Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid

• Decision Date: 01 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-511,19-511
• Citation: 209 L.Ed.2d 272,141 S.Ct. 1163
• Parties: FACEBOOK, INC., Petitioner v. Noah DUGUID, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

141 S.Ct. 1163

209 L.Ed.2d 272

FACEBOOK, INC., Petitioner

v.Noah DUGUID, et al.

No. 19-511

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued December 8, 2020

Decided April 1, 2021

Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for the petitioner.

Jonathan Y. Ellis, Washington, D.C., for the United States, as respondent supporting the petitioner.

Bryan A. Garner, Dallas, TX, for the respondents.

Andrew B. Clubok, Roman Martinez, Susan E. Engel, Samir Deger-Sen, Gregory B. In Den Berken, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, Paul D. Clement, Counsel of Record, Erin E. Murphy, Devin S. Anderson, Kasdin M. Mitchell, Lauren N. Beebe, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, Counsel for Petitioner.

Jeffrey B. Wall, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Sopan Joshi, Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark B. Stern, Michael S. Raab, Lindsey Powell, Casen B. Ross, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States, as respondent supporting the petitioner.

Scott L. Nelson, Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen, Litigation Group, Washington, DC, Sergei Lemberg, Counsel of Record, Stephen Taylor, Lemberg Law LLC, Wilton, CT, Bryan A. Garner, Karolyne H.C. Garner, Garner & Garner LLP, Dallas, TX, for respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) proscribes abusive telemarketing practices by, among other things, imposing restrictions on making calls with an "automatic telephone dialing system." As defined by the TCPA, an "automatic telephone dialing system" is a piece of equipment with the capacity both "to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator," and to dial those numbers. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). The question before the Court is whether that definition encompasses equipment that can "store" and dial telephone numbers, even if the device does not "us[e] a random or sequential number generator." It does not. To qualify as an "automatic telephone dialing system," a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential generator or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.

I

A

In 1991, Congress passed the TCPA to address "the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls" to consumers and businesses from telemarketers. § 2, ¶¶1, 6, 105 Stat. 2394, note following 47 U.S.C. § 227. Advances in automated technology made it feasible for companies to execute large-scale telemarketing campaigns at a fraction of the prior cost, dramatically increasing customer contacts. Infamously, the development of "robocall" technology allowed companies to make calls using artificial or prerecorded voices, obviating the need for live human callers altogether.

This case concerns "automatic telephone dialing systems" (hereinafter autodialers), which revolutionized telemarketing by allowing companies to dial random or sequential blocks of telephone numbers automatically. Congress found autodialer technology to be uniquely harmful. It threatened public safety by "seizing the telephone lines of public emergency services, dangerously preventing those lines from being utilized to receive calls from those needing emergency services." H. R. Rep. No. 102–317, p. 24 (1991). Indeed, due to the sequential manner in which they could generate numbers, autodialers could simultaneously tie up all the lines of any business with sequentially numbered phone lines. Nor were individual consumers spared: Autodialers could reach cell phones, pagers, and unlisted numbers, inconveniencing consumers and imposing unwanted fees.¹ Ibid.

Against this technological backdrop, Congress made it unlawful to make certain calls "using any automatic telephone dialing system" to "emergency telephone line[s]," to "guest room[s] or patient room[s] of a hospital," or "to any telephone number assigned to a paging service [or] cellular telephone service" without the "prior express consent of the called party." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).² The TCPA creates a private right of action for persons to sue to enjoin unlawful uses of autodialers and to recover up to $1,500 per violation or three times the plaintiffs’ actual monetary losses. § 227(b)(3).

B

Petitioner Facebook, Inc., maintains a social media platform with an optional security feature that sends users "login notification" text messages when an attempt is made to access their Facebook account from an unknown device or browser. If necessary, the user can then log into Facebook and take action to secure the account. To opt in to this service, the user must provide and verify a cell phone number to which Facebook can send messages.

In 2014, respondent Noah Duguid received several login-notification text messages from Facebook, alerting him that someone had attempted to access the Facebook account associated with his phone number from an unknown browser. But Duguid has never had a Facebook account and never gave Facebook his phone number.³ Unable to stop the notifications, Duguid brought a putative class action against Facebook. He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and programming its equipment to send automated text messages to those numbers each time the associated account was accessed by an unrecognized device or web browser.

Facebook moved to dismiss the suit, arguing primarily that Duguid failed to allege that Facebook used an autodialer because he did not claim Facebook sent text messages to numbers that were randomly or sequentially generated. Rather, Facebook argued, Duguid alleged that Facebook sent targeted, individualized texts to numbers linked to specific accounts. The U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed and dismissed Duguid's amended complaint with prejudice. 2017 WL 635117, *4–*5 (Feb. 16, 2017).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. As relevant here, the Ninth Circuit held that Duguid had stated a claim under the TCPA by alleging that Facebook's notification system automatically dialed stored numbers. An autodialer, the Court of Appeals held, need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers; it need only have the capacity to " ‘store numbers to be called’ " and " ‘to dial such numbers automatically.’ " 926 F.3d 1146, 1151 (2019) (quoting Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC , 904 F.3d 1041, 1053 (C.A.9 2018) ).

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether an autodialer must have the capacity to generate random or sequential phone numbers.⁴

591 U. S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 193, 207 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2020). We now reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment.

II

Section 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as:

"equipment which has the capacity—

"(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and

"(B) to dial such numbers."

Facebook argues the clause "using a random or sequential number generator" modifies both verbs that precede it ("store" and "produce"), while Duguid contends it modifies only the closest one ("produce"). We conclude that the clause modifies both, specifying how the equipment must either "store" or "produce" telephone numbers. Because Facebook's notification system neither stores nor produces numbers "using a random or sequential number generator," it is not an autodialer.

A

We begin with the text. Congress defined an autodialer in terms of what it must do ("store or produce telephone numbers to be called") and how it must do it ("using a random or sequential number generator"). The definition uses a familiar structure: a list of verbs followed by a modifying clause. Under conventional rules of grammar, "[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series," a modifier at the end of the list "normally applies to the entire series." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 (2012) (Scalia & Garner) (quotation modified). The Court often applies this interpretative rule, usually referred to as the "series-qualifier canon." See Paroline v. United States , 572 U.S. 434, 447, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014) (citing Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor , 253 U.S. 345, 348, 40 S.Ct. 516, 64 L.Ed. 944 (1920) ); see also United States v. Bass , 404 U.S. 336, 339–340, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This canon generally reflects the most natural reading of a sentence. Imagine if a teacher announced that "students must not complete or check any homework to be turned in for a grade, using online homework-help websites." It would be strange to read that rule as prohibiting students from completing homework altogether, with or without online support.

Here, the series-qualifier canon recommends qualifying both antecedent verbs, "store" and "produce," with the phrase "using a random or sequential number generator." That recommendation produces the most natural construction, as confirmed by other aspects of § 227(a)(1)(A) ’s text.

To begin, the modifier at issue immediately follows a concise, integrated clause: "store or produce telephone numbers to be called." See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund , 583 U. S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1061, 1076–77, 200 L.Ed.2d 332 (2018). The clause "hangs together as a unified whole," id., at ––––, 138 S.Ct., at 1077, using the word "or" to connect two verbs that share a common direct object, "telephone numbers to be called." It would be odd to apply the modifier ("using a random or sequential number generator") to only a portion of this cohesive preceding clause.

This interpretation of § 227(a)(1)(A) also "heed[s] the commands of its punctuation." United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. , 508 U.S. 439, 454, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1...