Fairchild Heights Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 18917.,18917. |
| Citation | 82 A.3d 602,310 Conn. 797 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | FAIRCHILD HEIGHTS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. FAIRCHILD HEIGHTS, INC. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Douglas J. Varga, with whom, on the brief, were Maximino Medina, Jr., Bridgeport, and Dominic Spinelli, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas T. Lonardo, with whom were Colin P. Mahon, Meriden, and Ryan A. Bauder, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).
George Jepsen, attorney general, Gregory T. D'Auria, solicitor general, and Phillip Rosario and Brendan T. Flynn, assistant attorneys general, filed a brief for the state of Connecticut et al. as amici curiae.
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McDONALD and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.
The plaintiff, Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc. (association), appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and directed that court to dismiss the association's claims alleging negligence and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq., against the defendant, Fairchild Heights, Inc., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The association argues that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before requesting declaratory relief and that it did not have standing to bring an action under CUTPA. We reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case for a new trial on the association's CUTPA claim.
The following relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the trial court's memorandum of decision. The association is a nonstock corporation that represents approximately forty-five mobile home owners who reside at the Fairchild Heights Mobile Home Park (park) in the town of Shelton. Nancy Dickal, a park resident for more than thirty years, has been the association's president since its creation in February, 2005. The defendant is a Connecticut corporation that owns and operates the park. The defendant's majority shareholder and the park's on-site manager is Jeffrey Doolan.
The association was established in part to address maintenance issues. Shortly after its creation, the association distributed a membership application to residents that included questions asking them to identify specific concerns regarding the park's operation and condition. On March 28, 2005, the association's attorney sent a letter to the defendant's attorney discussing these concerns and requesting a meeting to address them. Thereafter, the attorneys conducted a walk-through of the park on June 15, 2005, following which the association's attorney sent a letter to the defendant's attorney listing a series of maintenance violations and giving the defendant three weeks to make the necessary repairs or commit to make the repairs in a timely manner.
After the defendant rejected the deadline and the parties' negotiations broke down, the association filed an action against the defendant in July, 2006, seeking redress for the defendant's failure to respond to the association's concerns.1 The first two counts of the complaint alleged per se negligence for violations of state statutes and municipal ordinances, respectively, relating to maintenance standards applicable to mobile home park owners under chapter 412 of the General Statutes, entitled General Statutes § 21–64 et seq. The third count alleged a violation of CUTPA. The complaint sought declaratory relief pursuant to Practice Book § 17–56(a)(2), and injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney's fees pursuant to CUTPA. It also sought costs and other equitable relief to which the association might be entitled.
In September, 2006, the association filed a complaint with the Office of the Attorney General.2 The attorney general forwarded the complaint to the Department of Consumer Protection (department), which assigned the matter to a department investigator.3 Following several inspections, the investigator sent a letter dated October 13, 2006, to Doolan advising him of “serious violations” of General Statutes § 21–82(a). 4 The letter listed the violations and requested that Doolan advise the department by October 30, 2006, as to when the violations would be corrected, adding that a failure to cooperate would lead to additional enforcement action. Apparently in response to this letter, Doolan initiated certain actions intended to correct the violations.
Thereafter, the department investigator conducted further inspections of the park. In July, 2007, he issued two written reports noting certain improvements but stating that a number of violations had not yet been corrected. On July 31, 2007, the department conducted an informal compliance hearing, which was attended by the parties' counsel. At the hearing, it was noted that the defendant had made progress in addressing the violations but that concerns remained. In response, Doolan agreed to perform additional work to eliminate these concerns and to bring the park in compliance with the applicable statutory standards.
On October 24, 2007, the department investigator conducted another inspection and noted in a subsequent report that various improvements had been made. He also noted certain outstanding work that remained to be done. In a report dated November 28, 2007, however, the investigator referred to the October 24 inspection and stated that “[a]ll previous concerns appeared to be addressed.” A letter from the department to the defendant's attorney dated December 28, 2007, similarly stated that the department had “determined” that the park was “in compliance” with state law, “no further action [was] warranted,” and the file regarding the park had been “closed.”
On August 20, 2008, the association amended the complaint previously filed with the trial court in July, 2006, adding more detail to the existing three counts and one count of per se negligence for the defendant's alleged violations of statutory provisions relating to renewal of the residents' mobile home leases in December, 2007. The association also requested declaratory relief under Practice Book §§ 17–55 and 17–56, and injunctive relief to compel the defendant's compliance with the applicable statutory provisions, to correct any current areas of noncompliance, and to preclude the defendant from attempting to recover from the association's members or other park residents any costs or expenses arising out of or relating to the litigation. The association further clarified that it was requesting injunctive relief pursuant to CUTPA, among other statutory provisions.5
The case was tried to the court in May, 2009, after which the parties filed posttrial briefs. In a memorandum of decision dated September 24, 2009, the trial court found in favor of the defendant on all counts. The court explained that, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, administrative decisions are entitled to preclusive effect’ ” and that, with regard to counts one and three, the association had failed to provide the court with case law to support a modification of the department's findings for the defendant in the absence of an administrative appeal. The trial court further stated, with regard to count two, that the association had not met its burden of proof because no municipal employee had testified that the park was in violation of the municipal ordinances. The trial court finally found in favor of the defendant on the CUTPA count, declining to modify the department's finding that the defendant was in compliance with the statutes cited in the association's complaint.
The association appealed to the Appellate Court, which ordered supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the association had standing to bring a CUTPA claim. Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., 131 Conn.App. 567, 571 n. 7, 27 A.3d 467 (2011). The Appellate Court subsequently concluded that “the [association] failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that the trial court otherwise lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed the case.” Id., at 568–69, 27 A.3d 467.
The Appellate Court first determined that the operative complaint for purposes of addressing subject matter jurisdiction was the association's original complaint, and not the amended complaint on which the action had been tried. See id., at 574 n. 8, 27 A.3d 467. The Appellate Court thus did not address the alleged violation of statutory lease provisions, a claim that had not been included in the original complaint. The court then concluded, with respect to the first two counts of the original complaint alleging violations of maintenance standards and municipal ordinances under chapter 412, that the association's request for declaratory relief should be dismissed because the association had not sought a declaratory ruling from the department and thus had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. See id., at 577–80, 27 A.3d 467. The Appellate Court also concluded that the association did not have standing to seek injunctive relief because the original complaint did not allege that, in the absence of an injunction, the association would suffer irreparable harm.6 See id., at 580–82, 27 A.3d 467. The court finally concluded that the association lacked standing to bring a CUTPA claim because the association's allegations of damages required the participation of the individual association members in order to satisfy the CUTPA requirement of demonstrating ascertainable loss. Id., at 582–84, 27 A.3d 467. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court with direction to dismiss the association's action. Id., at 584, 27 A.3d 467.
The association filed a petition for certification to appeal to this court, and we granted certification limited to the following issue: “Did the...
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