co. v. Industrial Com., 290 Ill. 420, 125 N. E. 337. A cause of action for the death of a human being was unknown to the common law. Statutes, creating the cause of action have been passed, sometimes providing for a recovery by an administrator and sometimes for the person entitled to receive damages. It is purely a matter of statutory regulation. In this state, under the injuries act (sometimes called the Lord Campbell Act), the action must be brought by the administrator. The Workmen's Compensation Act takes away all causes of action for the death of an employee and provides compensation according to an established scale. Mississippi Power Co. v. Industrial Com., 289 Ill. 353, 124 N. E. 552. The act is intended for the protection of workmen and their families, and is to be so interpreted as to effectively remedy the ills intended to be remedied.

In Webster's New International Dictionary the word ‘parent’ is defined as follows: ‘One who begets, or brings forth, offspring; a father or a mother. Parent is sometimes used popularly and in statutes to include persons standing in loco parentis other than the natural parents, as in Lord Campbell's act, where it is defined to include father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, step-father, or step-mother; and it is sometimes construed as equivalent to ancestor, and regularly so in certain cases in the civil law.’ In Brush v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 46, it is said: ‘The husband is not, from the fact of marriage with the mother of minor children, bound to support them. As to him, so far as any obligation arising out of the marriage is concerned, they are strangers. He is not entitled to their custody or labor, nor is he bound to provide for them. Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. [N. Y.] 403 ;Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 675; Cooper v. Martin, 4 East. R. 77; Tubb v. Harrison, 4 Term. R. 118; 2 Kent's Com. 192. He may, however, by admitting them into family and treating them as members thereof, voluntarily assume the relation to them of parent. Where this is done, the step-father stands in the place of natural parent, and the reciprocal rights, obligations and duties of parent and child attach and continue, so long as this mutually assumed relation continues; and the step-child, in such case, is not entitled to recover for services rendered, nor is the stepfather entitled to pay for support. * * * Here the evidence shows that the relation of parent and child was voluntarily assumed by the act of the parties, and there is no evidence of an express contract to pay for services, nor are there any facts in evidence from which such contract can be implied.’

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