Fairchild Heights Residents Ass'n., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., No. CV 05 4004828 S (Conn. Super. 5/4/2006)

• Decision Date: 04 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV 05 4004828 S,CV 05 4004828 S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc. Opinion No.: 93417

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Unpublished Opinion

Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc Opinion No.: 93417

No. CV 05 4004828 S

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford at Milford

May 4, 2006

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

BARRY K. STEVENS, JUDGE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 18, 2004, the plaintiff, Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc., filed a three-count complaint against the defendant Fairchild Heights, Inc. The plaintiff is a non-stock corporation. The plaintiff's membership consists of approximately forty-three of the one hundred nine owners of mobile manufactured home units located in the Fairchild Heights Mobile Home Park (Park) in Shelton. The defendant is the owner and landlord of the Park. The plaintiff brings this action on behalf of its members, and alleges that its claims are representative of all of the Park's residents.

Count one of the plaintiff's complaint alleges negligence per se in violation of General Statutes §21-64 et seq., for negligence in the maintenance and upkeep of the roads and the mobile homes in the Park. Count two alleges negligence per se in violation of ordinances of the city of Shelton, and count three alleges unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes. §§42-110a et seq. The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, money damages, return of rent paid by its members, punitive damages, attorneys fees and costs.

On November 4, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks standing. The defendant filed a memorandum in support of its motion. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on December 12, 2005 and the defendant filed a reply. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

DISCUSSION

"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 485, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

As previously stated, the defendant moves to dismiss this action on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks standing. It argues that the harm the plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct is indirect and remote. It also contends that in order to determine or apportion any recoverable damages, the plaintiff's individual members must either join this action or institute their own actions.

The plaintiff counters that a non-stock corporation has standing in its representative capacity to bring a lawsuit on behalf of its members. More specifically, the plaintiff contends that it has satisfied the elements for "representational standing," particularly because it is seeking equitable as well as legal relief.

"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghomohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 328, 852 A.2d 703 (2004). "[I]f the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are remote, indirect or derivative with respect to the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff is not the proper party to assert them and lacks standing to do so. Where, for example, the harms asserted to have been suffered directly by a plaintiff are in reality derivative of injuries to a third party, the injuries are not direct but are indirect, and the plaintiff has no standing to assert them." Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 347-48, 780 A.2d 98 (2001).

The United States Supreme Court "identified three policy factors to guide courts in their application of the general principle that plaintiffs with indirect injuries lack standing to sue . . . First, the more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to determine the amount of plaintiff's damages attributable to the wrongdoing as opposed to other, independent factors. Second, recognizing claims by the indirectly injured would require courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, in order to avoid the risk of multiple recoveries. Third, struggling with the first two problems is unnecessary where there are directly injured parties who can remedy the harm without these attendant problems." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 353.

The plaintiff argues that it has standing to maintain this action because the allegations of the complaint satisfy the elements of associational or representational standing established in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) and adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 614-15, 508 A.2d 743 (1986). Under the test established in Hunt, an association has standing to bring an action on behalf of its members if "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal...