Fallins v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 96
Citation | 100 S.E.2d 214,247 N.C. 72 |
Decision Date | 30 October 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 96,96 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Parties | Laura FALLINS v. DURHAM LIFE INSURANCE CO. |
George W. Ball, Morehead City, George M. Womble, Raleigh, by G. M. Womble, Raleigh, for defendant, appellant.
C. R. Wheatly, Jr., Beaufort, for plaintiff, appellee.
The defendant's exception to the instructions and its motion for nonsuit raise the same question--the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury.
In cases of this character 'Collins v. United States Casualty Co., 172 N.C. 543, 90 S.E. 585, 586. The burden is on the plaintiff to show the insured met his death by bodily injury effected directly through external, violent, and accidental means, and upon such a showing the defendant can relieve itself of liability by showing the insured's death resulted directly or indirectly from (d) participating in, or attempting to commit an assault or a felony; or (e) violence intentionally inflicted by another.
The only witness (except as to proof of loss) was Levi Williams, who testified in substance that upon being told his nephew and some other boy were fighting, fired his rifle at a telephone pole for the purpose of stopping the fight.
There was no evidence the insured was the aggressor in the fight or that he brought it on; no evidence that either was hurt or in danger. Williams, according to his testimony, intentionally fired a rifle at the telephone pole in order to stop the fight, but with no intent to injure either participant. The jurors heard the story. They observed the witness when he told it. They weighed the testimony and found for the plaintiff on all issues. Does the evidence show that death was effected by accidental means?
An injury is 'effected by accidental means' if in the line of proximate causation the act, event, or condition from the standpoint of the insured person is unintended, unexpected, unusual, or unknown. The unintended acts of the insured are deemed accidental. Injuries caused to the insured by the acts of another person, without the consent of the insured, are held due to accidental means unless the injurious acts are provoked and should have been expected by the insured. Vance on Insurance, 3rd ed., Sec. 181, p. 947; Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 402, 2 S.E.2d 17; Powers v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 186 N.C. 336, 119 S.E. 481; Ziolkowski v. Continental Casualty Co., 365 Ill. 594, 7 N.E.2d 451; Franchebois v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 La. 358, 131 So. 46; Hutson v. Continental Casualty Co., 142 Miss. 388, 107 So. 520; Eagan v. Prudential Ins. Co., Mo.App., 107 S.W.2d 133; Price v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. 800, 147 P. 1175; Goldfeder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 155 Misc. 744, 280 N.Y.S. 552; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Distretti, 159 Tenn. 138, 17 S.W.2d 11; Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Ryder, 166 Va. 446, 185 S.E. 894; Nalty v. Federal Casualty Co., 245 Ill.App. 180.
Under the foregoing authorities, the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to go to the jury and to support its finding that the death of the insured was effected directly through external, violent, and accidental means. That finding brought the insured within the coverage of the policy.
The defendant contended, however, that the insured's death resulted directly or indirectly from (d) his participating in an attempt to commit an assault or felony, or (e) from violence intentionally inflicted by another person. The court submitted appropriate issues, both of which were answered for the plaintiff. These issues arose under the exclusion clauses of the policy. As to them, the burden of proof was on the defendant. MacClure v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742; Pearson v. Pearson, 227 N.C. 31, 40 S.E.2d 477. Ordinarily, the question whether a party has carried the burden of proof is for the jury.
In this case the insured was not injured by his adversary in the fight but by a stranger to it who shot, or claimed he shot, only to frighten the boys into stopping their...
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