Fabian v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Civil Action No. 16-4741

• Decision Date: 11 August 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16-4741
• Parties: JENNIFER FABIAN Plaintiff, v. ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

JENNIFER FABIAN Plaintiff, v. ST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-4741

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 11, 2017

MEMORANDUM

Jones, II J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the court is Defendant St. Mary's Medical Center's ("St. Mary's") Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. The motion seeks dismissal of various claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., as well as various demands for compensatory and punitive damages under the ADA and FMLA. (Second Am. Compl.)¹ For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an adult individual with qualified disabilities under the ADA—depression and anxiety—resulting from the loss of her young son to Leukemia in 2007. (SAC ¶¶ 7, 16.) Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's disabilities when it hired her as a dietary aid in its cafeteria in July 2011. (SAC ¶¶ 15, 17.) Plaintiff worked the overnight shift and was able to perform heressential job functions with reasonable accommodations. (SAC ¶¶ 15-16.) As a reasonable accommodation for her qualified disabilities, Defendant allowed Plaintiff to take paid time when needed from 2011 to 2014, such as on the dates of her son's passing and birthday. (SAC ¶ 20.)

At some unspecified point, Patricia Spurrier ("Spurrier"), an agent of Defendant, began repeatedly denying Plaintiff's requests to use her paid time off, thereby raising Plaintiff's anxiety. (SAC ¶¶ 21-22.)² Due to her heightened anxiety, Plaintiff requested to use her paid time off in March of 2015, but this request—as well as several unspecified subsequent requests—were denied by Spurrier. (SAC ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiff contacted Human Resources ("HR"), which informed her that she would have to resolve the issue with Spurrier. (SAC. ¶¶ 24-25.) Bill Laffler ("Laffler"), the manager of "dietary and cafeteria," reprimanded Plaintiff for contacting HR. (SAC ¶ 26.) When Plaintiff informed Laffler of Spurrier's conduct, he told her that she was to deal with Spurrier only. (SAC ¶¶ 27-28.) Moments later, Spurrier contacted Plaintiff and made various threats, such as, "If you want war you'll get war, watch your back" and "we will see." (SAC ¶ 29.) Spurrier also later made various "disparaging remarks" to and about Plaintiff within earshot and used "inappropriate language." (SAC ¶ 31.)

On or about April 10, 2015, Plaintiff requested to use her paid time off on July 9^th and 12^th of that year—the dates of her son's death and birthday. (SAC ¶ 32.) In doing so, Plaintiff followed Defendant's policy of seeking approval from a superior before taking paid time off. (SAC ¶ 33.) At some unspecified point in time, Spurrier told Plaintiff that she would have to wait until the schedule for that week was made to know if the request was approved. (SAC ¶ 34.)Plaintiff explained that she needed those days off as a reasonable accommodation for her disabilities and again sought approval of her request. (SAC ¶ 35.) On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff learned that her request had been denied, so she renewed the request. (SAC ¶¶ 36-37.) In response, Spurrier stated "Oh well, I don't know what to tell you it was not approved." (SAC ¶ 37.)

While on her way to work on July 6, 2015, Plaintiff remembers having tunnel vision and passing out. (SAC ¶ 38.) She went to her doctor, who found that she had suffered a nervous breakdown and rendered her unable to work for three weeks. (SAC ¶¶ 38-40.) When informed of Plaintiff's condition, Spurrier replied, "Well isn't that convenient." (SAC ¶ 41.) Plaintiff's doctor determined that she would be unable to work until August 1, 2015 and placed limitations on her abilities to work four consecutive night shifts in a row. (SAC ¶¶ 42-43.) Leading up to August 1, 2015, Plaintiff contacted Spurrier regarding her schedule for that week, however, Spurrier never responded. (SAC ¶¶ 44-45.) When Plaintiff was cleared by her doctor on July 29, 2015 to return to work, she again contacted Spurrier regarding her schedule, but Plaintiff's several messages went unreturned. (SAC ¶¶ 46-47.)

In mid-August, an HR representative informed Plaintiff that she would be placed back onto the schedule when there was room. (SAC ¶ 48.) Two months later, on September 28, 2015, Plaintiff was returned to her working schedule, but without regard to her doctor's restrictions on her ability to work consecutive nights. (SAC ¶¶ 52-53.) Plaintiff requested that her schedule be adjusted, but Spurrier never responded. (SAC ¶ 54.)

On October 25, 2015, Defendant hired a new employee, Ms. Fitch ("Fitch"), to replace Plaintiff's former co-worker. (SAC ¶ 55.) Ms. Fitch does not have any disabilities. (SAC ¶ 56.) Soon thereafter, Plaintiff's hours were reduced by almost half, while Fitch was given many ofPlaintiff's regular shifts and was scheduled for 40 hours per week. (SAC ¶¶ 55, 57.) Plaintiff attempted to contact Spurrier about this, but again received no response. (SAC ¶ 58.) In November of 2015, after Defendant changed the cafeteria's hours, Plaintiff's hours were again reduced, while Fitch's hours were not. (SAC ¶ 59.) On November 5, 2015, Plaintiff was removed from the schedule entirely. (SAC ¶¶ 60, 91.) As of the date Plaintiff commenced suit in federal court, she had not heard from Spurrier or HR (despite multiple attempts to contact them regarding her schedule), and had been put back on the schedule. (SAC ¶¶ 61-62.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and ultimately received a Right to Sue letter.³

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted). After the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Accord Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[A]ll civil complaints must contain more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Comply With Federal Pleading Rules

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint consists of two counts: Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count I) and Violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (Count II). In Count I, Plaintiff combines various theories of recovery by repeatedly using the phrase "discriminatory/harassing/retaliatory" to describe Defendant's alleged conduct under the ADA. The pleadings are woefully lacking with regard to critical dates and any level of specificity regarding what conduct is being attributed to what alleged violation: unlawful harassment, unlawful retaliation, unlawful disparate treatment, or unlawful disparate impact?

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that pleadings provide enough information to put a defendant on "'sufficient notice to prepare their defense' and also ensure 'that the Court is sufficiently informed to determine the issue.'" De Lage Landen Fin. Servs. v. Barton Nelson, Inc., Civ. No. 08-0530, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91441, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (quoting Philadelphia Dressed Beef Co. v. Wilson & Co., 19 F.R.D. 198, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1956)). This standard operates in tandem with that of Rule 10, which provides in pertinent part:

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity,each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence--and each defense other than a denial--must be stated in a separate count or defense.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b).

"The purpose of Rule 10 is to create clarity in pleadings, which allows a defendant and the Court to determine whether there are sufficient facts to support a claim entitling a plaintiff to relief." Young v. Centerville Clinic, Inc., Civ. No. 09-325, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111893, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2009). "Where a complaint fails to comply with Rule 10(b), dismissal of the complaint is within the court's discretion." Borrell v. Weinstein Supply Corp., Civ. No. 94-2857, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13741, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1994) (quoting Scott v. Township of Bristol, No. CIV.A. 90-1412, 1990 WL 178556, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1990)).

In this case, review of Count I of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint reveals consolidation and conflation of . . .

[S]eparate claims, involving different sets of operative facts, legal theories, and requirements of proof. They are founded on "separate transactions or occurrences" for the purposes of Rule 10(b). Furthermore, the Court finds that under the circumstances, requiring these claims to be pled in separate counts would "facilitate the clear presentation of the matters set forth" such that it would significantly aid Defendants in framing their responses[.]

Nicolaysen v. BP Amoco Chem. Co., Civ. No. 01-5465, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9325, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2002).

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