Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works Company

Decision Date05 August 1920
Citation111 A. 193,95 Conn. 350
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesFAIR v. HARTFORD RUBBER WORKS.

Case Reversed from Superior Court, Hartford County; William M Maltbie, Judge.

Action by George Fair against the Hartford Rubber Works. On reservation of questions of law arising on formal award by the Compensation Commissioner for the First Congressional District upon the facts found by him. Superior court advised the commissioner has power to reopen his award, etc., and to render judgment accordingly.

It appears from the finding of the commissioner: That on the 16th day of May, 1919, he approved a voluntary agreement of settlement between the claimant and the respondent, reciting that the average weekly wage of the claimant, computed in accordance with the statute, was $16.84, and that on or about January 1, 1919, the claimant sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, said injury being described in said agreement as follows:

" Hit in right eye with piece of rubber, which reduced the sight of right eye to less than one-tenth of normal vision,"

-and that the respondent contracted to pay the sum of $8.42 for the period of 104 weeks from January 26, 1919. Some three months after the approval of this voluntary settlement the claimant applied to the commissioner to have the original award set aside, and for an award as for total and permanent incapacity substituted therefor. On the evidence introduced at the hearing it appeared that the claimant, prior to the injury recited in the contract of voluntary settlement, had totally lost the sight of his left eye, and that as a result of the injury to his right eye in combination with his antecedent infirmity, claimant was totally and permanently blind. No evidence was introduced at the hearing to show that the incapacity of the claimant since the voluntary agreement of settlement was entered into had increased, decreased, or ceased, or that any changed conditions of fact had arisen with respect thereto. The questions reserved for our decision are whether the commissioner under the conditions stated has power to reopen the claim, and whether the claimant is entitled to compensation for total incapacity under section 5351 of the General Statutes, or for partial incapacity under subsection " G," of section 5352.

Albion B. Wilson, of Hartford, for plaintiff.

Charles Welles Gross, of Hartford, for defendant.

BEACH J.

We take up first the question of the substantive rights of the claimant under the Compensation Act as it stood at the time of the injury; and, having regard to the general scheme of compensation set forth in sections 5351 and 5352, we are of opinion that the claimant was plainly entitled, under the terms of the statute, to an award for total and permanent incapacity under section 5351; that is to say, to a weekly compensation equal to one-half of his average weekly earnings, at the time of the injury, for 520 weeks. Section 5351, which carries the subtitle. " Compensation for Total Incapacity," provides for compensation based on one-half of the average weekly wage of the claimant at the time of the injury, to be continued not longer than the period of total incapacity, and in no event longer than 520 weeks. Then follows a schedule of injuries, which are to be considered as causing total incapacity and compensation paid accordingly. These include total and permanent loss of sight in both eyes and other injuries equally serious. Section 5352 carries the subtitle, " Compensation for Partial Incapacity," and provides that in such case the weekly compensation " shall be *** equal to half the difference between his average weekly earnings before the injury and the amount he is able to earn thereafter," to continue during the period of partial incapacity, but not longer than 312 weeks; but for certain enumerated injuries a schedule of specific compensation periods is fixed, graded as to duration according to the severity of the injury, and as to these fixed awards the section provided that they should be " in lieu of all other payments," and among these specific injuries is included the following:

" For the complete and permanent loss of sight in one eye *** one hundred and four weeks."

The question is whether a one-eyed man, who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment destroying the sight of his good eye, whereby he is totally and permanently incapacitated, is entitled, under the act as it stood in 1918, to compensation for total incapacity under section 5351, or only to the specific compensation provided in section 5352 for the loss of one eye.

The respondent relies on the phrase " in lieu of all other payments," and insists that because the injury in question destroyed but one eye, section 5352 controls. This we think ignores the general scheme of the act, which deals with total incapacity under section 5351 and with partial incapacity under section 5352. The latter section assumes that the injured employé is still able to earn something after an injury, and the compensation which it awards is based on one-half of the difference between the earning capacity before and after the injury. Such a measure of compensation is not applicable to an injury which leaves the employé totally incapacitated from earning anything, and all cases of total incapacity, whether...

To continue reading

Request your trial
65 cases
  • State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., Nos. 18462
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 Noviembre 2012
    ...of a right of action or a defense by the laches of its officials” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works Co., 95 Conn. 350, 356, 111 A. 193 (1920) ( “[laches] the rule which denies a rehearing to a non-diligent litigant is not applied in cases [in which] the [s]......
  • Marone v. City of Waterbury
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 10 Marzo 1998
    ...of accident; Hayden v. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co., 100 Conn. 180, 188, 123 A. 9 (1923); to mistakes of fact; Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works Co., 95 Conn. 350, 355, 111 A. 193 (1920); and to fraud; Grabowski v. Miskell, 97 Conn. 76, 84, 115 A. 691 (1921); but not to mistakes of law. Kalinick ......
  • State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 Noviembre 2012
    ...of a right of action or a defense by the laches of its officials" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works Co., 95 Conn. 350, 356, 111 A. 193 (1920) ("[laches] the rule which denies a rehearing to a non-diligent litigant is not applied in cases [in which] the [s]ta......
  • Hustead v. H. E. Brown Timber Company
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 16 Diciembre 1932
    ... ... Life Assur. Corp. v. Beatty, 45 Ga.App. 104, 163 S.E ... 302; Fair v. Hartford Rubber Works Co., 95 Conn ... 350, 111 A. 193; Ellsworth v ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT