Faith v. Bowles

• Decision Date: 22 June 1897
• Parties: FAITH v. BOWLES ET AL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

37 A. 711

86 Md. 13

FAITH v. BOWLES ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 22, 1897

Appeal from circuit court, Washington county.

Ejectment by Rosanna Bowles and others against Lewis Faith. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and BRYAN, BRISCOE, BOYD, and ROBERTS JJ.

Geo. W Smith, Jr., and Wm. Kealhofer, for appellant.

Lewis D. Syester, J. Marbourg Keedy, and J. C. Lane, for appellees.

ROBERTS J.

This is an action of ejectment, brought by the appellees to recover from the appellant a lot of land in Washington county, in this state. The circumstances under which this controversy arises are that on the 4th of June, 1865 Washington county, a body corporate of said state, purchased from John J. Bowles and wife, for the consideration of $100 a certain lot of land, upon which Bowles then resided, and which was known in the corporation of the town of Hancock as "Lot No. 23." A deed of that date for said lot was executed and delivered to said county by said Bowles and wife, containing the statement that it was granted to said county "for a public school house, as the property of the schools of said county, and for no other purpose, in fee." The deed also contains a special warranty, and a covenant for such other assurances as may be requisite. Immediately after its purchase, the lot was improved by the erection of a school house thereon, and it continued to be used for public school purposes until the 13th of December, 1889, when it was sold and conveyed by the board of county school commissioners of Washington county to the appellant, who converted the same into a dwelling house, which for nearly seven years, and until after this suit was brought, he has continued to occupy as a dwelling. This suit is brought by the widow and heirs at law of John J. Bowles, the original grantor in the first-mentioned deed, who claim that the lot was conveyed by Bowles, the grantor, upon the condition that the lot was to be used for "public school purposes and for no other use," and that the abandonment of its use for public school purposes was a breach of the condition subsequent, and worked a forfeiture in favor of the grantor's heirs, who are the appellees here. The case was submitted to and tried before the court below, without the aid of a jury, and upon an agreed statement, the material facts of which have already been stated. So that the only inquiry necessary to be determined on this appeal relates to the proper construction and legal effect which should be given to the language employed in the deed from Bowles and wife to Washington county. Questions of like character with the one here presented have frequently occupied the attention of the courts, so that there is no want of decisions to guide us in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. In this case the original grantors are admitted to have received full consideration for the lot when sold, and, while the question of the amount of the consideration paid can have no effect in enlarging or extending the estate conveyed, it has nevertheless an important bearing upon, and greatly aids in the ascertainment of, the intention of the parties to the conveyance. To determine correctly the meaning and effect of the language of the deed which has brought about this controversy, it becomes our duty to ascertain as nearly as possible the intention of the parties, grantor and grantee. There can be no doubt of the intention of the grantors that the estate should be used for public school purposes. This is clearly manifested, but we search in vain for any words which indicate an intention that, if the grantee omitted so to use the estate, and actually devoted it to another purpose, the same should thereupon be forfeited, and revert to the heirs of the grantors. After careful examination, we have found, as stated by Bigelow, C.J., in Rawson v. Inhabitants, etc., 7 Allen, 129, 130, "no authoritative sanction for the doctrine that a deed is to be construed as a grant on a condition subsequent solely for the reason that it contains a clause declaring the purpose for which it is intended the granted premises shall be used, where such purposes will not inure specially to the benefit of the grantor and his assigns, but is in its...