Facey v. Dickhaut

• Decision Date: 25 September 2012
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 11–10680–MLW.
• Citation: 892 F.Supp.2d 347
• Parties: Valentino FACEY, Plaintiff, v. Thomas DICKHAUT, Anthony Mendonsa, and R. Raymond, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

892 F.Supp.2d 347

Valentino FACEY, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas DICKHAUT, Anthony Mendonsa, and R. Raymond, Defendants.

C.A. No. 11–10680–MLW.

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

Sept. 25, 2012.

Facey Valentino, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Joan T. Kennedy, Department of Correction, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Valentino Facey alleges his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when correctional officials knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him to a housing unit where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons described below, the defendants' motion is being allowed in part and denied in part. Specifically, the plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their official capacities are being dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity, and the plaintiff's claims against Superintendent Thomas Dickhaut are being dismissed because the plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Dickhaut violated a clearly established constitutional right. However, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment by defendants are not entitled to have the complaint dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity. Accordingly, this litigation may proceed against defendants Mendonsa and Raymond in their individual capacities.

II. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is an inmate at the Souza Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC). In a complaint filed on April 14, 2011, he alleges the following.

The plaintiff is a known member of the Blood Gang, and the members of that gang are known enemies of the Gangster Disciples. On June 7, 2010, despite the facility's policy of keeping apart known enemies, the plaintiff was placed in a housing unit on the “South Side” of the facility, where Gangster Disciples reside. Upon entering this housing unit, the plaintiff was attacked by three members of the Gangster Disciples who beat him and broke his jaw in two places. As a result, the plaintiff endured a substantial period of treatment and will have to have a metal plate in his jaw for the rest of his life.

Defendant Thomas Dickhaut is the Superintendent of SBCC. Defendant Anthony Mendonsa is the Deputy Superintendent of SBCC and assigns all prisoners to their designated housing areas. Defendant Sergeant R. Raymond is the assignment officer who carries out Mendonsa's orders. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by deliberately putting him in a housing unit where they knew his life would be in danger. Each is sued in their individual and official capacity, and the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

In their July 20, 2011 Motion to Dismiss, the defendants state that Facey failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a). The defendants further assert that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects them from being sued in their official capacities for money damages, that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under § 1983, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.¹

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “take all factual allegations as true and ... draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Rodriguez–Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir.2007); see also Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009). The court must “neither weigh[ ] the evidence nor rule[ ] on the merits because the issue is not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims.” Day v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 72, 75 (D.Mass.1996). A motion to dismiss should be denied if a plaintiff has shown “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Morales–Tanon v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir.2008) (applying the Bell Atlantic standard to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Rodriguez–Ortiz, 490 F.3d at 95–96 (applying the Bell Atlantic standard to a claim under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but does require “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A court may disregard “ ‘bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, and opprobrious epithets.’ ” In re Citigroup, Inc., 535 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); see Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.2005). It must afford the defendant (s) a “ ‘meaningful opportunity to mount a defense.’ ” Diaz–Rivera v. Rivera–Rodriguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir.1995)); see Redondo–Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005). “[I]n a civil rights action as in any other action subject to notice pleading standards, the complaint should at least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why.” Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.2004). Although “the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) are minimal ... ‘minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent requirements.’ ” Id. (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)).

As the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court will “liberally construe[ ]” his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Instituto de Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2000). Where a pro se plaintiff presents sufficient facts, “the court may intuit the correct cause of action,” even if the claim was imperfectly pleaded. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.1997). “However, pro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law.” Id.

Ordinarily, a court will not consider documents outside of the pleadings in a motion to dismiss. Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir.2009); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). From this rule, the First Circuit makes a “narrow exception for documents the authenticity of which [is] not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Id. at 3–4;see Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust, Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st Cir.1998) (When “a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”).²

IV. ANALYSISA. Exhaustion Requirement

The defendants assert that Facey's claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not file a timely appeal of the decision of the grievance officer. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Further, exhaustion is required “[e]ven when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably, money damages.” Id. at 524, 122 S.Ct. 983 (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001)).

The exhaustion requirement is one of “proper exhaustion,” rather than “exhaustion simpliciter.” See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). In other words, it...