Fana v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 17 March 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:11–cv–311–J–39JRK.
• Citation: 4 F.Supp.3d 1295
• Parties: Shkelqim FANA, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

4 F.Supp.3d 1295

Shkelqim FANA, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DOC, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:11–cv–311–J–39JRK.

United States District Court,
M.D. Florida,
Jacksonville Division.

Signed March 14, 2014.
Filed March 17, 2014.

[4 F.Supp.3d 1302]

Mitchell A. Stone, Stone Lockett, Jacksonville Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Bryan G. Jordan, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.

ORDER
BRIAN J. DAVIS, District Judge.
I. STATUS

Petitioner Shkelqim Fana filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is represented by counsel in this proceeding. The Petition challenges a 2008 state court (Duval County) conviction for attempted second degree murder with a weapon.¹Id. at 1. Petitioner raises fifteen main grounds for habeas relief as well as numerous sub-grounds. The Court is ever mindful of its responsibility to address each ground. Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992), Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir.2013). Upon review, no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.

This cause is before the Court on Respondents' Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. 16) ² and the Exhibits to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Appendix) (Doc. 17).³ Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 23), a Motion for Oral Argument (Doc. 24),⁴ a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 26), a Corrected Notice of Supplemental Authority ( Crimins Case Cite Correction Only) (Doc. 27), a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 28), and a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 29). See Order (Doc. # 8).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). “By its terms [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to th[re]e

[4 F.Supp.3d 1303]

exceptions.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The exceptions are: (1) the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; or (2) there was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (3) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. at 785.

There is a presumption of correctness of state courts' factual findings unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption applies to the factual determinations of both trial and appellate courts. See Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.2003).

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In his Petition, Petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to prevail on this Sixth Amendment claim, he must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), requiring that he show both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).

In establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, there must be a showing that appellate counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also, there must be a demonstration “that but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the appeal would have been different.” Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1236 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Black v. United States, 373 F.3d 1140, 1142 (11th Cir.2004)).

IV. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

There are prerequisites to a federal habeas review. The Court must be mindful of the doctrine of procedural default:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman [ v. Thompson ], supra, [501 U.S. 722] at 747–748, 111 S.Ct. 2546 [115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ]; [ Wainwright v.] Sykes, supra, [433 U.S. 72] at 84–85, 97 S.Ct. 2497 [53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ]. A state court's invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. [53, 59–62], 130 S.Ct. 612, 617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.

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Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012).

In addition, in addressing the question of exhaustion, the Court must ask whether the claim was raised in the state court proceedings and whether the state court was alerted to the federal nature of the claim:

Before seeking § 2254 habeas relief in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies available for challenging his conviction. See28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). For a federal claim to be exhausted, the petitioner must have “fairly presented [it] to the state courts.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir.2005). The Supreme Court has suggested that a litigant could do so by including in his claim before the state appellate court “the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim ‘federal.’ ” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). The Court's guidance in Baldwin “must be applied with common sense and in light of the purpose underlying the exhaustion requirement”—namely, giving the state courts “a meaningful opportunity” to address the federal claim. McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302. Thus, a petitioner could not satisfy the exhaustion requirement merely by presenting the state court with “all the facts necessary to support the claim,” or by making a “somewhat similar state-law claim.” Kelley [ v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr.], 377 F.3d [1317] at 1343–44 [ (11th Cir.2004) ]. Rather, he must make his claims in a manner that provides the state courts with “the opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon (his) [federal] constitutional claim.” Id. at 1344 (quotation omitted).

Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1351–52 (11th Cir.2012), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 875, 184 L.Ed.2d 686 (2013).

Procedural defaults may be excused under certain circumstances. Indeed, “[a] petitioner who fails to exhaust his claim is procedurally barred from pursuing that claim on habeas review in federal court unless he shows either cause for and actual prejudice from the default or a fundamental miscarriage of justice from applying the default.” Id. at 1353 (citing Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam)). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is only available in extraordinary cases upon a showing of “ ‘actual’ innocence” rather than mere “ ‘legal’ innocence.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.2001) (citations omitted), cert. denied,535 U.S. 926, 122 S.Ct. 1295, 152 L.Ed.2d 208 (2002).

In order for Petitioner to establish cause,

the procedural default “must result from some objective factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from raising the claim and which cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir.1992) (quoting [Murray v.] Carrier, 477 U.S. [478] at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639 [91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) ] ). Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,528 U.S. 934, 120 S.Ct. 336, 145 L.Ed.2d 262 (1999). Of note, “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural

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default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315.

V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record shows the following transpired. Petitioner was charged by a second amended information with attempted first degree murder of Lorenc Bujari. Ex. 2 at 113–14. In pertinent part, the information reads:

SHKELQIM FANA on or between the 25th day of March, 2000, and the 26th day of March, 2000, in the County of Duval and the State of Florida, did attempt to unlawfully kill Lorenc Bujari, a human being, by stabbing the said Lorenc Bujari with a premeditated design to effect the death of Lorenc Bujari, and during the commission of the aforementioned Attempted First Degree Murder, the said, SHKELQIM FANA carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or attempted to use a weapon, to wit: a knife, contrary to the provisions of Sections 782.04(1)(a) and 777.04(1) and 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

Ex. 2 at 113.

Assistant Public Defender Melina Buncome–Williams represented Petitioner, and Ms. Buncome–Williams filed a...