Faigel v. Fairfield University

• Decision Date: 11 February 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 22007).
• Citation: 815 A.2d 140,75 Conn. App. 37
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: VERA FAIGEL v. FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY.

75 Conn. App. 37

815 A.2d 140

VERA FAIGEL v.FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY.

(AC 22007).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 22, 2002.

Officially released February 11, 2003.

Foti, Mihalakos and Peters, Js.

Dawne Westbrook, with whom, on the brief, was John R. Williams, for the appellant(plaintiff).

Michael C. Jankovsky, for the appellee(defendant).

Opinion

PETERS, J.

In this state, under special circumstances, a student may challenge her dismissal from an educational program as a breach of contract.Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital,239 Conn. 574, 592-93, 687 A.2d 111(1996).To limit judicial intrusion into educational decision making, the student must, however, allege nonperformance of a special promise, a promise outside the purview of normal educational expectations.Id.The central issue in this case is whether a student's claim of breach of contract met this exacting standard.The trial court concluded that it did not and rendered judgment in favor of the educational institution.We agree.

The plaintiff, Vera Faigel, an immigrant from Russia, filed a four count complaint against the defendant, Fairfield University.She alleged that the defendant(1) failed to perform its contractual obligation to give her proper credit for her academic achievements in Russia, (2) obtained tuition payments by false pretenses, (3) intentionally or recklessly caused her to suffer emotional distress and (4) violated General Statutes § 42-110b of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.She did not make a tort claim of educational malpractice.The defendant responded by filing a motion for summary judgment with respect to each count of the plaintiff's complaint.In light of facts disclosed in an affidavit attached to the motion, the defendant asserted that the case presented no disputed material facts and no basis for an action for breach of a contractual promise.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, claiming that there were factual disputes about the reason why she agreed to withdraw from the defendant's nursing school.She alleged that she would have been a student in good standing if the defendant had honored its contractual obligations to her.The plaintiff did not, however, file a counteraffidavit but submitted only her sworn interrogatory answers and her deposition testimony.¹

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and filed a memorandum of decision stating the reasons for its decision.Citing Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital,supra, 239 Conn. 592-93, the court held that "the information submitted by the plaintiff does not raise an issue that the decision of the [defendant] requiring her withdrawal from the nursing curriculum was anything other than a purely academic decision. . . or that it was based upon a breach of a `contractual promise distinct from any overall obligation to offer a reasonable program.'"

The plaintiff's appeal challenges the propriety of the trial court's order of summary judgment on the same grounds that she raised in her opposition to the defendant's motion at trial.Our consideration of these claims is governed by a well established standard of review."Pursuant to Practice Book§ 17-49, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Such questions of law are subject to plenary appellate review."(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co.,260 Conn. 152, 158-59, 793 A.2d 1068(2002).In deciding whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.B & D Associates, Inc. v. Russell,73 Conn. App. 66, 69, 807 A.2d 1001(2002);Yancey v. Connecticut Life & Casualty Ins. Co.,68 Conn. App. 556, 558, 791 A.2d 719(2002).

We start our discussion of the plaintiff's appeal by examining the merits of the first count of the plaintiff's complaint, in which she alleged a breach of contract.Our resolution of the validity of this count is, as the trial court held, dispositive of the remaining counts of the plaintiff's complaint.

There is no dispute about the underlying facts.In 1991, the plaintiff enrolled in the defendant's school of nursing in an eighteen month accelerated program for obtaining a bachelor of science degree in nursing.This was a nursing program designed for applicants who already had a bachelor of science degree in another field.Because the plaintiff had obtained a master of science degree in engineering in Russia, the defendant gave the plaintiff credit for some, but not all, of the courses she had successfully completed there.Thereafter, the defendant required the plaintiff to take additional liberal arts courses to provide the foundation for her nursing studies.After encountering serious academic and clinical difficulties, the plaintiff was dismissed from the nursing school in September, 1994, because she failed to pass a final motor performance examination.She had agreed, in writing, that failure to pass this examination would require her to withdraw from continuation in the nursing program.According to the plaintiff, this factual showing did not establish that she was required to withdraw from the defendant's nursing program for academic reasons, as the trial court held.Her argument has two parts.

First, the plaintiff argues that the withdrawal agreement was not enforceable because, as she had alleged in her complaint, she had signed the withdrawal agreement under protest because if she had not done so, she would have had "no chance to continue the nursing program."In the absence of any further factual elaboration of this claim, this allegation does not give rise to a cognizable factual dispute.

Second, the plaintiff argues that, even if the withdrawal agreement was valid on its face, the academic and clinical problems that it documents are not the proper measure of her performance.This argument arises out of her allegation that the defendant failed to honor its oral promise that she would receive "many credits" for her Russian educational experience.As a result of this breach of promise, the plaintiff alleged, the defendant required her to take eleven additional liberal arts courses that impaired her timely completion of the nursing program.In the same vein, she alleged that, if she had not been required to take these additional courses, by the time of her withdrawal she would have fulfilled all of the criteria for good standing that existed when she enrolled.In effect, she argues that her performance was judged by a standard that differed from that of which she had been advised at the time of her enrollment in the nursing school.

The linchpin for the plaintiff's argument is her contention that the promise on which she allegedly relied is a promise that is enforceable.It is not dispositive that the alleged promise was oral.It is, however, dispositive that the alleged promise did not satisfy the criteria for an action for breach of contract in an educational context that were set out in Gupta.

In Gupta, our Supreme Court stated that a student contesting dismissal from an educational program could pursue an action for breach of contract only under one of two circumstances.To succeed, the student would have to make a showing that "the educational program failed in some fundamental respect, as by not offering any of the courses necessary to obtain certification in a particular field" or that "the educational institution failed...