Fancher v. Butler University, Cause No. IP01-1070-C-M/S (S.D. Ind. 3/4/2003)
| Decision Date | 04 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. IP01-1070-C-M/S. |
| Parties | FANCHER, DONNA, Plaintiff, v. BUTLER UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on defendant's, Butler University ("Butler"), Motion for Summary Judgment on the claims of plaintiff, Donna Fancher ("Fancher"), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The parties have fully briefed their arguments, and the motion is now ripe for ruling.
Prior to 1997, Marriott Corporation ("Marriott") contracted with Butler to perform the housekeeping duties for Butler on its campus. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 2. Fancher, an African-American, began working for Marriott at Butler in 1993 as a housekeeper. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 1-3. In 1997, Butler decided to bring the housekeeping work "in house," and on about July 9, 1997, Fancher applied for the Housekeeper position at Butler. Fancher Depo. at 14, Hill Aff. ¶ 5. On October 1, 1997, Nickolas Hill ("Hill"), Director of the Building Services and Grounds Department at Butler, hired Fancher for the Housekeeper position. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 11, 15.1 The job description for Butler's housekeepers, which was in effect at all relevant times,2 included the following duties and responsibilities:
Perform daily cleaning of facilities, including restrooms, classrooms, dormitory rooms, walls and floors, and any other assigned areas. Assist in maintaining a safe and friendly campus environment. Assist in setting up for campus events and functions. Assist in moving chairs, tables, and other furniture as required. Relamp areas as needed. Perform other related duties as required or assigned.
Def.'s Ex. A. Housekeepers were also expected to have a valid driver's license. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 10.
Upon hire, Fancher was assigned to perform housekeeping duties in Schwitzer Hall, which was the same worksite she was assigned to while working for Marriott. Id. ¶ 15. Fancher also was assigned housekeeping tasks in other campus buildings, including the radio station, the Dance Academy, and the Carter House. Id. ¶ 20. Fancher's duties included cleaning, sweeping, and maintaining bathrooms, hallways, and dorm rooms. Fancher Depo. at 54. Fancher generally worked the Monday-Friday, 7:00 a.m.-3:30 p.m. shift unless she was assigned to work overtime or weekends. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 21, 23. Fancher worked two weekends a year because it was mandatory to work on "Parents Weekends," and she occasionally volunteered to work overtime during the week or on weekends. Fancher Depo. at 55-65.
Janetta Spears ("Spears"), a Caucasian, was hired by Butler in October 1998 for the Housekeeper position. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 27-28. Spears was assigned to set up for campus events and functions. Id. At the time Spears was hired, she had a valid driver's license. Id.; Def.'s Ex. B. Spears became ineligible to drive a campus vehicle when her driver's license was suspended on March 22, 1999. Pl.'s Ex. 5. Hill learned that Spears' license was suspended around December 1999. Hill Depo. at 37. Spears continued to drive herself to assigned worksites after her license was suspended, but later various Butler workers were assigned to take her to the worksites. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 31. To correct this inefficiency, Hill decided to replace Spears with Fancher, a licensed driver, on the Wednesday-Sunday, 7:00 a.m.-3:30 p.m. shift. Id. ¶¶ 32, 35.3 Fancher would take over Spears' responsibilities — setting up for campus events and functions — while Spears would perform Fancher's duties of cleaning and sweeping at Schwitzer Hall and other campus locations. Hill considered moving other employees instead of Fancher, but the other candidates for the switch were lead employees with supervisory responsibility. Hill Depo. at 36. Hill concluded that transferring a lead employee would cause a negative effect on the positions they would have to vacate. Id.
On or about February 9, 2000, Hill met with Fancher, informed her of his decision, and assigned her to set up for campus events. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 33. After the switch, Fancher's responsibilities included picking up chairs and tables and setting them up for campus events. Fancher Depo. at 70.
Fancher also continued to clean the Dance Academy one day a week. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 34. One day later, on about February 10, 2000, Fancher told Hill that she could not work the Wednesday-Sunday shift and that she objected to performing her assigned duties. Id. ¶ 37. Hill accommodated Fancher by revising her schedule to eliminate the weekend hours, leaving her with the following schedule: 10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m., Monday and Thursday; 7:00 a.m.-3:30 p.m., Tuesday and Wednesday; and 3:00 p.m.-11:00 p.m., Friday. Id. ¶ 39. Hill told Fancher that if it did not work out, he would switch her back to cleaning Schwitzer Hall. Fancher Depo. at 74. Fancher told Hill that she did not want to move furniture all day long, and Hill said to Fancher that she was "stronger and smarter" than Spears. Fancher Depo. at 78, 101-02. Fancher found the comment to be very offensive. Fancher Depo. at 163. Hill later explained the comment by saying he was trying to put a "positive slant" on the situation. Hill Depo. at 47. Fancher testified that Spears was shorter and less muscular than she. Fancher Depo. at 105.
During the brief period in which Fancher stayed at Butler after the assignment change, Hill did not switch Fancher back to Schwitzer Hall. Def.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 41. Fancher submitted a letter of resignation to Butler on February 25, 2000, effective March 1. Id.
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
See also United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which she relies. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
On certain occasions, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that a court approach a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case with a particular degree of caution. See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The language implied that summary judgment might be less appropriate in this context based upon the presence of issues of motive and intent. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit emphasized, however, these cases do not establish a heightened summary judgment standard for employment-related cases. Instead, the language from the prior cases simply means "that courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will...
To continue reading
Request your trial