Fantozzi v. City of New York

Decision Date20 October 2022
Docket Number1:21-cv-4439-GHW
PartiesSTEPHEN JOSEPH FANTOZZI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

A party's failure to comply with procedural rules has consequences. Regardless of the substantive allegations made in a case, anyone seeking to bring and maintain a lawsuit in federal court must comply with a host of technical requirements. Sometimes, these rules are complex or difficult to parse even for the most sophisticated of counsel. Sometimes, they are relatively simple- like the process to serve an individual whose known place of business is in New York City. Plaintiff Stephen Joseph Fantozzi brought an action against the City of New York, Officer Anthony P Sclafani, Officer Angel L. Figueroa, Jr., and New York Police Department Officers John and Jane Does 1-10 containing various claims alleging police misconduct. Because Plaintiff s counsel failed to effectively serve process on the individual defendants within the time period required by the rules without good reason, Plaintiff's claims against them must be dismissed. And because Plaintiff abandoned his other claims by failing to address arguments about them made in Defendants' motion to dismiss, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts[1]

In May 2018, Plaintiff was seated on a bench at 50 Battery Place in Manhattan. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 14-15. A uniformed NYPD police officer and Officer Sclafani shouted Plaintiff s name, told him to “stand up and turn around,” and then aggressively grabbed and restrained him. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Sclafani repeatedly kicked Plaintiff s leg, then pulled his leg out from under him and shoved him to the ground. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Then, Sclafani stomped on Plaintiff s lower back and right hand, which caused Plaintiff severe pain and exacerbated Plaintiff s existing back injury. Id. ¶¶ 20- 22. The officers handcuffed Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 23. They ignored Plaintiff when he told the officers that the handcuffs were too tight, id. ¶ 24, and Plaintiff later developed “handcuff neuropathy” in his right hand, id. ¶ 23. While still on the ground, Plaintiff told Sclafani that he had injuries in both his shoulders and begged him not to pull him up by his arms. Id. ¶ 26. But Sclafani ignored Plaintiff's plea and pulled him up by the handcuffs, which caused Plaintiff extreme pain and exacerbated his preexisting shoulder injuries. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. The other officers at the scene, including Officer Figueroa, Jr., never intervened. Id. ¶¶ 28-31.

Plaintiff was put into an ambulance. Id. ¶ 25. The ambulance took Plaintiff to Mount Sinai Beth Israel Hospital, where he received treatment for the injuries he sustained from this attack. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff's injuries from the arrest are ongoing and permanent. Id. ¶ 33. Despite his arrest and alleged mistreatment, no charges were ever brought against him. Id. ¶ 34.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this case on May 18, 2021, naming the City of New York, and Officers Anthony P. Sclafani, Angel L. Figueroa Jr., and John and Jane Does 1-10. See generally Compl. His complaint lays out counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) false arrest against all Defendant Officers, (2) excessive force against Defendant Sclafani (or, alternatively, against Defendant John Doe 1), (3) failure to intervene against Defendant Figueroa, Jr. and Defendants NYPD Police Officers John and Jane Does 1-10, and (4) municipal liability against Defendant City of New York. Id. ¶¶ 35-71.

Plaintiff's counsel, Joseph M. Stancati, served Defendant City of New York on June 22, 2021. Dkt. No. 10. On August 16, 2021, the 90-day window to serve Defendants in this action expired. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Defendants' answer to the complaint-filed October 25, 2021- then informed Plaintiff that Defendants Sclafani and Figueroa, Jr. had not yet been served. Dkt. No. 13 at 1 n.1. Over four months later, nearly seven months past the expiration of Plaintiffs window for service, and almost ten months after the filing of the case, Sclafani was finally served by delivery of summons to an authorized officer at Sclafani's place of business on March 9, 2022. Dkt. No. 22. Even later, on March 17, 2022, Figueroa, Jr. was served by delivery of a summons to an authorized person at Figueroa, Jr.'s place of business. Dkt. No. 23.

On June 1, 2022, the Defendant Officers and the City of New York filed a motion, and accompanying memorandum of law, to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(c). Dkt. Nos. 29 (“Mot. to Dismiss”), 30 (“Def's Mem.”). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's claims against Sclafani and Figueroa, Jr. should be dismissed because they had not been timely served, and no extension of the time to effectuate service was warranted on the facts of the case. Def s Mem. at 5-12. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff s claims against the John and Jane Doe defendants should be dismissed because the statute of limitations had run on those claims, and that Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against the City of New York should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 12-16. Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in Opposition on June 28, 2022. Dkt. No. 31 (“Pl's Opp'n”). That Opposition responded only to Defendants' arguments concerning the service of process issue. See generally id. In their July 8, 2022 Reply, Defendants renewed their argument that Plaintiff's claims against Sclafani and Figueroa, Jr. should be dismissed for failure to timely serve process. Dkt. No. 33 (“Reply”) at 2-6. And they argued that because Plaintiff had failed to respond in his Opposition to Defendant's arguments concerning the John and Jane Doe Defendants and the City of New York, Plaintiff's claims against those defendants should be deemed abandoned and dismissed on that basis as well. Id. at 6-7.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rules 12(c) and 12(b)(6)

In deciding Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, courts employ “the same standard applicable to dismissals pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). And under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC, 622 F.3d 104, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2010). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, devoid of supporting facts, does not suffice. Id. To satisfy the “plausibility” requirement, the plaintiff must plead facts that permit the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). However,

[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” A complaint must therefore contain more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Pleadings that contain “no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth” otherwise applicable to complaints in the context of motions to dismiss.

DeJesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). Thus, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s] without “further factual enhancement” will not survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

On a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, a court must generally “limit itself to the facts stated in the complaint.” Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 192 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999)). In that context, [a] court's task is to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint; it is not to assess the weight of the evidence that might be offered on either side.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020). “The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive merits. The Rule thus assesses the legal feasibility of the complaint, but does not weigh the evidence that might be offered to support it.” Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006).

B. Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(2)

Under Rule 12(b)(5), a party may move for dismissal of a complaint based on the inadequate service of process. Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(5). “In considering a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, a Court must look[ ] to matters outside the complaint to determine whether it has jurisdiction.” Cassano v. Altshuler, 186 F.Supp.3d 318, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Darden v. Daimler-Chrysler N. Am. Holding Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). “Once a defendant challenges the sufficiency of service of...

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