Fahnestock v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 18 October 1880
• Citation: 95 Pa. 301
• Parties: Fahnestock <I>versus</I> Wilson.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 301

95 Pa. 301

Fahnestock versus Wilson.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 4, 1880.

October 18, 1880.

October 4th 1880.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1880, No. 202.

Rodgers & Oliver, for plaintiff in error.—The disputed item was incurably defective until the date of the Act of June 11th 1879, Pamph. L. 122. That act can be given a prospective effect only: McCoy's Appeal, 1 Wright 125; Sutton v. Clark et al., 7 W. N. C. 437; Ashman v. McIlvaine, 8 Id. 309. The act can only be construed as retrospective by reading into it words referring to past time, and so doing violence to the rules of construction, and to the property and constitutional rights of defendant: Lambertson et al. v. Hogan, 2 Barr 22; Potter's Dwarris on Stats. 162; McCabe v. Emerson, 6 Harris 111; Bates v. Koch, 6 Barr 476; Becker's Appeal, 3 Casey 55; West Branch Boom Co. v. Dodge, 7 Id. 285; Ogle v. Somerset & Mt. P. Turnpike Co., 13 S. & R. 256. This act if retrospective would operate both on the right and the remedy in a pending action: Lefevre v. Witmer, 10 Barr 505-6; Schoneman v. Fegley, 2 Harris 379; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 101. Even the amended specification of items is insufficient under, Lee v. Burke, supra; Russell v. Bell, supra; Shields v. Garrett, 5 W. N. C. 120.

A. C. Patterson, for defendant in error.—The operation of the statute in this case is retroactive and should be construed as similar acts have been, so as to advance and render effective the remedy the law-maker has provided, as the court held in the case of the Commonwealth v. Dillon, 11 P. F. Smith 488. The preamble and the language of the whole act lead us at once to the fact that the legislature designed by its enactment to extend the right of claimants in mechanic's lien, just as it did when it enacted the Act of 1806, whereby it introduced a system of amendments into the pleadings and trials of other causes.

Mr. Justice TRUNKEY delivered the opinion of the court, October 18th 1880.

The claim was filed, October 13th 1876, and was defective. Therefore, by the terms of the statute which created the lien, it expired at the end of six months from the time the work was done and materials were furnished. More than two years after the lien died an attempt was made to restore it to life by an amendment. Whether it was competent for the court to revive the lien is the first question reserved.

A mechanic's lien on a building is entirely statutory — a privilege not of common right — and is in addition to the common-law remedies which belong to all citizens. While the lien continues, and after it falls, the claimant, notwithstanding his special boon, is entitled to the same remedies as other laborers and vendors for recovery of his debt. These remedies remain whether the claim filed be perfect or faulty, or none be filed at all. The favor is not merely a remedy by suit, it is a lien on property from the commencement of the work — a valuable right, preferring the claimant before other creditors, and often compelling one man to pay another's debt. Its enforcement is by proceeding in rem. Where the claimant is a sub-contractor, it is no defence for the owner of the building to show that he has fully paid the party with whom he contracted. Such a right, existing at the time the work was done or material furnished, cannot be taken from the claimant by repeal of the statute,...