O'Fallon Development Co. v. Ring
| Decision Date | 29 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 40039,40039 |
| Citation | 224 N.E.2d 782,37 Ill.2d 84 |
| Parties | O'FALLON DEVELOPMENT CO., Inc., Appellee, v. Daniel F. RING, County Treasurer et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John M. Karns, Jr., State's Atty., and Eugene H. Widman, Asst. State's Atty., Belleville, for appellants.
Jones, Ottesen & Fleming, Belleville (Patrick J. Fleming, Belleville, of counsel), for appellee.
On February 17, 1966, the circuit court of St. Clair County 'ordered, adjudged and decreed' that the assessed valuation of a shopping center owned by the plaintiff, O'Fallen Development Co., Inc., 'is hereby set and determined for real estate tax purposes at a sum of $194,234 resulting in a tax due and payable for the year 1963 in the sum of $8,095.67.' The judgment also directed that upon the payment of that sum the county treasurer expunge from his books and records any penalties and interest due on the 1963 taxes, and that 'the tax sale held on these 1963 taxes, after the filing of this suit be and the same is hereby set aside and declared to be null and void and of no force and effect.' The defendants. Who are the county treasurer, the county clerk and the members of the board of review of St. Clair County, have appealed directly to this court. The revenue is involved.
The amended complaint, upon which this order was based, identified the defendants, alleged the plaintiff's ownership of the property in question and that the plaintiff had been notified of an initial assessment for real-estate tax purposes in the sum of $479,348. It also alleged that the plaintiff 'by and through its attorneys followed proper procedures' which resulted in hearings held before the Board of Assessors, and that on September 18, 1963, and again on September 30, 1963, the Board of Assessors determined 'that the state equalized assessed valuation for this property should be $194,234.' The amended complaint further alleged:
The complaint prayed that the court (1) order the members of the board of review to execute the certificate of error; (2) order the county treasurer to expunge from his books any penalties and interest; (3) enjoin the county treasurer from taking any further action for the purpose of collecting the 'tax assessment' for the year 1963; (4) find as a matter of law that the proper and legal assessed valuation of the plaintiff's property is $194,234, and determine that the proper amount of tax due and payable for 1963 real-estate taxes will be the sum of $8,095.67; (5) order the county treasurer, after receipt of that amount, to make entries on his books to show that the tax is not delinquent and not a lien upon the property of the plaintiff, and (6) 'find as a matter of law that the decision of the Board of Assessors as to the assessed valuation for tax purposes is binding upon the Board of Review.'
On July 28, 1965, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Thereafter, on September 3, 1965, the court ordered that 'the sale of the property described in the complaint for 1963 taxes is hereby suspended until further order of this Court.' On February 17, 1966, the plaintiff filed its amended complaint, the allegations of which have been described, and on the same date the court entered the order that has been described. On March 11 the defendants moved to vacate that order and for leave to answer the amended complaint. These motions were denied on April 27, 1966, and on that date the court denied the motion to dismiss the original complaint. This appeal followed.
The contention of the defendants that the court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff without affording them an opportunity to answer the original or the amended complaint must be sustained. Like a demurrer, a motion to dismiss admits facts well pleaded; but it admits them only for the purpose of determining whether, as a matter of law, those facts state a claim...
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