FAIRVIEW TP. v. FAIRVIEW TP. POLICE ASS'N

• Decision Date: 28 March 2002
• Citation: 795 A.2d 463
• Parties: FAIRVIEW TOWNSHIP v. FAIRVIEW TOWNSHIP POLICE ASSOCIATION, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

795 A.2d 463

FAIRVIEW TOWNSHIP v. FAIRVIEW TOWNSHIP POLICE ASSOCIATION, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 3, 2001.

Decided March 28, 2002.

Sean T. Welby, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Walter A. Tilley, III, York, for appellee.

Before McGINLEY, Judge, FRIEDMAN, Judge, and MIRARCHI, Jr., Senior Judge.

OPINION BY Senior Judge MIRARCHI.

The Fairview Township Police Association (Association) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County that vacated the portion of the arbitration award requiring Fairview Township (Township), a second class township, to provide postretirement medical benefits to its police officers and their spouses upon their retirement.

The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Township's petition to review the arbitration award due to the Township's failure to timely file the petition; and (2) whether the arbitrators had authority to require the Township to provide postretirement medical benefits to its police officers and their spouses under the Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, commonly known as "Act 111," 43 P.S. §§ 217.1—217.10, and Section 1512(d) of The Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. § 66512(d). We reverse and reinstate the arbitration award.

The Association is a collective bargaining unit representing the Township police officers. Before the collective bargaining agreement between the Association and the Township was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1999, the parties began negotiating terms of a new agreement. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the parties submitted the disputes for arbitration. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act 111, 43 P.S. § 217.4, each party appointed an arbitrator, and the third neutral arbitrator was selected by the arbitrators appointed by the parties from the list provided by the American Arbitration Association.

In the Stipulation submitted to the trial court, the parties stipulated to the following events that occurred after an arbitration hearing held in February 2000. Sometime in August 2000, the Association-appointed arbitrator signed a proposed arbitration award and forwarded it to the neutral arbitrator. On August 22, 2000, the neutral arbitrator signed the award and forwarded it to the Township-appointed arbitrator, John J. Sylvanus, Esquire, who received it on August 25, 2000. On September 25, 2000, Sylvanus gave a copy of the award to the Township solicitor without signing or dissenting from the award. Sylvanus and the Township solicitor are partners in the same law firm. Sylvanus also faxed a copy of the arbitration award to the Township assistant manager on September 25, 2000.

On October 25, 2000, the Township filed the petition for review with the trial court seeking to vacate Paragraph 10 of the arbitration award, which provided:

Retirement Healthcare—Effective January 1, 2000 the Township shall provide medical benefits to officers and their spouses for all officers retiring on either disability pursuant to Act 600 or normal age and service retirement pursuant to Act 600. Said benefits shall extend for a period of five years from the date of the officer's retirement and shall only be provided if the officer certifies, in writing, on or before the anniversary date of his or her retirement that he or she is not eligible for coverage under any other employer sponsored healthcare plan, including a plan sponsored by the employer of his or her spouse. Further, for spousal coverage, the officer must be legally married to his or her spouse at the time of retirement. An officer must choose and be eligible for this benefit at the time of his or her retirement.

The Township alleged that it was not permitted to pay postretirement medical benefits to the police officers and their spouses under Section 1512(d) of The Second Class Township Code, which provides in relevant part:

The board of supervisors may contract with any insurance company, nonprofit hospitalization corporation or nonprofit medical service corporation to insure its ... employes and their dependents under a policy or policies of group insurance covering life, health, hospitalization, medical service or accident insurance. (Emphasis added.)

The Township argued that the term "employes" under Section 1512(d) includes only current employees, not former employees who have retired, and that by requiring the Township to provide postretirement benefits to its former employees, the arbitrators mandated the Township to perform an illegal act. In its answer, the Association alleged that the Township failed to timely file the petition for review within thirty days of the arbitration award.

The trial court concluded that the petition for review was filed timely within thirty days after the Township-appointed arbitrator provided the copy of the arbitration award to the Township. As to the merits of the petition, the trial court concluded that the term "employes" under Section 1512(d) includes only current employees and that the arbitrators therefore mandated the Township to perform an illegal act by requiring it to provide postretirement medical benefits to retirees and their spouses. The trial court accordingly vacated Paragraph 10 of the arbitration award. The Association's appeal to this Court followed.

Article 3, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. Art. 3, § 31, authorizes the General Assembly to enact laws "which provide that the findings of panels or commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers shall be binding upon all parties...." Pursuant to Article 3, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Legislature enacted the Act 111 granting policemen and firemen "the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits" and "the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes." Section 1 of the Act 111, 43 P.S. § 217.1.

Section 7(a) of the Act 111, 43 P.S. § 217.7(a), further provides in pertinent part:

The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.

Despite Section 7(a) of the Act 111 disallowing an appeal from the arbitration award, the courts have recognized limited review of an arbitration award under the narrow certiorari scope of review, under which the reviewing court may question only (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) excess of the arbitrators' power; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers' Ass'n, 540 Pa. 66, 656 A.2d 83 (1995); Guthrie v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 508 Pa. 590, 499 A.2d 570 (1985).¹

The Association first contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitration award because the Township failed to timely file the petition for review.

The petition to review an arbitration award is deemed to be an appeal from an order of a government agency and, therefore, must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the arbitration award. Section 933(b) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(b); Section 5571(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b). For the purpose of determining the timeliness of an appeal, the date of entry of an order is the date of service of the order, or the date of mailing if service is made by mail. Section 5572 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5572.

The Association argues that the arbitration award executed by the majority of the arbitration panel constitutes a final decision on the disputed issues under Section 7(a) of the Act 111, and that the date of the entry of the arbitration award in this matter, therefore, should be August 22, 2000 when the arbitration award signed by the Association-appointed arbitrator and the neutral arbitrator was mailed to the Township-appointed arbitrator.

The facts in this matter are similar to those in City of Jeannette v. Fraternal Order of Police, Jeannette Lodge No. 24, 477 Pa. 588, 385 A.2d 351 (1978). In that case, the neutral arbitrator executed the award and sent the copy of the award to the arbitrators appointed by the parties. The union-appointed arbitrator then concurred in the award in writing and forwarded it to the township-appointed arbitrator, who dissented from the award and forwarded the copy of the award signed by the majority of the arbitration panel and the copy of his dissent to the neutral arbitrator, who in turn forwarded those copies to the American Arbitration Association. The American Arbitration Association subsequently sent the copies of the arbitration award and the dissent to the parties.

As in this matter, the union argued that for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the application for review of the arbitration award, the date of the award was the date of the execution of the award by the majority of the arbitration panel. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the union's argument and held that the arbitration award is considered final under Section 7(a) of the Act 111 only where the award is in writing, and a copy of the award is forwarded to both parties, and that the date of the award was therefore the date that the parties received the copy of the award from the American Arbitration Association.

In this matter, the Township-appointed arbitrator received the arbitration award executed by the Association-appointed...