Fair v. State

• Decision Date: 30 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 49S04-9312-CR-1439,49S04-9312-CR-1439
• Citation: 627 N.E.2d 427
• Parties: James FAIR, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 427

627 N.E.2d 427

James FAIR, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49S04-9312-CR-1439.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 30, 1993.

Andrew W. Swain, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Pamela F. Carter, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

We grant transfer to examine the rules applicable to inventory searches of automobiles under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Concluding that the search in this case did not comply with the Fourth Amendment, we reverse.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On October 13, 1991, Officer Jeffrey Wager of the Indianapolis Police Department was dispatched to the Vantage Point Apartment Complex in response to a complaint that gun shots had been fired. The police dispatcher advised Wager of a potential suspect described as a black male wearing a red baseball cap and blue or gray pants with a firearm of some kind. Upon arriving at the complex Officer Wager observed a man in the parking lot, later determined to be defendant James Fair, who fit this description. At the time, the suspect was placing a cylindrical object into the trunk of a car.

As Officer Wager pulled into the parking lot, he temporarily lost sight of Fair. When Wager reestablished contact, the trunk was closed, and Fair was standing beside the car. Wager pulled along side Fair and asked him to step away from the car and hold his hands where they could be seen. Fair complied, and Wager performed a pat-down search which turned up six 20-gauge shotgun shells. During the course of the encounter, Officer Wager formed the belief that Fair was a patron at a Vantage Point party to which he had been called earlier in the evening. He also concluded that Fair was intoxicated. At this juncture he arrested Fair for public intoxication, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of his squad car.

Officer Wager then entered Fair's vehicle and searched its glove compartment. His stated purpose in doing this was to locate rental papers which would confirm Fair's claim that he had leased the car. After locating the rental papers, Wager decided to do an inventory search of the vehicle. While searching the interior of the car, he found a green leafy substance which he suspected was marijuana. After concluding that the interior contained no other contraband or "property which needed to be noted," R. at 103, Wager decided that he wanted to look in the trunk. He obtained the keys from Fair and unlocked and opened the trunk, where he found a shotgun on top of some clothing.

The State charged Fair with possession of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-48-4-11 (West 1986); public intoxication, a class B misdemeanor, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 7.1-5-1-3 (West 1982); and dealing in a sawed-off shotgun, a class D felony, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-47-5-4.1 (West Supp.1993). The public intoxication and possession of marijuana counts were later dropped. Prior to trial Fair filed a motion to suppress evidence--the shotgun seized from the trunk. The trial court denied his motion after an evidentiary hearing. Fair was later convicted of the shotgun offense after a bench trial.

Fair's sole contention on appeal has been that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the shotgun. At trial, the State conceded that Officer Wager did not have a warrant to search Fair's car, but persuaded the trial court to admit the shotgun on the theory that it had been discovered pursuant to a valid inventory search. Fair claims that the search did not attend a lawful impoundment and therefore the inventory was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. ¹ He also claims that the search was made in bad faith, a mere pretext for a criminal investigation. The majority of a divided Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and concluded that a proper inventory search had occurred. Fair v. State (1993), Ind.App., 615 N.E.2d 489. We disagree and reverse.

II. Introduction to Inventory Searches

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that searches of private property be reasonable. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Montague v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181. This generally means the search must be authorized by a properly issued warrant. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271. It is a "cardinal principle" in search and seizure jurisprudence that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); Montague, 266 Ind. at 55, 360 N.E.2d at 185. When the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence that was seized during a warrantless search, it bears the burden of showing both the need for an exemption from the warrant requirement and that its conduct fell within the bounds of the exception. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2412-13; Robles v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 660.

In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), the Supreme Court defined what has become known as the "inventory exception" when it held that the police may conduct a warrantless search of a lawfully impounded automobile if the search is designed to produce an inventory of the vehicle's contents. See also Dixon v. State (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 1318. Because the police are performing an administrative or caretaking function rather than a criminal investigatory function when they impound an automobile, the Court declared that the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are inapplicable. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. at 3097 n. 5. Thus, the justification for an inventory search "does not rest on probable cause and ... the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983); Rabadi, 541 N.E.2d at 274 ("Probable cause is not an issue in such inventory searches because of the non-criminal context in which they occur."). The inventory search is now considered a "well-defined exception to the warrant requirement." Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643, 103 S.Ct. at 2608; Foulks v. State (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 374, 376.

As in all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the test of constitutionality in inventory cases is reasonableness. The First Circuit has observed that reasonableness has a protean quality which renders it more a concept than a constant, United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992), such that it cannot be usefully refined "in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In determining the reasonableness of an inventory search, courts must examine all the facts and circumstances of a case. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. This examination typically encompasses two overlapping sets of circumstances. First, the propriety of the impoundment must be established because the need for the inventory arises from the impoundment. Second, the scope of the inventory must be evaluated. Where either is clearly unreasonable, the search will not be upheld. In borderline cases, however, the ultimate character of the search is often most clearly revealed when both the necessitousness of the impoundment and the scrupulousness of the inventorying are viewed together.

III. The Decision to Impound

As we have said, the threshold question in inventory cases is whether the impoundment itself was proper. Accord People v. Braasch, 122 Ill.App.3d 747, 78 Ill.Dec. 67, 461 N.E.2d 651 (1984); see also United States v. Young, 825 F.2d 60, 61 (5th Cir.1987) (finding inventory was reasonable "presupposes that the police had the right to impound the vehicle"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 1483, 99 L.Ed.2d 711 (1988). Furthermore, "where the circumstances show that the police had no authority to impound the vehicle, or that police custodial care of the vehicle was not necessary, the inventory search was unlawful." Annotation, Inventory Search of Impounded Vehicles, 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 544 (1973) quoted in State v. Jewell, 338 So.2d 633, 638 (La.1976). Fair asks us to hold that police can properly impound a car only if their authority to do so is invoked by violation of a motor vehicle or forfeiture statute. In support of his argument, he observes that Indiana has numerous statutes authorizing the impoundment of motor vehicles. ² While impoundment pursuant to such statutes is clearly proper, we agree with the Court of Appeals that statutory authority does not present the sole justification which courts will recognize, Fair, 615 N.E.2d at 491, inasmuch as impoundment is sometimes warranted by exigencies not cataloged in state statutes.

The police are expected not only to enforce the criminal laws but also to aid those in distress, abate hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and perform an infinite variety of other tasks calculated to enhance and maintain the safety of communities. The Supreme Court has recognized this multifaceted nature of policing and, in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) labeled it the "community caretaking function[ ]." This rubric is "a catchall for the wide range of responsibilities that...