Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC

• Decision Date: 26 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 11–cv–3052.,11–cv–3052.
• Citation: 86 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 900,819 F.Supp.2d 764
• Parties: FACEBOOK, INC., Plaintiff, v. TEACHBOOK.COM LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

819 F.Supp.2d 764

86 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 900

FACEBOOK, INC., Plaintiff,

v.TEACHBOOK.COM LLC, Defendant.

No. 11–cv–3052.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Sept. 26, 2011.

Anne H. Peck, Jeffrey Thomas Norberg, Cooley & Godward LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Michael G. Rhodes, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, CA, Michael J. Harris, Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Anthony L. Abboud, Abboud Legal LLC, Northbrook, IL, Mike Rodenbaugh, Rodenbaugh Law, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) has filed an eight-count complaint against Defendant Teachbook.com LLC (“Teachbook”) alleging trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and related federal and state claims. (Compl.) Teachbook moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot. & Mem.) Teachbook's motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

As is always the case with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we look to the complaint and any supporting exhibits for the facts upon which to evaluate the motion. In this case, Facebook has filed a fifteen-page complaint and five accompanying exhibits. Normally at this stage, these materials would provide the sum total of the relevant facts for evaluating Teachbook's motion to dismiss. But in support of its motion to dismiss, Teachbook has proffered over 300 pages of additional material that it would like us to consider. Thus, after first setting out the allegations Facebook makes in its complaint and supporting exhibits, we then determine whether Teachbook's additional material ought to be considered in evaluating the current motion.

A. Facebook's Complaint

Facebook is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Since its founding in 2004, Facebook has risen to prominence through its provision of a social networking website and related services. ( Id. ¶¶ 6, 10–11.) Teachbook is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Northbrook, Illinois. ( Id. ¶ 2.) Teachbook maintains a social networking website targeted specifically at teachers. ( Id. ¶ 12.)

Facebook is suing Teachbook for infringement of Facebook's claimed statutory and common law trademark rights in “FACEBOOK” and related marks. ( Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 24–74.) Facebook has been continuously using the FACEBOOK mark since February 2004 and now owns multiple United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) registrations for it. ( Id. ¶¶ 6–8 & Ex. A.) Facebook alleges that, “as a result of the nature and quality of Facebook's services, its widespread use of the FACEBOOK Marks, Facebook's enormous and loyal use base, its numerous trademark registrations and pending applications, and other factors, the FACEBOOK Marks are famous[.]” ( Id. ¶ 10.)

Facebook accuses Teachbook of trading on the fame the FACEBOOK mark has achieved. ( Id. ¶ 28.) According to the complaint, Teachbook's website has contained the following statement at various times:

Many schools forbid their teachers to maintain Facebook and MySpace accounts because of the danger that students might learn personal information about their teachers. With Teachbook, you can manage your profile so that only other teachers and/or school administrators can see your personal information, blogs, posts, and so on. Teachbook is all about community, utility, and communication for teachers.

( Id. ¶ 13.) Based on this statement, Facebook contends that Teachbook is touting itself as a “substitute for Facebook.” ( Id.)

Although Teachbook applied to register its “TEACHBOOK” mark with the USPTO on an intent-to-use basis on March 16, 2009, Facebook has opposed this application. ( Id. ¶ 14.) Facebook asserts that the TEACHBOOK mark is substantially similar to its FACEBOOK mark. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Facebook further claims that the services Teachbook offers under the TEACHBOOK mark “are the same as and/or related to some of the services provided by Facebook.” ( Id. ¶ 16.) In Facebook's view, Teachbook's use of the TEACHBOOK mark also “creates a false suggestion of an affiliation or connection between [Teachbook] and Facebook, where none exists.” ( Id. ¶ 17.) Notably, Facebook contends that Teachbook “adopted its TEACHBOOK Mark with the intention of causing confusion with, and trading on the goodwill of, the FACEBOOK Marks.” ( Id. ¶ 18.)

Based on these allegations, Facebook initially filed suit against Teachbook in the Northern District of California on August 18, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 20.) That case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Teachbook, however, on May 3, 2011. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Facebook subsequently filed this suit against Teachbook here in the Northern District of Illinois on May 6, 2011. (Dkt. No. 1.)

B. Teachbook's Exhibits

In addition to these allegations in Facebook's complaint, which we accept as true, Teachbook has offered over 300 pages of exhibits in support of its motion to dismiss. Teachbook claims that these materials are all either referenced in Facebook's complaint or public records subject to judicial notice. (Mem. at 5–6.) Thus, we must address the threshold issue of whether these materials are properly considered in conjunction with Teachbook's motion to dismiss.

In addition to the allegations in the complaint, courts are free to examine “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice” in evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007); Thompson v. Illinois Dep't of Professional Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2002); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.1994). But besides this limited class of materials, Rule 12(d) mandates that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (emphasis added). When a court converts a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id.

The question here, then, is whether the materials Teachbook has presented are either “incorporated into the complaint by reference” or subject to “judicial notice.” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322, 127 S.Ct. at 2509. If they are, then we may properly evaluate them under Teachbook's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If they are not, then we can only evaluate them, if at all, after converting Teachbook's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and allowing Facebook an opportunity to present any pertinent material. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). We first consider the materials that Teachbook contends are subject to judicial notice, followed by those that Teachbook contends are referenced in the complaint.

1. Judicial Notice

Seven of Teachbook's ten exhibits are materials that it contends are subject to judicial notice. These exhibits consist of a filing Facebook made with the European trademark authority (Mem., Ex. B.); USPTO records pertaining to trademark registrations belonging to Facebook and others ( Id., Exs. C–G); and dictionary definitions ( Id., Ex. H.). Regarding Facebook's European filing and the USPTO records, Teachbook maintains that these documents are “matters of public record” of which we can take judicial notice. (Mem. at 5.) Teachbook also cites Seventh Circuit authority for the consideration of dictionary definitions in trademark cases. ( Id. at 6.) Teachbook relies on these documents to argue that “Facebook has judicially admitted facts which undercut its entire complaint” and that Facebook cannot rely on the suffix “-BOOK” to maintain its trademark claim against Teachbook. (Mem. at 9–13.)

Teachbook places particular emphasis on Facebook's filing with the European trademark authority. (Mem. at 9–11.) In that filing, Facebook was replying to objections raised by a Spanish holder of the trademark “FACTBOOK” to Facebook's attempt to register “FACEBOOK” as a trademark. (Mem., Ex. B. at 1.) Facebook argued that “the aural and conceptual differences between the marks counteract any existing similarity” between them, and, as such, “likelihood of confusion ... can be clearly excluded.” ( Id. at 6.) Teachbook urges that this statement and others made in the same document are fatal to Facebook's complaint in this case. ( Id. at 9.)

Facebook responds that “the evidentiary value of Teachbook's proffered documents are subject to reasonable dispute,” which precludes consideration of them at this stage. (Resp. at 5–6.) Facebook also challenges Teachbook's position that its filing with the European trademark authority is a “judicial admission,” because the filing was not made in the present litigation. ( Id. at 6.) Facebook further maintains that the document is irrelevant to this case based on disparate factual and legal contexts. ( Id. at 6–7.) Lastly, Facebook objects to Teachbook's reliance on dictionary definitions that, in Facebook's view, are of reasonably disputed evidentiary value. ( Id. at 7–8.)

As indicated, a court may consider facts subject to judicial notice in the context of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322, 127 S.Ct. at 2509; Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 325 n. 4 (7th Cir.1996). In order for a fact to be subject to judicial notice, Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that the “fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Courts strictly adhere to these criteria because “the effect of taking judicial notice under Rule 201 is to...