Fairbank v. Haentzsche
| Decision Date | 30 September 1874 |
| Citation | 73 Ill. 236,1874 WL 8966 |
| Parties | N. K. FAIRBANK et al.v.RUDOLPH HAENTZSCHE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH E. GARY, Judge, presiding. Messrs. WALKER, DEXTER & SMITH, for the appellants.
Messrs. BARBER & LACKNER, for the appellee.
In December, 1872, Mary Arnold was employed in one department of appellants' factory. There were in the same room with her 18 or 20 persons, mostly females, all engaged in the work of making tin pails in which lard was to be packed. What was then but one room had formerly constituted two. The partition, however, that divided them had all been taken down, except a small portion left for support. Around the sides of the room were placed benches, at which sat the girls, whose business it was to solder the tin work. It was deemed expedient to change the engine from one room of the factory to another, and it was placed in the room west of and adjoining what was the work-room before the partition was removed. The main shaft projected through the division wall into the work-room occupied by the deceased and other employees, a distance from four to six feet, at a point a few feet from that part of the partition left standing. This change was made on the 14th of December, in the evening, for the reason, as is alleged, the proprietors were so pressed with business they had not time to do it during the day. On the morning of the 16th of December, Mary Arnold came, with the other girls, to her work at the usual hour. Having taken some pails from the “crimper,” which stood a little north of the center of the room, and placed them on her bench, she started to get some solder, which was kept in another part of the room. In going to or coming from that point, she passed the shaft, then in motion, and, in some unexplained way, her clothing was caught, drawing her around it, which occasioned the injuries that produced her death.
It is contended the deceased had the same knowledge, or means of knowledge, of the producing cause of the injury, with appellants, and hence it is insisted there can be no recovery. The principle, that where the servant has equal means of knowledge, with the master, of the danger to which he is exposed while in the service of the latter, he will be presumed to assume all risks incident to the employment, is certainly familiar law, and is sustained by the authorities; but the difficulty is, in the application of the principle to the facts of this case. The deceased was not injured by anything occurring in her employment, or by anything that could properly be said to be incident thereto. It was by a temporary peril, to which she and the other employees were exposed, by the negligent conduct of the proprietors of the factory. It is not controverted the length of the shaft, when put in, was greater than was necessary, and the only reason assigned for not sooner cutting it off was, the press of business. This fact will hardly justify the conduct of appellants. According to their own testimony, they knew the shaft, in its then condition, was dangerous to those engaged in the room, for they undertake to prove they warned them to be careful. The room was about 50 feet long, by 25 or 30 feet wide. The center portion was occupied by a press, crimper, shears and boxes, used in forming pails. There were engaged in this department 18 or 20 women. Besides, the room contained all their work upon which they were engaged, and much other material. It was necessary for the employees to go from one part of the room to another, and, in doing so, they had, of necessity, to pass this revolving shaft. It had around it no guard, indeed nothing at all, to prevent persons from getting against it.
But for the urgent necessity for the manufacture of this work, which occasioned great hurry, it distinctly appears, from the evidence, the danger to which the employees were exposed would have been previously removed by shortening the shaft, as was afterward done. The superintendent, and no doubt all the employees, understood it was a mere temporary...
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