Falk v. Curtis Pub Co.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1900
• Docket Number: 8.
• Citation: 98 F. 989
• Parties: FALK v. CURTIS PUB. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

98 F. 989

FALK v. CURTIS PUB. CO.

No. 8.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

January 4, 1900

Samuel M. Hyneman, for plaintiff.

J Martin Rommel and Hector T. Fenton, for defendant.

DALLAS Circuit Judge.

The defendant has assigned 10 reasons in support of its demurrer to the plaintiff's statement of claim:

1. The objection that 'the writ and statement are defective and insufficient, in not alleging that the suit is brought as well for himself as for the United States,' need not be considered; for the plaintiff's counsel, though denying that such a suit must be so brought, concede that it may be and have expressed their willingness to amend by adding after the name of the plaintiff these words, 'who sues as well for himself as for the United States'; and this amendment will, of course, be allowed. Megargell v. Coal Co., 8 Watts & S. 342.

2 and 3. The brief for the defendant states that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the demurrer set up the proposition 'that this penalty can only be incurred by a natural person in whose actual possession infringing copies can be, and have been, found prior to suit brought, and cannot be enforced against a corporation. ' This proposition has been earnestly and ably enforced by argument, but it cannot be sustained. It is unquestionably true that section 4965 of the Revised Statutes, upon which this action is founded, is a rigorously penal one, and therefore should be strictly construed. But the construction which the defendant invokes is not merely restrictive,--it is discriminative; and the real question is whether the congress intended, in using the words 'any person,' to discriminate between two sorts of persons (natural and artificial) equally well known, and both recognized by law. No reason has been suggested which could have induced such an intent, and to me it seems that to ascribe to congress a purpose to exempt corporations from, while subjecting natural persons to, the penalties imposed by this section, would be to assume that it purposed a manifestly unreasonable consequence; and of this the court should not be persuaded except by clear and unequivocal expression. 1 Shars. Bl. Comm. p. 90, and note by Christian. But congress has distinctly declared its intent to the contrary; for the first section of the Revised Statutes prescribes that:

'In determining the meaning of the Revised Statutes, * * * the word 'person' may extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations, * * * unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense.'

Although this defining provision is, in my opinion, conclusive of the question, yet I have examined the cases referred to in supposed support of the defendant's position, but without finding that they tend to sustain it. The case of Androscoggin Water-Power Co. v. Bethel Steam-Mill Co., 64 Me. 441, arose under a state statute which created a criminal offense and also imposed a civil liability; and it was held that 'the intent with which the act prohibited is done' was, under that statute, the essential subject of inquiry either in the criminal or in the civil proceeding which it contemplated, and that the intent meant 'is individual, not corporate, intent.' But it was there said:

'While, undoubtedly, the word 'person' may include a body corporate, we do not think that it was the legislative intention that in the act under consideration it should do so. The fair and natural construction to be given to the language used negatives any such idea.'

That case is plainly distinguishable from this one.

In State v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611, a corporation was indicated under an act of the legislature for erecting and keeping up a nuisance. Nothing was decided which is applicable here, but only that, in view of the state of legislation and practice in the state of Ohio, the whole theory and machinery of whose administration of criminal law seems adapted only to the prosecution and punishment of natural persons, the legislature could not have intended in the use of the word 'person,' which is found in almost every criminal law of the state, to authorize an indictment against a corporation for this particular offense, without any special or further provision as to the liability of corporations or the mode of proceeding against them.

Benson v. Manufacturing Co., 9 Metc. (Mass.) 562, was decided under a statute which by its express terms made the agents or superintendents of manufacturing establishments liable to the penalties which it imposed; and it was in view of this provision that the court held that, inasmuch as every case may be reached without applying the penalties to corporate bodies, and sustaining actions against them in their corporate name for breach of this statute, an action against such corporate bodies in their corporate name could not be sustained. The court, however, said:

'They (corporations) may be said to be embraced in the word 'owner' of any manufacturing establishment; and if the provision had been thus limited, and no penalty imposed on other persons than the owners of establishments, it would perhaps have been a reasonable construction, and necessary to give force and effect to the statute, to the extent designed, to

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