Fagan v. City of Vineland
| Citation | 22 F.3d 1283 |
| Decision Date | 29 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | 92-5551 and 92-5594,92-5482,No. 92-5594,A,No. 92-5551,M,No. 92-5481,No. 92-5482,Nos. 92-5481,92-5481,92-5594,92-5551,s. 92-5481 |
| Parties | Sarah E. FAGAN, General Administratrix and Administratrix Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Michael J. Fagan, Deceased, v. The CITY OF VINELAND, a Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey; Joseph Cassisi, Jr., Chief of Police of the City of Vineland; Police Officers David Tesoroni; Peter F. Coccaro, III; Benny Velez; Phillip C. Bocelli; Richard Putnam; David Cardana; Mario R. Brunetta, Jr.; John Does, (fictitious names) representing other police officers of the City of Vineland Police Department; Town Liquors, a/d/b/a VTL, Inc.; Marquez Amnon Corporation, a/d/b/a East Landis Hotel and Motel; John Doe (fictitious name) agent, servant or employee selling liquors for Marquez Amnon Corporation, a/d/b/a East Landis Hotel and Motel; Jeffrey T. Pindale; and Mary Ellen Duke, Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher M. Duke, Deceased, jointly, severally and in the alternative. Wanda PINDALE v. TOWN LIQUORS, a/d/b/a VTL, Inc.; John Doe I, (fictitious name) agent, servant or employee selling liquors for Town Liquors, a/d/b/a VTL, Inc.; Marquez Amnon Corporation a/d/b/a East Landis Hotel and Motel; John Doe II, (fictitious name) agent, servant or employee selling liquors for Marquez Amnon Corporation, a/d/b/a East Landis Hotel and Motel; The City of Vineland, a Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey; Joseph Cassisi, Jr., Chief of Police of the City of Vineland; David Tesoroni; John Doe III; and John Doe IV, (fictitious names) representing other police officers of the City of Vineland Police Department; and Jeffrey T. Pindale, jointly, severally and in the alternative v. Mary Ellen DUKE, Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher M. Duke, Third Party Defendant. Maurice G. DAVIS, Jr. v. VTL, INC. a/d/b/a Town Liquors; John Doe I, (fictitious name) agent, servant or employee selling liquors for VTL, Inc., a/d/b/a Town Liquors; Marquez Amnon Corporation a/d/b/a East Landis Hotel and Motel; John Doe II, (fictitious name) agent, servant or employee selling liquor |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Gerald M. Eisenstat, Harry Furman (argued), Eisenstat, Gabage & Berman, Vineland, NJ, for appellant Sarah Fagan.
Arnold Robinson, Millville, NJ, for appellant Wanda Pindale.
Harold B. Shapiro, Dana Davis Teague (argued), Shapiro & Shapiro, Vineland, NJ, for appellant Maurice G. Davis, Jr.
Philip S. Burnham, II, Basile, Testa & Testa, Vineland, NJ, for appellant Albino Genetti.
John M. Fitzpatrick, Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & Kauffman, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant Mary Ellen Duke.
A. Michael Barker (argued), Horn, Goldberg, Gorny, Daniels, Paarz, Plackter & Weiss, Atlantic City, NJ, for appellees City of Vineland, David Tesoroni, Peter F. Coccaro III, Benny Velez, Phillip D. Bocelli, Richard Putnam, Mario R. Brunetta, Jr. and Joseph Cassisi, Jr.
Richard M. Pescatore, Perlow, Sebera & Pescatore, Bridgeton, NJ, for appellee Town Liquors d/b/a VTL, Inc.
Stacy L. Moore, Jr., Parker, McCay & Criscuolo, Marlton, NJ, for appellee Marquez Amnon Corp. d/b/a E. Landis Hotel and Motel.
Peter W. Sachs, Sachs & Sachs, Holmdel, NJ, for appellee Estate of Christopher M. Duke.
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, COWEN and LEWIS Circuit Judges.
These five consolidated actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 arose from a high-speed police pursuit in Vineland, New Jersey, in which an automobile attempting to evade Vineland police officers crashed into an innocent bystander's vehicle. Three people were killed and three others were injured. The plaintiffs are the survivors of the accident and the estates and relatives of those who were killed. They claim that their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated because the police officers pursued the fleeing automobile in a reckless manner in violation of statewide guidelines, and because the City of Vineland ("the City" or "Vineland") had a policy of not properly training its police officers regarding high-speed pursuits. Plaintiffs also brought a state law negligence claim against defendant Town Liquors. Plaintiffs allege that Town Liquors, which sold wine to the driver of the fleeing automobile, contributed to his intoxication and helped to cause the accident.
Plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants. The district court held (1) that the law of the case doctrine did not prohibit it from reconsidering a predecessor judge's earlier denial of summary judgment in favor of the defendants; (2) the standard of care under section 1983 is conduct which "shocks the conscience," and the pursuing officers' actions did not rise to that level of misconduct as a matter of law; (3) since none of the officers were liable, the City could not be liable because its alleged failure to train had not caused a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights; (4) the absence of any remedy under New Jersey law did not affect the scope of plaintiffs' due process rights; and (5) the evidence against defendant Town Liquors was insufficient, as a matter of law, to show that the wine it sold was a cause of the accident.
We will affirm in part and reverse in part. We agree that the law of the case doctrine does not apply. We hold, however, that the City may be held independently liable for violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, even if no individual police officer is liable. We agree that the absence of a state remedy has no effect on plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause. We also agree that the record contains insufficient evidence to show that defendant Town Liquors proximately caused the accident. We therefore will reverse the grant of summary judgment rendered in favor of the City, and affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Town Liquors. 1
The parties disagree about many of the factual details. Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we will view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, the plaintiffs. Clement v Consolidated Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir.1992).
On March 6, 1988, at about 1:55 a.m., defendant Officer David Tesoroni of the Vineland Police Department was on routine patrol on Landis Avenue in Vineland, New Jersey. Landis Avenue is the main street running through the City's business district and is a popular gathering and cruising place for young people. As Officer Tesoroni headed west on Landis...
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