Falls v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the New Orleans Reg'l Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 21 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO: 16-2499 |
| Parties | FRANCIS FALLS, ET AL v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, ET AL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is a Motion to Determine Damages (R. Doc. 57) and a Motion to Determine Attorneys' Fees and Costs (R. Doc. 61) filed by Plaintiffs Francis Falls ("Falls"), Mitchell Miraglia ("Miraglia"), and Thad Tatum ("Tatum") (collectively "Plaintiffs") seeking an order of the Court awarding each Plaintiff $10,000 in damages as well as $48,430.50 in attorneys' fees and $7,573.96 in costs for all Plaintiffs. The motions are opposed. R. Doc. 65; R. Doc. 64. Both motions were submitted on March 22, 2017 and heard without oral argument.
This action was initially filed in the District Court on March 28, 2016 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. ("RA"). R. Doc. 1. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants the City of New Orleans and the Board of Commissioners of the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority have violated the ADA in connection with the bus stop system in New Orleans. In particular, the Plaintiffs allege that nearly 94.3% of all bus stops are non-compliant with ADA requirements. The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have failed to construct or alter bus stops to ensure accessibility and have failed to provide program access at the existing bus stops. R. Doc. 1. As such, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have discriminated against them and continue to do so by excluding/denying the Plaintiffs the full and equal benefits of their services and by failing to have accessible facilities or taking steps to make them accessible. Id. at p. 16.
On December 23, 2016, the Parties consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Thereafter, on February 10, 2017, the undersigned approved and ratified the Parties' Settlement Agreement (R. Doc. 55). R. Doc. 54. The Settlement Agreement provided for the improvement of existing ADA compliance procedures, a plan for bringing bus stops into ADA compliance, the selection by Plaintiffs of priority bus stops to be brought into compliance, a time frame for compliance as well as a method for the monitoring and enforcement of the settlement agreement. R. Doc. 54, p. 3-10. In return, the Plaintiffs agreed to release their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Defendants. Id. at p. 10-11. Finally, as part of the Settlement Agreement, the Parties agreed to submit the issues of Damages and Attorneys' Fees and Costs for determination by the undersigned. Id. at p. 10.
In accordance with the Parties' Settlement Agreement (R. Doc. 55) and this Court's order (R. Doc. 54), the Plaintiffs submitted their Motion to Determine Damages (R. Doc. 57) on February 20, 2017. In total, the Plaintiffs request $10,000 each in damages. R. Doc. 57. The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to damages under Title II of the ADA because they are qualified individuals that were excluded from participation or denied benefits of services, programs or activities and that such exclusion or discrimination was because of their disability. R. Doc. 57-1, p. 12. They argue that they were discriminated against when the Defendants failed to modify/construct bus stops in compliance with applicable standards and when the Defendants failed to provide program access.
In opposition, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages because: (i) there is no evidence of intentional discrimination; and (ii) the Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proof to lay out a prima facie case of discrimination because Tatum is not a qualified individual and all defendants have offered no evidence of any alleged discrimination by reason of their disability. R. Doc. 65.
The Plaintiffs have brought claims seeking damages under both Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. "The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA both prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities; they employ many of the same legal standards and offer the same remedies." Sweeney v. Texas State Univ., No. 14-910, 2016 WL 3829552 at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2016) (citing Maples v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 901 F. Supp. 2d 874, 878 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff'd, 524 Fed.Appx. 93 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Museum, No. 15-4947, 2016 WL 6215976, at *1 n.1 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016) (citing Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2011)) ( ).
Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004); Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 472 F. App'x 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Moreover, "[a] plaintiff asserting a private cause of action for violations of the ADA or the RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a showing of intentional discrimination." Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002).
Here, the Plaintiffs seek damages under Title II of the ADA. The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to damages under Title II of the ADA because they are qualified individuals that were excluded from participation or denied benefits of services, programs or activities and that such exclusion or discrimination was because of their disability. R. Doc. 57-1, p. 12. The Defendants oppose the award of damages arguing that (i) there is no evidence of intentional discrimination; and (ii) the Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proof to lay out a prima facie case of discrimination because Tatum is not a qualified individual and all defendants have offered no evidence of any alleged discrimination by reason of their disability. R. Doc. 65. In order for the Plaintiffs to prevail, they must demonstrate that they are qualified individuals that were eitherdenied benefits of or otherwise discriminated against by the Defendants by reason of their disability. See Melton, 391 F.3d at 671-72.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), an individual is disabled under the ADA where "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual." A "major life activity" includes, but is not limited to, "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). "Additionally, the 2008 Amendments to the ADA stress that the definition of disability shall be construed in favor of a broad number of individuals under the Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the Act." Mitchell v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., No. 15-5963, 2017 WL 993146, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2017) (slip copy) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)).
The Parties agree that Miraglia and Falls are qualified individuals under the ADA. R. Doc. 65, p. 14. However, the Defendants argue that that Tatum should not be considered a qualified individual because the Plaintiffs fail to address or present any analysis or explanation as to whether Tatum's physical impairments results in substantial limitation in a major life activity. Id. In turn, the Plaintiffs argue that Tatum is a qualified individual because he is a C-7 paraplegic as a result of a puncture wound to the neck in 1988. R. Doc. 57-1, p. 10.
In considering Tatum's physical impairments as a result of his paraplegia, the Court finds that Tatum is a qualified individual under the ADA. During his deposition, Tatum explained that as a result of his paraplegia he suffers limitations to his right side. While Tatum uses a four-legged walker around his home as a result of physical therapy and can drive, he strictly uses a wheelchair to get around outside of his house. R. Doc. 57-14, p. 41, Tr. 15-17. When he travels around in hiscar, Tatum relies on others to place and remove his wheelchair from his car. Id. at p. 66, 117-18. Given his physical limitations as a result of paraplegia, the Court finds that Tatum is certainly substantially limited in major life activities as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 12102, including walking, standing, and bending.
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