Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 97282

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSOUTER
Citation141 L.Ed.2d 662,118 S.Ct. 2275,524 U.S. 775
Docket Number97282
Decision Date26 June 1998
PartiesBeth Ann FARAGHER, Petitioner, v. CITY OF BOCA RATON

524 U.S. 775
118 S.Ct. 2275
141 L.Ed.2d 662

Beth Ann FARAGHER, Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF BOCA RATON.

No. 97-282.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 25, 1998.
Decided June 26, 1998.
Syllabus*

After resigning as a lifeguard with respondent City of Boca Raton (City), petitioner Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against the City and her immediate supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman, for nominal damages and other relief, alleging, among other things, that the supervisors had created a "sexually hostile atmosphere'' at work by repeatedly subjecting Faragher and other female lifeguards to "uninvited and offensive touching,'' by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of women in offensive terms, and that this conduct constituted discrimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges'' of her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). Following a bench trial, the District Court concluded that the supervisors' conduct was discriminatory harassment sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of Faragher's employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The District Court then held that the City could be held liable for the harassment of its supervisory employees because the harassment was pervasive enough to support an inference that the City had "knowledge, or constructive knowledge'' of it; under traditional agency principles Terry and Silverman were acting as the City's agents when they committed the harassing acts; and a third supervisor had knowledge of the harassment and failed to report it to City officials. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. Relying on Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49, and on the Restatement (Second) of Agency §219 (1957) (Restatement), the Court of Appeals held that Terry and Silverman were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that their agency relationship with the City did not facilitate the harassment, that constructive knowledge of it could not be imputed to the City because of its pervasiveness or the supervisor's knowledge, and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it.

Held: An employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the plaintiff victim. Pp. ____-____.

(a) While the Court has delineated the substantive contours of the hostile environment Title VII forbids, see, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370-371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295, its cases have established few definitive rules for determining when an employer will be liable for a discriminatory environment that is otherwise actionably abusive. The Court's only discussion to date of the standards of employer liability came in Meritor, supra, where the Court held that traditional agency principles were relevant for determining employer liability. Although the Court cited the Restatement §§219-237 with general approval, the Court cautioned that common-law agency principles might not be transferable in all their particulars. Pp. ____-____.

(b) Restatement §219(1) provides that "a master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.'' Although Title VII cases in the Court of Appeals have typically held, or assumed, that supervisory sexual harassment falls outside the scope of employment because it is motivated solely by individual desires and serves no purpose of the employer, these cases appear to be in tension with others defining the scope of the employment broadly to hold employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts, including sexual assaults, that were not done to serve the employer, but were deemed to be characteristic of its activities or a foreseeable consequence of its business. This tension is the result of differing judgments about the desirability of holding an employer liable for his subordinates' wayward behavior. The proper analysis here, then, calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the Restatement, but rather an inquiry into whether it is proper to conclude that sexual harassment is one of the normal risks of doing business the employer should bear. An employer can reasonably anticipate the possibility of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace, and this might justify the assignment of the costs of this behavior to the employer rather than to the victim. Two things counsel in favor of the contrary conclusion, however. First, there is no reason to suppose that Congress wished courts to ignore the traditional distinction between acts falling within the scope of employment and acts amounting to what the older law called frolics or detours from the course of employment. Second, the lower courts, by uniformly judging employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard, have implicitly treated such harassment outside the scope of employment. It is unlikely that such treatment would escape efforts to render them obsolete if the Court held that harassing supervisors necessarily act within the scope of their employment. The rationale for doing so would apply when the behavior was that of co-employees, because the employer generally benefits from the work of common employees as from the work of supervisors. The answer to this argument might be that the scope of supervisory employment may be treated separately because supervisors have special authority enhancing their capacity to harass and the employer can guard against their misbehavior more easily. This answer, however, implicates an entirely separate category of agency law, considered in the next section. Given the virtue of categorical clarity, it is better to reject reliance on misuse of supervisory authority (without more) as irrelevant to the scope-of-employment analysis. Pp. ____-____.

(c) The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting a theory of vicarious liability based on §219(2)(d) of the Restatement, which provides that an employer "is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment unless . . . the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance on apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.'' It makes sense to hold an employer vicariously liable under Title VII for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made possible by use of his supervisory authority, and the aided-by-agency-relation principle of §219(2)(d) provides an appropriate starting point for determining liability for the kind of harassment presented here. In a sense a supervisor is always assisted in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship; however, the imposition of liability based on the misuse of supervisory authority must be squared with Meritor's holding that an employer is not "automatically'' liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates who creates the requisite degree of discrimination. There are two basic alternatives to counter the risk of automatic liability. The first is to require proof of some affirmative invocation of that authority by the harassing supervisor; the second is to recognize an affirmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even when a supervisor has created the actionable environment. The problem with the first alternative is that there is not a clear line between the affirmative and merely implicit uses of supervisory power; such a rule would often lead to close judgment calls and results that appear disparate if not contradictory, and the temptation to litigate would be hard to resist. The second alternative would avoid this particular temptation to litigate and implement Title VII sensibly by giving employers an incentive to prevent and eliminate harassment and by requiring employees to take advantage of the preventive or remedial apparatus of their employers. Thus, the Court adopts the following holding in this case and in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, --- U.S. ----, ----, 118 S.Ct. 2257, ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----, also decided today. An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Pp. ____-____.

(d) Under this...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7233 practice notes
  • Part II
    • United States
    • Federal Register April 23, 2004
    • April 23, 2004
    ...for their exempt employees' conduct. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (liability for sexual harassment by supervisory employees may be imputed to the employer where employer fails to take prompt and effectiv......
  • Federal Election Commission,
    • United States
    • Federal Register July 29, 2002
    • July 29, 2002
    ...Federal statutes where full incorporation is not necessary to effect the statute's underlying purpose. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 n.3 (1998) (The ``obligation is not to make a pronouncement of agency law in general or to transplant [the Restatement (Second) of Age......
  • Fair Labor Standards Act: Minimum wage and overtime pay for executive, administrative, professional, outside sales, and computer employees; defining and delimiting exemptions,
    • United States
    • Federal Register April 23, 2004
    • April 23, 2004
    ...for their exempt employees' conduct. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (liability for sexual harassment by supervisory employees may be imputed to the employer where employer fails to take prompt and effectiv......
  • Johnston v. Henderson, No. 00-6445CIV.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
    • May 1, 2001
    ...perceive as abusive". Id. at 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367. As the Supreme Court more recently explained in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), "simple teasing...off-hand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7198 cases
  • Johnston v. Henderson, No. 00-6445CIV.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
    • May 1, 2001
    ...perceive as abusive". Id. at 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367. As the Supreme Court more recently explained in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), "simple teasing...off-hand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to ......
  • Kopman v. City of Centerville, Civ. No. 10–4093–KES.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. District of South Dakota
    • May 11, 2012
    ...in fact did perceive to be so.’ ” Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)). On the objective prong, the fact-finder views the facts from the totality [871 F.Supp.2d 887]o......
  • Hale v. Hawaii Publications, Inc., Civ. No. 05-00709 ACK-BMK.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Hawaii)
    • December 28, 2006
    ...conditions of employment.'" Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 Plaintiff alleges that Migita's harassing conduct, which created a hostile work environment, originate......
  • Michalowski v. Rutherford, Case No. 14 C 899
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • March 6, 2015
    ...the conditions of the victim's employment and creates an abusive working environment violates Title VII.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 firm's commentaries
12 books & journal articles
  • Sex Discrimination Claims Under Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
    • United States
    • Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law Nbr. XXII-2, January 2021
    • January 1, 2021
    ...that the employer did not act for (the asserted) non-discriminatory reasons.’”44 40. See id. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 41. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 42. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. RE......
  • Ending Political Discrimination in the Workplace.
    • United States
    • Missouri Law Review Vol. 87 Nbr. 2, March 2022
    • March 22, 2022
    ...of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate impact theory."). (258) See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) ("[I]n order to be actionable under the statute [Title VII],... [the] objectionable environment must be both objectively and s......
  • How Sexual Harassment Law Failed Its Feminist Roots
    • United States
    • Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law Nbr. XXII-1, October 2020
    • October 1, 2020
    ...denigrating conduct to which he subjected Harris, until he was explicitly told so. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. 52. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). See discussion of this case infra at notes 152– 53 and accompanying text. 53. Id. at 794. 54. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, ......
  • Walking a Tightrope: Employment Rights of Foreign Nationals in the Workplace
    • United States
    • Business and Society Review Nbr. 107-4, December 2002
    • December 1, 2002
    ...C.F.R. § 1606 (2001).8. Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131 (4thCir. 1995).9. Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).498 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 10. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).11. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT