Fairchild v. Mathews

Decision Date07 June 1966
Docket NumberNo. 9550,9550
Citation91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43
PartiesArthur A. FAIRCHILD, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Neill MATHEWS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

C. H. Higer, Emmett, for appellant.

Ryan & Speropulos, Weiser, for respondent.

SPEAR, Justice. tThis is an action brought by respondent, Arthur A. Fairchild, to recover the balance claimed due and owing on a contract for labor and services performed on appellant's land.

During the month of March or April, 1961, Fairchild and appellant's nephew entered into an oral agreement for certain land leveling work to be performed on a portion of Mathews' land known as the 'Home Forty' upon which Mathews' residence was located. Pursuant to said agreement respondent furnished a D7 caterpillar tractor, a scraper and other allied equipment such as a ripper and dozer, and an operator for the purpose of leveling this land. The parties agreed respondent should be paid at the rate of $12.50 per hour for the time spent when the machines were actually operating.

Respondent hired Sydney Christensen as his operator and the leveling work was performed on the Home Forty from May 1, 1961 through May 23, 1961. Additionally, four hours of work were performed on the Home Forty on June 13, 1961. During this time Christensen recorded the hours actually spent operating the machines and said record was admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. While work was being performed on the Home Forty appellant approached respondent for the purpose of having certain work done on another tract of land owned by appellant and known as the 'West Forty.' Orally it was agreed that respondent was to level a certain hill on this tract, fill a certain existing drain ditch, and dig another drain ditch closer to the southern boundary of this tract.

The price to be paid for this work is in complete dispute. Respondent testified that no definite price was stated or agreed upon and he merely assumed it was understood by both parties that payment was to be made at the rate of $12.50 per hour just as it was on the Home Forty. He further testified that his estimate to appellant of the total cost of this work would amount to from $1000 to $1200. On the other hand appellant testified it was definitely agreed by the parties that the price for this additional work on the West Forty was to be $300 if respondent performed the ditch work personally and $250 if respondent hired a third party to perform that part of the work.

The work was performed on the West Forty from May 24, 1961 through June 24, 1961. Again Christensen kept a written record of the actual hours spent operating the machines, as shown in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2. A summary of these two records was made by respondent and admitted into evidence was Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. These exhibits show 178 hours of work done on the Home Forty and 137 hours on the West Forty. However, in a letter written by respondent to the A.S.C.P. Committee of Payette County, respondent indicated only 160 1/2 hours of work performed on the Home Forty, but this does not include the four hours of work performed on June 13 (Plf.Exh. 5).

Respondent received payments from the Federal Land Bank and appellant totalling $2,175.

Additionally, respondent received a check of $250 dated March 29, 1962 from appellant, and written on the face thereof is the following:

'Leveling in full. Home Place.' (Plf.Exh. 8) This check was accepted by respondent on April 2, 1962. Appellant testified in effect that prior to the execution of this check the parties were in dispute concerning the balance due respondent for the work performed and that payment by this check constituted payment in full and closed the entire transaction. This was the purpose of the notation, 'Leveling in full. Home Place.' To the contrary respondent testified there was no intention on his part of accepting the $250 check (Plf.Exh. 8) as payment in full because he had already received payment in excess of that to which he was entitled for the leveling work performed on the 'Home Forty' and to him the notation 'Home Place' really meant the 'Home Forty.' He also testified to several attempts to secure further payments for the work which had been performed on the West Forty, after receipt of the check from appellant. These providing unavailing, plaintiff filed his complaint on September 19, 1963 seeking recovery from appellant in the sum of $1,512.50, together with interest from April 2, 1962, claiming this as a balance due for 315 hours of work performed.

Appellant answered with a general denial alleging respondent had been paid in full, and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that by the payment of $250 by check, Plf. Exh. 8, all claims had been settled and payment therefor accepted by respondent.

After a trial by the court sitting without a jury, the court found and concluded that respondent had performed work on the Home Forty for a total of 164 1/2 hours, that at the rate of $12.50 per hour as agreed upon by the parties, respondent was entitled to $2,056.25, that respondent had received payments totalling $2,425 (including the $250 check) and there was therefore an overage of $368.75 to be applied to the amount due for work performed on the West Forty. The court further found and concluded that concerning the West Forty there had been no meeting of the minds between the parties as to the price to be paid, and therefore appellant should be required to pay a reasonable price; or to put it another way, the respondent was entitled to receive a reasonable value for services performed, and that the reasonable value would be 60% of $12.50 per hour, which for 137 hours of work would total $1,027.50. Deducting therefrom the overage previously found, the balance due was computed by the trial court as $658.75.

To these findings respondent objected on the ground there was no evidence to support a finding of quantum meruit or reasonable value of services performed at anything less than the full $12.50 per hour. After hearing thereon the trial court concluded that such objection was well taken and in amended findings of fact found that the reasonable value of the work done on the West Forty was the full $12.50 per hour and the true balance due respondent was $1,343.75, together with interest from July 2, 1962. Judgment was entered accordingly.

In his appeal from this judgment appellant lists three assignments of error: (1) that the court erred in not finding acceptance of the $250 check of March 29, 1962 amounted to an accord and satisfaction; (2) that the court erred in reversing its memorandum decision by finding in quantum meruit for the full $12.50 rather than 60% thereof as the reasonable value for services performed, thus in effect granting respondent all he had asked for in his complaint; and (3) that the court erred in not allowing appellant and his wife to testify what was understood to be defined as the 'Home Place' as indicated on the check (Plf.Exh. 8).

We find no merit in any of these assignments of error.

Accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging a contract or cause of action, hereby the parties agree to give and accept something in settlement of the claim or demand of the one against the other, and perform such agreement, the 'accord' being the agreement and the 'satisfaction' its execution or performance.

To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must be an offer in full satisfaction of the obligation accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if it is accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and the condition must be such that the party to whom the offer is made is bound to understand that if he accepts it, he does so subject to the conditions imposed. Nordling v. Whelchel Mines Co., 90 Idaho 213, 409 P.2d 398; Clay v. Rossi, 62 Idaho 140, 108 P.2d 506; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 1, p. 301; 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 6, p. 476.

In order for the acceptance of a check to amount to an accord and satisfaction, where it is for a lesser sum than is claimed by the creditor to be due, the conditions must be made plain, definite and certain by the...

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    ...v. Blue Flame Gas Co., 90 Idaho 393, 412 P.2d 418; Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Brown, 90 Idaho 403, 412 P.2d 586; Fairchild v. Matthews, 91 Idaho 1, 415 P.2d 43; and McKenney v. Anselomo, 91 Idaho 118, 416 P.2d 509. Shriveses contend, however, that this principle is not applicable to fr......
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    ...the Court notes that the cases can be traced back to a case that does not require dispute of the obligation, Fairchild v. Mathews, 91 Idaho 1, 415 P.2d 43 (1966), and that the dispute requirement crept in by way of the UCC adopted in the Idaho Peterson argues that the district court's concl......
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