Family and Social Services Admin. v. Calvert
| Decision Date | 20 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 09A04-9602-CV-50,09A04-9602-CV-50 |
| Citation | 672 N.E.2d 488 |
| Parties | FAMILY AND SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Appellant-Respondent, v. Timothy CALVERT, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appellant-Respondent, Indiana Department of Family and Social Services ("FSSA"), appeals from two orders: one granting the petition, filed by Appellee-Petitioner, Timothy Calvert ("Calvert") for judicial review of an agency action and reversing the decision of the administrative law judge, and the other denying FSSA's motion for relief from the trial court's order that FSSA pay for Calvert's care. We affirm, and instruct that Chase Center Nursing Home ("Chase") be granted the statutorily appropriate interest on the judgment.
The parties present various issues which we restate as:
I. Whether the court had personal jurisdiction over FSSA in the proceeding requiring FSSA to pay for Calvert's care;
II. Whether that same court had statutory authority to order FSSA to pay for the services that the Indiana Adult Protective Services ("APS") required be provided to Calvert;
III. Whether the administrative law judge's decision was supported by the record, in accordance with the law, or otherwise proper;
IV. Whether the Attorney General's office engaged in a conflict of interest; and,
V. Whether Chase should recover its attorney fees incurred in the judicial review and appeal process, as well as statutory interest on the unpaid Medicaid obligation.
Calvert was admitted to Chase on December 1, 1993 to convalesce after being hospitalized for increased seizure activities. On December 28, 1993, APS Investigator Jerry Stoner and Cass County Prosecutor Richard Maughmer filed in the Cass Circuit Court a petition for an involuntary protective order for Calvert. The following day, the court conducted a hearing and found that Calvert was an endangered adult, and that he should continue to be placed in protective care at Chase.
On February 11, 1994, FSSA reviewed Calvert's assessment and determined that he did not have medical need for continued residence in a nursing facility. On February 15 of that year, Calvert's placement at Chase was approved for thirty days only, from December 1, 1993 through December 31, 1993. 1 Calvert appealed the decision to deny him placement at Chase to the FSSA hearing and appeals division.
On June 23, 1994, an administrative law judge conducted an evidentiary hearing. Approximately two months later, that administrative judge issued an opinion affirming the decision of FSSA that Calvert's continued placement in a nursing facility was unwarranted. Ironically, on the same day the administrative judge issued his opinion, the Cass Circuit Court ordered that the State pay for Calvert's nursing home care from the date of placement until FSSA found Calvert a suitable alternative placement. The very next day, Calvert appealed the administrative judge's decision to the Secretary of FSSA.
On January 5, 1995, the Secretary affirmed the decision of the administrative judge. Later that month, Calvert filed a verified petition for judicial review of the Secretary's action. FSSA filed an answer to Calvert's petition. On July 20, 1995, the trial judge ordered the parties to submit briefs regarding the petition, and they complied.
On September 25, 1995, FSSA filed a motion for relief from the order that they pay for Calvert's nursing home care from the date of placement until FSSA found Calvert a suitable alternative placement. In response, Calvert filed a motion to dismiss, to which FSSA then filed a response.
On October 25, 1995, the trial judge granted Calvert's petition for judicial review of an agency action, made extensive findings, and reversed the administrative judge's decision. Moreover, on October 30, 1995, the judge who received FSSA's September 25 motion denied it with a detailed order. FSSA filed a timely praecipe to appeal both the October 25 order and the October 30 order. 2
FSSA contends that since it did not commence the protective order action, did not join in the action, was not served with a summons, and did not enter an appearance, the Cass Circuit Court never acquired jurisdiction over it. FSSA argues that the failure to serve the Attorney General is another reason why jurisdiction over FSSA was not acquired. We are unconvinced that the Cass Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction over FSSA.
As all parties agree, FSSA is an umbrella agency with three divisions, one of which is the Division of Disability, Aging and Rehabilitative Services ("DDARS"). In turn, DDARS is authorized to create an Adult Protective Services Unit. Ind.Code § 12-10-3-1; Ind.Code § 12-9-5-3. DDARS must contract for the adult protective services required in each county with the prosecuting attorney, with a governmental entity qualified to provide the services required, or with a combination of the two. Ind.Code § 12-10-3-7.
In view of the uncontested facts that (1) the original petition for protective services for Calvert was filed by an APS representative and the Cass County Prosecutor, and that (2) APS is a responsibility of FSSA, we conclude that the Cass Circuit Court did have jurisdiction over FSSA. Moreover, since the prosecutor is specifically authorized to initiate the protective action on behalf of the State, we see no reason for the Attorney General to have been served. The prosecutor represents the State at the local level in adult protective matters just as he or she represents the State in criminal matters. The party which commenced an action need not be served when it inherently should have notice of that very action.
FSSA also contends that the trial court had no statutory authority to order FSSA to pay for Calvert's continuing nursing home care. Thus, FSSA claims the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the payment of Calvert's care. In order to address this issue, we look to the relevant provisions of the Indiana Code, keeping in mind that where a statute has not previously been construed, the interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. In re E.I., 653 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The court is required to determine and effect the legislative intent underlying the statute, and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience. Id. When determining whether the court's order complied with the statutory mandates, we construe the meaning of the statute by interpreting the statute as a whole and giving words their common and ordinary meaning. Id. at 511.
According to Ind.Code § 12-10-3-19, the "circuit and superior courts with jurisdiction in the county in which the alleged endangered adult resides have original and concurrent jurisdiction over a matter filed under this chapter trial court." Indiana Code Section 12-10-3-24 states:
If, after a hearing, the court determines that an endangered adult should be required to receive protective services, the court shall issue a protective services order. The order must stipulate the following:
(1) The objectives of the protective services order.
(2) The least restrictive protective services necessary to attain the objectives of the protective services order that the endangered adult must receive.
(3) The duration during which the endangered adult must receive the protective services.
(4) That the adult protective services unit or other person designated by the court shall do the following:
(A) Provide or arrange for the provision of the protective services ordered by the court.
(B) Petition the court to modify or terminate the protective services order....
"Protective services" is defined as available medical, psychiatric, residential, and social services that are necessary to protect the health or safety of an endangered adult. Ind.Code § 12-10-3-5. That same chapter also provides:
The court may issue an order to:
(1) enjoin a person from interference with the delivery of a protective service ordered under section 24 of this chapter; or
(2) direct a person to take actions to implement the delivery of the protective services ordered under section 24 of this chapter.
Because Calvert resided in Cass County, the Cass Circuit Court properly had jurisdiction to hear the petition for protective services filed by APS. The administrative judge's order denying Medicaid benefits to Calvert in spite of FSSA's failure to find more appropriate placement for Calvert was apparently viewed by the trial court as an interference with the court order requiring that Calvert be provided with care. As such, the trial judge's order requiring FSSA to pay Chase for Calvert's care until they placed him at a suitable alternative location was the judge's way of directing FSSA to "take actions to implement the delivery of the protective services [previously] ordered". See Ind.Code § 12-10-3-27(2). The trial judge had the statutory authority to make his order and the responsibility to see that Calvert received the needed services. The protections envisioned by the statute are illusory unless the services ordered by the court are actually provided. The provision of services includes payment by the State in appropriate situations. To provide services only to those persons who can pay for them is token compliance with the statute.
FSSA also argues that under the applicable standard of review, the trial court should not have reversed the administrative judge's decision. "When reviewing the...
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