Fallon v. Indian Trail School

• Decision Date: 31 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 2-85-0806,No. 4,4,2-85-0806
• Parties: , 102 Ill.Dec. 479, 35 Ed. Law Rep. 1205 Mary Jane FALLON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDIAN TRAIL SCHOOL, Addison Township School DistrictMaureen Roach and Louise Roynan-Leo, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 101

500 N.E.2d 101

148 Ill.App.3d 931, 102 Ill.Dec. 479,

35 Ed. Law Rep. 1205

Mary Jane FALLON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDIAN TRAIL SCHOOL, Addison Township School District No. 4

Maureen Roach and Louise Roynan-Leo, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-85-0806.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Oct. 31, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1986.

O'Callaghan & Waller, Joseph Michael O'Callaghan, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kralovec Marquard Doyle & Gibbons, Wheaton, for defendants-appellees.

Justice STROUSE delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Mary Jane Fallon, appeals from the order of the circuit court which dismissed counts I, II, and III of her four-count amended complaint against the defendants, Indian Trail School (school), Addison Township School District No. 4 (school district), Maureen Roach and Louise Roynan-Leo (teachers). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

The plaintiff's amended complaint sought to recover damages for spinal injuries suffered as a result of a trampoline accident which occurred on February 23, 1975. At that time the plaintiff was a sixth-grade student at the school and the defendants, Roach and Roynan-Leo, were physical education teachers. The incident occurred when the plaintiff attempted a "front drop" maneuver on the trampoline during her physical education class. In her attempt to perform the maneuver, the plaintiff sustained spinal injuries.

The plaintiff's amended complaint contained four counts. Count I alleged that the school and school district were strictly liable for the consequences of exposing pupils to an "abnormally dangerous instrumentality," a trampoline, during the physical education program. Count II alleged that the school and school district were negligent in the selection and use of an "abnormally dangerous" apparatus, a trampoline. Count III alleged the school and school district were negligent in the hiring and supervising of their teachers. Count IV alleged the willful and wanton misconduct of all of the defendants with regard to the method in which they conducted the physical education class. The trial court dismissed counts I, II, and III, but left pending count IV. The plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of counts I through III.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously granted the motion to dismiss counts I and II, thereby preventing her from introducing evidence which would demonstrate that trampoline usage is an "abnormally dangerous" activity. The plaintiff also contends that the trial court erroneously granted the motion to dismiss count III, as it properly included the elements of a negligent hiring and supervision claim.

As this case comes before us on the granting of a motion to dismiss, we note that, in considering this matter, all well-pleaded facts must be taken as true, as well as all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. (Morrow v. L.S. Goldschmidt Associates, Inc. (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1089, 1096, 82 Ill.Dec. 152, 468 N.E.2d 414.) Moreover, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are to be interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Denkewalter v. Wolberg (1980), 82 Ill.App.3d 569, 572, 37 Ill.Dec. 883, 402 N.E.2d 885.

In count I, the plaintiff alleged that the trampoline was an abnormally dangerous instrumentality, and the school district should, therefore, be held accountable under strict tort liability for any injuries due to its use. In count II, the plaintiff charged the school and school district with negligence as a result of a violation of section 10.20.8 of the School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 122, par. 10-20.8) because the trampoline was an abnormally dangerous instrumentality. We must, therefore, decide whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support the contention that the trampoline is an abnormally dangerous instrumentality and trampoline usage is an abnormally dangerous activity.

Illinois recognizes strict liability under two theories: unreasonably dangerous defective products (Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d 182), and the theory which plaintiff alleges is applicable to this case, ultrahazardous activities (City of Joliet v. Harwood (1877), 86 Ill. 110). Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1981) (Restatement) have formulated a definition of ultrahazardous activities. Under section 519(1) of the Restatement, "[o]ne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." (Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 519(1) (1981).) Section 520 of the Restatement considers: "[E]xistence of a high degree of risk of some harm * * *; likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage * * *." Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 520 (1981).

Illinois has long recognized strict liability for damages caused by engaging in an ultrahazardous activity, although it has never explicitly relied upon the Restatement factors in determining whether a given activity is abnormally dangerous. In City of Joliet v. Harwood (1877), 86 Ill. 110, the Illinois Supreme Court held that blasting dynamite in a residential area was intrinsically dangerous and gave rise to strict liability for the blaster. A similar result was reached in FitzSimons & Connell Co. v. Braun (1902), 199 Ill. 390, 394-97, 65 N.E. 249, and Opal v. Material Service Corp. (1956), 9 Ill.App.2d 433, 451-61, 133 N.E.2d 733. Finally, a Federal District Court held that shipping acrylonitrile, a hazardous and toxic substance, was an ultrahazardous activity that subjected the shipper to strict liability under Illinois law. (Indiana Belt Harbor R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. (N.D.Ill.1981), 517 F.Supp. 314.) In so holding, the court relied upon the Restatement formulation of abnormally dangerous activities. 517 F.Supp. 314, 318-20.

The plaintiff concedes that there is no Illinois authority discussing either whether (1) trampoline usage of this sort is an ultrahazardous activity, or (2) the trampoline is an abnormally dangerous instrumentality. Indeed, the trial court, in its written disposition dismissing counts I and II, noted that most of the...