Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1930
• Citation: 151 A. 182,111 Conn. 693
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FALVEY v. SPRAGUE METER CO. et al.

151 A. 182

111 Conn. 693

FALVEY v. SPRAGUE METER CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 9, 1930

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Earnest C. Simpson Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Florence Falvey for the death of her husband. Edwin C. Falvey, claimant opposed by Sprague Meter Company, employer, and others. From a judgment affirming the award and dismissing the appeal of the employer from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner, taken and tried to the court, the employer appeals.

No error.

S Polk Waskowitz and Edward S. Pomeranz, both of Hartford, for appellant.

Frank L. Wilder, of Bridgeport, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTIBLE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

HAINES, J.

The claimants is the widow of Edwin C. Falvey who was in the employ of the Sprague Meter Company. His employment began in October, 1911, in the company's factory in Bridgeport, and continued there until March, 1912, when he took charge of a warehouse of the company at Davenport, Iowa, and so continued until February, 1914, and then acted as traveling salesman for the company in territory contingent to Iowa until 1926, and thereafter in states east of the Mississippi river. He was married in 1926, and thereafter lived in Indianapolis, Ind. The finding states that " in October, 1928, at the office of the employer in Bridgeport, the deceased was made sales manager and arrangements were made for him to move to Bridgeport and take over these duties on January 1st, 1929, which time was later extended to March 1st, 1929." The respondents take exception to this finding, claiming it is found " without evidence." The record is confused and not in proper form, but enough appears to satisfy us that the finding should stand as ruled by the commissioner. It was a part of the duties of the deceased to attend conventions all over the United States and to make daily reports to the employer at Bridgeport and personal reports two or three times a year. All orders to the deceased, as well as his salary checks, were sent to him from the home office in Bridgeport.

The main contention of the respondents is that because the contract of employment was entered into prior to the enactment of our Compensation Act, and because the deceased was not a resident of Connecticut, the compensation commissioner in this state was without jurisdiction in this case and could not lawfully make an award. The respondents are in error in assuming that jurisdiction of claims under Workman's Compensation Acts are conferred by residence of the employee. This was a Connecticut contract and in fact when made both parties thereto were residents of this state. The fact that the duties of the employee thereunder required him thereafter to travel and to live outside this state in no way changed its character as a Connecticut contract, and our courts were open to either or both parties thereto for the enforcement of its provisions and it clearly came within the purpose and the provisions of our Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1918, § § 5339-5414) when the latter went into effect.

The act did not attempt by compulsion to change any rights or liabilities of the parties under existing contracts, but left its adoption and the incorporation of its provisions subject entirely to the will of the parties either of whom could, if he desired, refuse to accept the terms of part B of the Act (Gen. St. 1918, § § 5341 et seq.) This refusal was not indicated by either party to the present contract and the provisions of the act, thus by clear implication and conclusive presumption, became a part of this contract. Our act provides compensation under a contract made in Connecticut, though performed outside the state, the purpose being that contracts made here may operate outside our jurisdiction. It does not provide compensation for residents of this state only. It gives compensation for " any injury," thus...