Fairclough v. St. Amand
Decision Date | 03 November 1927 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 808 |
Citation | 217 Ala. 19,114 So. 472 |
Parties | FAIRCLOUGH v. ST. AMAND. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; William M. Walker Judge.
Bill in the nature of a bill of review by Frederick St. Amand against Dorothy Woodward Fairclough, to set aside a decree of divorce rendered in a cause styled "Dorothy E. St. Almond against Frederick St. Almond." From a decree for complainant, respondent appeals. Reversed and rendered.
James H. Willis and McClellan, Rice & Stone, all of Birmingham, for appellant.
Frank Bainbridge, of Birmingham, for appellee.
A court of equity will look behind the nominal complainant to ascertain the truth of the matter in the determination of who the real parties in interest are, and as affecting and enforcing an estoppel against either of said parties, if the facts warrant. Nicrosi v. Calera Land Co., 115 Ala 429, 22 So. 147; Whiteman v. Taber, 205 Ala. 319, 87 So. 353.
The general principles of an estoppel have been stated by the courts and need not be repeated. Ivy v. Hood, 202 Ala. 121, 79 So. 587. It is rested on reason, and to the effect, that one who procures a decree (of divorce) through his or her fraudulent conduct is bound by it and is thereby estopped to question its validity. This is the rule of the English (Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 Howell, St. Tr 355) and that of the American courts. Kaufman v Kaufman, 177 A.D. 162, 163 N.Y.S. 566; Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N.J.Eq. 60; Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76, 35 N.E. 761, 764, 39 Am.St.Rep. 156; Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, 186 Mich. 324, 152 N.W. 921; Simons v. Simons, 47 Mich. 253, 645, 10 N.W. 360; Bancroft v. Bancroft, 178 Cal. 359, 173 P. 579; Moor v. Moor (Tex.Civ.App.) 63 S.W. 347.
And in Supreme Lodge v. Eckhardt, 197 Ill.App. 302, it is declared:
"The jurisdiction of a court of a suit for divorce cannot be questioned in a subsequent proceeding by the party at whose request and upon whose testimony as to jurisdiction of facts such court found that it had jurisdiction, especially where such party has received the benefits of the divorce litigation and rights of others have accrued thereunder, it being immaterial whether the adjudication in the divorce litigation was procured through misrepresentation of facts or misrepresentation of the law."
Such is the rule as to parties to an action, and a person in privity with them who caused the same is likewise bound. 2 Freeman on Judgments, § 336. That is, estoppel and laches have been held to bind a personal representative of the party so affected. Patterson v. Weaver (Ala.Sup.) 114 So. 301; Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 276, 57 So. 474. And such is the estoppel as to invoking the question of the jurisdiction of the court where the action challenged was invoked or procured by fraud of a party in interest. Nichols v. Nichols, supra; Supreme Lodge v. Eckhardt, supra; Moor v. Moor, supra; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 96 Mich. 128, 55 N.W. 673.
A careful reading of this record convinces us that Fairclough actuated, dominated, participated, and procured the decree that by this suit is challenged as constituting a fraud as to the residence that vitiated the decree of divorce in the suit of St. Amand or St. Almond. The validity vel non of that decree affects other procedures in another state, on which the rights of Dorothy and her child Kingston (by Fairclough) are rested, by virtue of the second marriage in another state contracted by Dorothy and Mr. Fairclough, Jr., after that decree for divorce was rendered in Alabama. Not only did said Fairclough come to Alabama for the purpose of that proceeding, after assuring Dorothy that her marriage or temporary status with St. Almond was a nullity, but he caused the jurisdiction of the Alabama court to be invoked to the end of the rendition of the decree, and with a full knowledge of all the facts, thereafter, he remarried Dorothy in New York, and she bore him a child whose paternity he has consistently recognized, treating and regarding the mother as his wife and the child as his son. This action on his part was predicated on his guilty conduct in the premises, with full knowledge of facts and the legal effect or status superinduced, and in acquiescence of his guilty conduct advised, arranged, procured, financed, and was a beneficiary of the Alabama decree for divorce. When the Faircloughs came to Alabama, divorce was his object that he might remarry Dorothy. He had repeatedly assured her that her temporary association with St. Almond, by reason of her immaturity, or nonconsent, or whatever be the reason, was invalid under the law of New York or New Jersey. She was a passive agent or actor under his domination and control, subject to his wish, suggestion, or domination. His was the guilty knowledge of all the facts and the law in the premises and participated and directed to the end of the fraud he now seeks to uncover under other name and agency. He left his home on the 9th or 10th of January, 1923, for Birmingham, bringing Dorothy, after he had been advised by his friends or members of his family not to do so; his object was divorce against St. Almond.
Such was not Dorothy's intention or aim--it was subservience to his will and purpose of the husband she loved and trusted, by reason of their former marriage. She said in reply to the question:
Her position is further defined as follows:
And she then stated that she lived with him in Birmingham as husband and wife, confided, trusted, and loved him as her husband, and from that relation she bore him the son they called Kingston, whom he recognizes and admits as his child. She was asked and answered:
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