Fafel v. Dipaola

• Decision Date: 07 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1718.,04-1718.
• Citation: 399 F.3d 403
• Parties: Leonard FAFEL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. James V. DIPAOLA, individually and in his capacity as Middlesex Sheriff, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

399 F.3d 403

Leonard FAFEL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. James V. DIPAOLA, individually and in his capacity as Middlesex Sheriff, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 04-1718.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard October 5, 2004.

Decided March 7, 2005.

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Robert S. Mantell, with whom Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz LLP was on brief, for appellant.

Thomas Drechsler, Special Assistant Attorney General, with whom Salvatore M. Giorlandino, Assistant Attorney General, and Finneran, Byrne & Drechsler, L.L.P., were on brief, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Leonard Fafel appeals from the denial of his Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from an injunction that prohibits him from pursuing claims in state court in contravention of a consent judgment entered in federal court pursuant to Rule 68. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 (Relief from Judgment or Order); Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 (Offer of Judgment). Fafel argues that the injunction is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the district court misunderstood the scope of its ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the underlying Rule 68 judgment. Given that the district court had more than an arguable basis for concluding that it had jurisdiction to enforce its judgment, we reject Fafel's collateral attack and affirm the district court's decision.

I.

A. Fafel's State and Federal Court Actions

We recount the undisputed facts and procedural history in some detail to provide an understanding of the unusual nature of this case. On April 10, 2002, Fafel filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with pendent state law claims, in federal district court against Defendant-Appellee, Middlesex County Sheriff James V. DiPaola, individually and in his official capacity, based on Fafel's termination from employment in April 2000. Specifically, Fafel alleged that DiPaola had caused a deprivation of Fafel's constitutional rights to freedom of association and due process in violation of § 1983 and its state law counterpart, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, § 11I, and that he had engaged in tortious interference with Fafel's employment. Fafel had already filed another action against DiPaola and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts arising out of the same incident in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging that Fafel had been terminated without the benefit of procedural protections required under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 35, § 51. On May 30, 2002, less than two months after the filing of his federal court action, Fafel obtained a court order in his state court action directing DiPaola and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to reinstate Fafel with back pay. Judgment in Fafel's favor was not entered until approximately six months later, in January 2003.

B. DiPaola's Offer of Judgment

On April 17, 2003, while DiPaola's appeal from the state court judgment was pending in the Massachusetts Appeals Court, Fafel filed a civil contempt action against DiPaola in state court seeking enforcement of the state court judgment. On April 30, 2003, DiPaola filed a motion for summary judgment in Fafel's federal court action. Instead of waiting for a ruling on the motion, DiPaola extended an offer of judgment to Fafel on May 8, 2003, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which permits "a party defending against a claim [to] serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued." DiPaola's offer specified an amount of $150,000, including "attorney['s] fees and costs accrued to date in the [federal court] case only," which amount, "[i]f accepted, ... shall satisfy all claims made and relief sought by the plaintiff against the defendant arising from or related to the April 2000 termination of the plaintiff from his employment in the Middlesex Sheriff's Department." The offer also provided that, upon Fafel's acceptance, "judgment shall enter in the amount of $150,000 ... in the case of Leonard Fafel v. James V. DiPaola, Individually, and in his capacity as Middlesex Sheriff [,] and ... plaintiff's claims for punitive damages and injunctive relief shall be dismissed with prejudice." The offer of judgment did not explicitly refer to the disposition of Fafel's state law claims.

Under Rule 68, "[i]f within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment." Fafel timely accepted the offer, and DiPaola filed the requisite documents with the court on May 13, 2003. For reasons that remain unclear, judgment was not immediately entered. Instead, on May 15, 2003, the entire case was dismissed "[i]n accordance with the Offer of Judgement filed by the Defendant on May 13, 2003."

C. DiPaola's Motion to Enforce

When Fafel refused to sign a stipulation of dismissal in his state court contempt action or to assent to a motion to vacate the state court judgment of reinstatement and back pay based on Fafel's April 2000 termination, DiPaola moved in federal district court on June 11, 2003, to enforce the Rule 68 judgment through an injunction prohibiting Fafel from pursuing his state court action. That same day, judgment was entered in the federal court action in Fafel's favor. Because the order of dismissal entered on May 15, 2003, clearly failed to comply with either the terms of Rule 68 or the terms of the offer of judgment filed with the court,¹ we treat that order as superseded by the judgment that was properly entered on June 11, 2003 "[i]n accordance with Plaintiff's acceptance of the Defendant's Offer of Judgement," which in turn provided that "judgment shall enter in the amount of $150,000 ... in the case of Leonard Fafel v. James V. DiPaola Individually, and in his capacity as Middlesex Sheriff [,] and ... plaintiff's claims for punitive damages and injunctive relief shall be dismissed with prejudice."

On August 19, 2003, the district court held a hearing on DiPaola's motion to enforce.² DiPaola argued that Fafel was precluded from pursuing reinstatement through his state court contempt action because, under the terms of the Rule 68 offer of judgment that Fafel had accepted, his identical prayer for injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement in the federal court action had been dismissed with prejudice. Similarly, DiPaola argued, Fafel was precluded from pursuing back pay in state court through his contempt action because, again under the terms of the Rule 68 offer, Fafel's acceptance of payment of $150,000 "satisf[ied] all claims made and relief sought by the plaintiff against the defendant arising from or related to [his] April 2000 termination."³

Observing that Fafel had "lost" any entitlement to back pay (the amount of which had never been calculated) in state court by accepting DiPaola's offer of a $150,000 federal court judgment in satisfaction of "all claims made and relief sought ... arising from or related to [his] April 2000 termination," the district court enjoined Fafel — deliberately "parrot[ing]" the terms of the offer of judgment he had accepted — "from taking any action to seek relief or make claims against defendant arising from or related to the April 2000 termination of the plaintiff from his employment in the Middlesex Sheriff's Department."⁴ When Fafel objected on the ground that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his action in state court, the district court responded, "I have jurisdiction over my judgment[,] and I'm enforcing this judgment with respect to all claims made and relief sought by the plaintiff against the defendant arising from or related to the April[ ] 2000 termination of the plaintiff."

D. Fafel's Motion for Relief

Fafel did not appeal from the issuance of the injunction. On October 30, 2003, approximately one month after the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal had passed, Fafel, represented by new counsel, filed a "Motion to Vacate the Judgment and Reopen the Case Due to an Unauthorized Acceptance of an Offer of Judgment." He claimed that his former attorney had acted "contrary to [Fafel's] specific instruction that [his attorney] not accept an offer of judgment to the extent that it would dispose of [Fafel's] claims in Massachusetts Court." In his motion, Fafel estimated that "he would be owed $457,000" in back pay "as of June 30, 2003," under the state court's judgment and stated that "[i]t simply would not have made sense to accept a $150,000 offer of judgment in Federal Court, to the extent that it would have [led] to a waiver of the lucrative judgment in State Court worth $457,000 plus reinstatement." Fafel then alleged that his former attorney had been "instructed not to accept the offer to the extent that it called for a release of the state law claims." In his prayer for relief, Fafel requested that the court "[w]ithdraw the injunction that prevents Plaintiff from pursuing remedies in State Court for the April 2000 termination."

The magistrate judge considering this motion held an evidentiary hearing on February 24, 2004, and issued a report and recommendation on April 14, 2004. The magistrate judge construed the motion as one for relief from judgment under the catch-all provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which permits a district court to grant relief for "any other reason [not set forth in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5)] justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

The magistrate judge first addressed Fafel's failure to appeal the issuance of the injunction. Reciting the "bedrock" rule that "Rule 60(b)(6) cannot, and should not, be used to [circumvent] time limits available to take an appeal," the magistrate judge stated: "To the extent that plaintiff...