Fain v. Benak

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ALVORD, J.
• Citation: Fain v. Benak, 205 Conn.App. 734, 258 A.3d 112 (Conn. App. 2021)
• Decision Date: 13 July 2021
• Docket Number: AC 43898
• Parties: Marie FAIN v. Bethany BENAK et al.

205 Conn.App. 734

258 A.3d 112

Marie FAIN

v.Bethany BENAK et al.

AC 43898

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 10, 2021

Officially released July 13, 2021

James E. Coyne, Stratford, for the appellant (defendant Department of Administrative Services).

Charles K. Norris, Norwich, with whom, on the brief, was Anthony D. Sutton, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Alvord, Cradle and Eveleigh, Js.

ALVORD, J.

The defendant Department of Administrative Services¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Marie Fain, in this negligence action following a trial to the court. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in (1) declining to apply the "unavoidable accident doctrine" to the facts of the case and (2) granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration after it determined that she presented sufficient evidence to support an award of damages for future medical expenses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court in its memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant to our discussion of the claims on appeal. On the morning of June 5, 2017, the plaintiff was driving south on Flanders Road in East Lyme. The plaintiff was traveling at the posted speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour. The plaintiff drove this route daily during her commute to her job as a school teacher. That morning, a vehicle operated by the defendant's employee, Bethany Benak, struck the plaintiff's vehicle.² The collision happened suddenly and without warning; the two vehicles were heading in opposite directions and were in their respective lanes when Benak's vehicle crossed into the plaintiff's lane, the southbound lane, and struck the plaintiff's vehicle. On impact, the plaintiff's vehicle spun and entered the northbound lane, where it collided with another vehicle. Finally, the plaintiff's vehicle came to a stop at a stone wall. On the basis of the plaintiff's testimony, which the court found was credible, the court determined that during the course of the accident, Benak's vehicle crossed the center line and did not slow down.

Just prior to the accident, Benak heard a popping sound, and the vehicle she was operating pulled to the left,³ toward the southbound lane of traffic. At trial, the police officer who responded to the scene testified that Benak's front left tire appeared to have blown out, and the court found that there was a tear in the tire. At the time the tire burst, Benak did not know the speed at which she was traveling, whether she had applied her vehicle's brakes, or how far she was from the plaintiff's vehicle.

After the accident, an ambulance transported the plaintiff to the emergency department of a hospital. The plaintiff sustained a fractured hip, a bruised kidney, and a fractured arm as a result of the accident. Due to the nature of the fracture, her arm required surgery to attach a plate and screws to the broken bone. The plaintiff remained hospitalized for four days before being discharged to a rehabilitative center for two weeks. Because of the fracture in her hip, the plaintiff was "non-weight bearing" for approximately two months and, as a result, spent much of her time in a bed or a wheelchair. In addition to these physical ailments, the plaintiff was unable to take part in her normal summertime activities and was unable to properly care for herself or her family. Furthermore, the plaintiff was unable to return to work as an elementary school teacher until December, 2017, six months after the accident. At the time of trial, two and one-half years after the accident, the plaintiff continued to experience pain as a result of her injuries.

On August 15, 2018, the plaintiff commenced the present action. In the plaintiff's operative complaint, filed on December 2, 2019, she alleged that Benak was negligent and claimed that the defendant was liable for the plaintiff's damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556.⁴ The case was tried to the court, Knox , J. , on December 12 and 13, 2019. Both parties submitted post-trial briefs. On January 15, 2020, the court issued its memorandum of decision, in which it found that Benak had negligently operated her vehicle and had caused the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle. The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $344,867.33. This award included compensation for economic damages in the amount of $84,867.33⁵ and noneconomic damages in the amount of $260,000.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that it was reasonably probable that the plaintiff would require future surgery and physical therapy; however, the court also found that there was "insufficient evidence upon which to determine future medical expenses." On January 23, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration as to her claimed future medical expenses and attached a letter from her treating physician, Daniel Gaccione, which was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit during trial. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, the defendant filed this appeal. On February 11, 2020, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and awarded the plaintiff an additional $14,250 in damages for future medical expenses.⁶

On February 3, 2020, while the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration remained pending, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, reargument and to set aside the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On February 17, 2020, the court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant thereafter amended its appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the "unavoidable accident doctrine" to the facts of the case. In particular, the defendant argues that the court should have applied the "unavoidable accident doctrine" because "the blowout of the tire was not foreseeable and amount[ed] to an unavoidable accident." We disagree.

Before we address the substance of the defendant's first claim, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. The defendant maintains that whether a court should apply the "unavoidable accident doctrine" is a question of law subject to plenary review. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that our review is guided by the abuse of discretion standard.

"The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts as they appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLeo v. Equale & Cirone, LLP , 202 Conn. App. 650, 659, 246 A.3d 988, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 927, 247 A.3d 577 (2021).

In its memorandum of decision, the court set forth its determination with respect to the applicability of the "unavoidable accident doctrine" as follows: "In Shea v. Tousignant , [172 Conn. 54, 372 A.2d 151] (1976), the court held that liability cannot be imposed on the operator of a vehicle who has a sudden medical emergency resulting in the loss of control of the vehicle. See also Smith v. Czescel , [12 Conn. App. 558, 533 A.2d 223, cert. denied, 206 Conn. 803, 535 A.2d 1316] (1987). The court rejects the application of the ‘unavoidable accident’ doctrine for the following reasons. First, there is no claim that Benak experienced a sudden medical emergency which prevented her ... [from] maintain[ing] control of the vehicle. This court will not by analogy extend the doctrine to a mechanical issue with the vehicle. Second, and more significantly, the court finds that the plaintiff has sustained her burden of proof that the driver of the state vehicle negligently operated her vehicle and caused the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle in one or more of the ways set forth in the operative complaint."

The defendant does not argue clear error with respect to the court's factual finding that there was no claim that Benak experienced a sudden medical emergency that prevented her from controlling her vehicle or its factual finding that Benak negligently operated her vehicle. Rather, the defendant claims only that the court erred in declining to apply the concept of unavoidable accident to these facts. Our resolution of this issue depends on whether the court properly declined to apply the "unavoidable accident doctrine" to the facts of this case.⁷ Therefore, our standard of review is plenary.

Having established the standard of review, we turn to the defendant's claim that the court erred in refusing to apply the "unavoidable accident doctrine." The plaintiff responds that the "court's decision to not apply the unavoidable accident doctrine to the evidence adduced at trial was correct, as the trial court clearly and unequivocally found that the defendant's operator was negligent as alleged by the plaintiff in the operative complaint." We agree with the plaintiff.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In the trial court's memorandum of decision, the court expressly credited the plaintiff's testimony that "the state vehicle when it was approaching the plaintiff's vehicle crossed the center line and failed to slow down." The court found that "the plaintiff [had] sustained her burden of proof that the driver of the state vehicle negligently operated her vehicle and caused the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle in one or more of the ways set forth in the operative complaint." Further, the court determined that Benak's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.

In her operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Benak was negligent in a...